[rollei_list] Re: OT - The Concorde
- From: Jerry Lehrer <jerryleh@xxxxxxxxxxx>
- To: rollei_list@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
- Date: Fri, 22 Apr 2005 10:13:59 -0700
David,
I am intimately familiar with the politics and engineering of the 707, KC-135
and the DC-8 series, having worked for their nacelle and pylon supplier
Rohr, (now Goodrich Aerospace) I am happy NOT to have worked on
their competition, Convair's 880 and 990. Also known as Howard Hughes'
Folly!
Jerry
David Seifert wrote:
> Eric Goldstein wrote:
>
> >Convensional wisdom is that it was a bit of trickery on the part of PanAm
> >that convinced Boeing to develop the first high capacity high altitude
> >passenger jet. Marc's history regarding the Dash-80 is interesting...
> >
> >
> >Eric Goldstein
> >
> >
> >
>
> The biggest problem with conventional wisdom, is that it is so
> frequently wrong. The history of the development of the
> 367-80/707/KC135 is a very interesting and has many twists and turns.
> The 367-80 designation was chosen by Boeing to throw the competition off
> the track. Model 367 was a large piston driven B-29 derived commercial
> aircraft known as the Stratocruiser. Boeing built the Dash 80 as a
> demonstrator, not a prototype. It was designed in secret and built
> entirely on company money. Boeing bet to company on the project. As an
> aside, Boeing would do the same thing (bet the company on a big idea)
> in the late 60's with the 747 program. The purpose of the demonstration
> was to get a piece of an anticipated USAF contract for a jet tanker.
> The newly developed practice of mid-air refueling long range jet
> bombers had shown that piston driven tankers required the jet bombers to
> slow to near stall speeds. Upon demonstration the Dash 80 was
> acknowledged as largely meeting the USAF needs but the internal politics
> were wrong for Boeing. The Air Force really wanted to buy a plane that
> Lockheed was proposing but could not deliver for a while. The Air Force
> ordered a small number (29 to be precise) of Dash 80 derived KC135s from
> Boeing but intended to buy a much larger number of the preferred
> Lockheed plane. I mention that the KC135 was a derivative of the Dash
> 80. The Air Force required that the KC135 have a larger fuselage cross
> section than the Dash 80 which required quite a bit of redesign. An
> interesting thing is that the KC135 had a circular cross section where
> the 707 is bi-lobal. They really were not the same aircraft. In the
> fullness of time the Air Force changed their mind about the Lockheed
> aircraft. My guess is that the "Senator from Boeing" Henry "Scoop"
> Jackson had something to do with it although there can be no doubt that
> the KC135 was a near perfect plane for the job.
>
> The development of the 707 followed a similar pattern. The initial 707
> design was close but not quite what the airlines really needed. Pan Am
> bought a small number of the 707-120 for initial service but planned to
> buy a much larger number of the yet to be delivered DC-8. Seeing that
> the 707-120 needed to be larger Boeing went about creating the 707-320
> Intercontinental. The stretch required a new wing design and
> consequently is really a whole new plane. The 707-320 is the model that
> was produced in large volumes and the plane we think of when we say
> "Boeing 707." Douglas had the benefit of watching what Boeing was doing
> and learned from the mistakes and as a consequence the first DC-8 was a
> much more durable design.
>
> Marc is correct in that without the initial KC135 contract Boeing would
> not have had the resources to have spun-out the 707 series.
>
> Most of this information was covered in a one hour documentary of the
> Dash-80 originally shown several years ago on the Discovery Wings channel.
>
> Jerry, first flight of Dash 80 was July, 1954. First KC-135 flight was
> August 1956. Initial USAF purchase contract issued in 1954. First
> 707-120 flight December 1957.
>
> Sources: Boeing, NASA and Airliners.net websites
>
> Ardeshir, with respect to your suspicions about BA and AF claims that
> Concorde operations were unprofitable, I point out that your assumption
> about actual fares paid per passenger is wrong. The price a handful of
> celebrities paid to be on the last flight is not reflective of the
> actual fares charged during revenue service. Large numbers of seats
> were sold to Cunard as part of QE2/Concorde packages. These were
> regularly scheduled flights not charters like the ill-fated AF flight.
> BA routinely offered Concorde seats as an even swap for full-fare first
> class sub-sonic seats on a space available basis. Also, your dates for
> revenue service are wrong. The Concorde first flight was, indeed, in
> 1969 but final approval for operations between JFK and LHR was not
> achieved until 1976 when revenue operations began. This changes your
> depreciation numbers quite a bit.
>
> David
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