[lit-ideas] Re: untestable proposition of the day
- From: Donal McEvoy <donalmcevoyuk@xxxxxxxxxxx>
- To: lit-ideas@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
- Date: Sun, 21 Aug 2005 18:28:24 +0100 (BST)
--- Eric Yost <mr.eric.yost@xxxxxxxxx> wrote:
>> The untestable proposition of the day, indeed any day, is surely
> that whatever proposition we make as to the line demarcating what is
> testable from what is not testable is itself untestable in the sense
>> of whatever demarcation is proposed.
>
> ___
>
> Can we test that the untestable is the suggestion of untestability
> by the very nature of what it asserts about testing?
This formulation is none too clear to me: how can "the untestable" be merely
"the suggestion of untestability"? Is the insoluble merely "the suggestion of
insolubility" (what does this mean)? Taken at face value this is like saying
the instance of a general concept is the suggestion of that general concept,
so that "the untestable" - being an instance of the concept of untestability
- is also "the suggestion" of the general concept of which it is an instance.
I don't see how this is helpful or importantly true.
There are at least three issues raised by the question.
A. Is any demarcation criterion between the testable and the untestable
itself untestable?
B. Is the claim/proposition that such a criterion is untestable (or,
alternatively, testable) itself untestable?
C. Are the answers to these questions true by some kind of necessity or are
they contingent?
Strictly the question only raises B. But if the answer to A is yes it might
be said that the answer to B must be yes also, and if the the answer is no to
A it must be no to B: since 'p is testable' arguably implies 'the claim 'p is
testable' is testable', much as 'p' implies 'p is true'. But this argument is
perhaps open to the objection that it confuses the testability of p with the
testability of a statement saying that 'p is testable'. Leaving this aside,
we might just discuss whether A is to be answered with a yes.
The Popperian answer is that it is. Two examples:- the verificationist
doctrine of testability, according to which what is testable is what is
verifiable by observation, is not itself verifiable by observation. Second,
the Popperian falsificationist doctrine of testability, according to which
what is testable is what is falsifiable by observation, is not itself
falsifiable by observation. This is because neither doctrine specifies a
class of test/observation statements that would, respectively, verify or
falsify itself; nor, equally, can any such doctrine be derived or deduced
from the class of observation-statements - that is, the class of statements
that might, respectively, be verified or falsified by observation.
It is an illusion, though perhaps an attractive one, to think that the
verification of a statement by observation would show a verificationist
doctrine of testability to be verified/testable; or to think that the
falsification of a statement by test-observation would show a
falsificationist doctrine of testability to be itself testable.
Even if the practice of science may pertain to our evaluation of the worth of
any such doctrine (in so far, for example, as it illuminates scientific
practice), such doctrines are meta-science rather than science: they are not
testable statements of science. They are proposals, normative rather than
simply descriptive.
In passing it should be noted that because the verficationist criterion of
testability was also a criterion of meaning, it was, according to itself,
meaningless. But Popper's falsificationist criterion of testability was not a
criterion of meaning also, and so its untestability does not make it
meaningless according to itself.
>Is there an
> ontological discontinuity between the testable and the untestable,
> or does the testable slowly, and by imperceptible degrees, merge
> with the untestable in a way we cannot test?
In other words, is the difference between what is testable and what is not
testable an "ontological" difference?
Popper would avoid saying so for a number of reasons, including that the use
of the term "ontological" here is a kind of philosopher's talk that is more
liable to create darkness than light. He would prefer to say the difference
is logical: it is a difference based on the different logical status of
statements testable by observation from those that are not.
It is possible to take this view and yet accept that 1. there are degrees of
testability 2. there is a spectrum ranging from the clearly testable to the
clearly untestable 3. there are always borderline statements or statements
whose logical status as regards their testability may need further
clarification. This means the second aspect of your question is not in the
logical alternative to the first part - the question does not raise a genuine
either/or dilemma.
Popper does not think any such border is 'given' in any natural sense but
that it is to be mapped by examining the statement in the light of the
current discussion and the methodological conventions we adopt. Whether a
statement is to be properly regarded as testable or not does not depend on
its logical form or even the 'normal' meaning of the terms used but depends
on examining the method by which the statement is defended. Thus "All swans
are white" might be treated/defended as an (untestable) definition or,
alternatively, as a testable, falsifiable empirical claim: which it is for
the purposes of any discussion can only be decided by how it is treated
within that discussion.
It should be emphasised that though this means that the application of a
falsificationist criterion is, in this way, relative to the way statements
are defended in discussion, this is not to imply that any decision whether in
a given discussion a statement is testable is therefore a merely relativist
or subjective decision rather than a decision that can be objectively
evaluated (by further critical discussion if need be).
Hope this helps disperse some of the fog.
Best,
Donal
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