[Wittrs] Re: On the Mechanism of Understanding
- From: kirby urner <kirby.urner@xxxxxxxxx>
- To: Wittrs@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
- Date: Wed, 12 Aug 2009 06:42:36 -0700
On Wed, Aug 12, 2009 at 6:09 AM, Stuart W. Mirsky<SWMirsky@xxxxxxx> wrote:
>
>
> Kirby wrote:
>
> . . . someone has a flash of insight, says "aha! now I get it" and yet
> manages to not follow the rule, didn't really get it after all. Observers
> have to say this someone doesn't get it.
>
> This notion some authors cited here have shared, that "understanding"
> is some "hidden process [in the brain]" i.e. points to some interior
> process, is simply not consistent with our manifest and evident use of
> that word. People understand all the time without pausing to reflect
> or have any specific experience.
>
> The tool "understand" is definitely caught up in the machinery with,
> is associated with "aha!" experiences, sub-vocalized reading etc., but
> to claim these time-bound experiences are "the meaning" of what it
> means to understand, is to misperceive what "meaning" means.
>
> My response:
>
> I think there's a misunderstanding here, at least insofar as I am among the
> commenters of whom Kirby is speaking, above. For instance, he suggests that
> "This notion that some authors cited here have shared, that 'understanding'
> is some 'hidden process [in the brain]' i.e. points to some interior
> process, is simply not consistent with our manifest and evident use of that
> word."
>
Hey thanks for responding. I think it was actually Hawkins I was
thinking of, but in a long quote from you (wasn't it?). That thing
about how one knows, reading a novel, that one understands it, e.g.
Robinson Crusoe doesn't have to wait until he gets of the island to
know he understood the twelve books washed ashore with him -- or at
least he maybe understood eleven of them, this 'Philosophical
Investigations' thing was maybe a stumper. He'll check in with some
others if he's ever rescued, maybe find out if he understood it at
all. He's especially intrigued by the "private language" stuff!
> Although I've made it a point to note that understanding in my own
> experience is not always accompanied by actions and is often solely
> internal, characterized, say, by a feeling of "getting it" which is also
> usually accompanied by various images, thoughts, etc., I have also been
> quite clear to note that I am not arguing that any PARTICULAR image,
> thought, etc., IS that understanding. What I've suggested is that knowing
> anything (and this includes understanding anything) seems to consist of a
> complex set of relationships reflected in various mental mappings by which
> we hold together pictures of different aspects of the world we experience.
> (See my moment of insight on the road through the Carolinas.)
>
I'd go further and saw "no picture at all" is often just as well, i.e.
"I understand the traffic laws of the state of Oregon" is sort of
tacitly assumed by the fact that I have a drivers license. I don't
only understand these laws when I'm thinking about them or driving my
car. People can say "Kirby understands the rules of the road in
Oregon" without pausing to consider what I might be reflecting on at
that moment. The grammar of "understand" is a lot more like that of
having a badge or award of some kind.
To take another example, I'll walk up to an elevator and simply use
it, punching buttons while yakking about something else. I understand
how to use an elevator, but there's nothing whatsoever I feel I need
to report about mental states or mental pictures or anything. I'm
actually thinking about a meeting I'm about to have.
There's really know time to reflect on all the stuff I understand as I
go through my day, yet understand I do.
Speaking of elevators, there's a new kind catching on with all the
buttons on the outside i.e. you commit to a floor before you get on.
Once on the elevator, no buttons inside. Wild eh?
> Any given individual's instance of understanding something will certainly be
> accompanied by understanding behavior when appropriate but, while it will
> not be identifiable with any single image or even the same image that others
> have, I want to say that it looks to me like we make a lot of connections in
... or any image at all mind you, let's not anchor understanding to
any ghostly or interior process, *not* because it's somehow illegal or
irrelevant to mention such things (as I've already said, those "aha!"
moments enter into it) but because the grammar evidently (on the face
of it) follows a different pattern.
If you read a lot of political stuff, you'll see propositions like
"UNDP failed to grasp the implications of these funding changes and
continued its spending spree" i.e. we easily involve corporations,
NGOs, agencies in the grammar of "understanding" ("failing to grasp"
is a kind of misunderstanding). You might say "oh no, I'm talking
only about what humans do, not agencies" but that's to simply slice
away a big piece of the grammar and our goal is not to twist the
meaning of "understand" but to accept standard usage and investigate
accordingly.
> our networked map-pictures (which constitute a level of representing -- a
> nod here to Gerardo) and that it is the rough connections, types of
> linkings, etc., that are the internal experience of understanding something.
Not everyone is so navel-gazey about this stuff. Introspective types,
always fascinated by their interior processes as we call them, are
probably not the most qualified to investigate meanings per
Wittgenstein's philo. The PI is always taking us out of these first
person scenarios and reminding us of when *other people* get to say we
understand or not -- and they *do* get to, i.e. it's grammatically
correct to say stuff like: "I don't care about your process, I just
want to know if you understand or not, and for that, I don't need to
give a fig about your 'mental life' as that's entirely irrelevant to
my making my assessment" (that might be a driving instructor).
Indeed, you'll get these defensive people who, when you tell them they
don't understand something, like to fall back on lengthy descriptions
of some mental process that led them to conclude thus and so. Who
cares really? They don't understand, nuff said.
> In keeping with Edelman's point about memory, I would suggest that when we
> share understandings with others it isn't because we have the exact same
> linked representations, the same map connectors in play but, rather that
> there is enough similarity for each to understand the other (even if
> particular mental images differ as they very likely to).
>
I can't think of any mental images that'd be important to "prove" I
understand the rules of the road in Oregon. I can play a "mental
YouTube" of me stopping at a red light, putting out a flare when
broken down, signalling before turning, but these all seem gratuitous
and beside the point, to you as well I would suppose. Like, who cares
what I imagine? This is about understanding, not what I'm imagining
-- distinct concepts with different grammars.
We don't say: she's sleeping now, so for the next few hours she has
no understanding of politics or driving a car. How peculiar and
strange that would sound, really goes against the way we use the word
"understanding". Anyone talking in such a bizarre fashion is likely a
philosopher or AI guy of some kind (a euphemism for "vaguely retarded"
in some circles).
> Edelman's point that human memory is rough, approximate, constantly
> changing, unlike computer memory, and that it thus operates differently than
> computer memory does, seems to me to be key here. Understanding, which
> certainly relies on the memory function, is imprecise and fuzzy in the same
> way. This explains a lot, including our frequent uncertainty about what
> others mean, the difficulties inherent in translating between languages and
> our own shifting grasps of things. Understanding is like shooting at a
> moving target though, as we know in the world outside ourselves, such
> targets are often successfully hit and some of us are better than others at
> doing so. Moreover, despite inherent capacities, our skills level can often
> be improved by practice and dedication.
I don't think Edelman's focus on memory is especially explanatory w/r
to "understanding". He's drawing us back to thinking the meaning of
"understanding" is some first person ghostly process we can introspect
about and point to with our mind's eye. That's so not helpful.
Introverts who endlessly obsesses about their interior life shouldn't
be allowed to drive a Wittgensteinian car as they'll just hit the
first tree they come to. They won't understand.
Kirby
> SWM
>
>
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