[Wittrs] How to Verify Wittgenstein
- From: Sean Wilson <whoooo26505@xxxxxxxxx>
- To: wittrs@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
- Date: Wed, 30 Sep 2009 19:43:18 -0700 (PDT)
(reply to Bruce)
... one would first have to know what an empirical discovery of such a thing or
its opposite would have to look like. It seems to lead to one of two
directions. It might go into "possible-world talk," which itself seems far
more speculative. Or it will take the form, "the MRI looks like this, and I
have a theory about what this means." I'm not sure why this latter claim
wouldn't be subject to the same sort of objection.
Here is what I want to say: what needs to be seen?
What he is saying is that thought is sentential. That's his point. That the
flow or structure of thought is language-like. You don't need an empirical
account of anything here, because it is given to you as a therapy, not
as journalism. If you would dispute the premise (idea), the goal would be to
see what you meant -- to see whether your grammar might be knotted up. This is
exactly what Philosophical Investigations is doing. It's Wittgenstein showing
you how to philosophize.
Imagine someone saying, "when I think in language, there is more than the
meaning of words in my mind. There is extra meaning." One would not say: where
is the empiricism for that? Where's your proof? One would want to know two
simple things: (1) is there a clinical problem (in which case real therapy
might be needed); or (2) is there confusion in the grammar of the
expression. You might say, "give an example." And an exchange would ensue that
allowed you to completely investigate how this "extra mind meaning" played in
the person's lexicon (grammar). After you figured out exactly the assertability
conditions, you would then "conjugate" the matter by relating it to the
same sort of thing that you express for that. "Oh you mean 'anticipation.'
Well, even that is sentential too, -- no?"
Of course, if your form of life was different, you could not relate to it. (How
do I know what a Lion says ...). If it were, you would be able to acquire some
sense of it (assuming at least equal degree of sophistication). Given the way
minds are, the sense that you would acquire would either be poor or
sophisticated. You know that immediately. And if you were especially
sophisticated -- if you could see deeply into ideas and into thoughts -- you
probably would find many of the expressions of others to be either ordinary or
confused. You would rarely find something contemplative from another's
utterances where you had received the therapeutic benefit.
Regards and thanks
Dr. Sean Wilson, Esq.
Assistant Professor
Wright State University
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