[lit-ideas] : lw.5

From: palma <palmaadriano@xxxxxxxxx>
To: "lit-ideas@xxxxxxxxxxxxx" <lit-ideas@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Date: Fri, 9 May 2014 07:32:29 +0200
in spite of all the laughable dust, there are four, to my knowledge,
theories of how names name, Fregean and variants, Millian, marcus, Kripke,
Katz. In any presentation of a theory the claim is made that it does not
say the "non sayable" namely that the "naming relation" is non expressible.
compare and contrast. would wittgenstein ot the followrs tell me what is
wrong with this:

THE NAME GOD PICKS THE UNIQUELY OMNIPRESENT ETERNAL OMNIPOTENT CREATOR OF
ANYTHING ELSE


the namng "relation" holds between an entity and a term. for those who opt
for the view that there are no gods the relation has one relatum empty so
it conceivable that it is not satisfied by anything.
Now, did that explain the relation or what else is needed?


On Thu, May 8, 2014 at 6:31 PM, Donal McEvoy <donalmcevoyuk@xxxxxxxxxxx>wrote:

>
> >3. We are now challenged to disprove the thesis by saying things in
> language which we are told in advance are unsayable, even though we have no
> idea what such things might be.
>
> 4. In such form, the challenge obviously cannot be met, so 1. and 2. are
> taken as proven.>
>
> At to 4, no: if W is right, his POV can only be shown - it cannot be
> proved, still less expressed (though we may use expressions to show it).
>
> As to 3, no: the challenge is to give an account that explains how names
> name - it is left open whether this can be done, even though W's position
> is that it cannot. No question is begged: and it is assumed that, if such
> an account can be given, it will not be "saying" the "unsayable" but rather
> showing that what W thinks is unsayable can in fact be said.
>
> JLS' post might allude to the view that 'Fido' names the dog Fido if it is
> used as a name of Fido: but this does not *explain* *how *'Fido' names
> Fido (it no more does this than saying "'The snow is white' is true iff the
> snow is white" *explains how* the linguistic statement can refer to a
> non-linguistic reality). To give examples where names name is not to give
> an explanation of the naming-relation but merely to illustrate it: what the
> challenge asks is to provide an explanation so that the relation is
> captured in language, perhaps by way of some "theory" or "criterion" by
> which we can determine that a word is being used as a name and not
> otherwise.*
>
>
> Dnl
> Ldn
> *Consider the difference between a dog owner uttering 'Fido' when (a)
> asked the name of his dog (b) shouting at Fido - (b) is not a use of 'Fido'
> to *name* Fido in the same sense as (a), or perhaps at all (and even in
> (a) 'Fido' may *report *Fido's name rather than 'name' Fido in some other
> sense, as when (c) the Queen *names* a ship 'Fido').
>    On Thursday, 8 May 2014, 13:05, palma <palmaadriano@xxxxxxxxx> wrote:
>
>
>
>
>
>  wittgenstein was confused in a rather benign way.
>  in his view a statement of the form "king Leonidas is brave" is not
> 'saying' anything since it fails to be a representation/proposition of a
> fact (the traditional cretinism of thinking that the abstract is not
> representable coupled with crappy early behaviorism is the key to
> understand the view, hence "KL died defending the Thermooilis" is a
> representation of the fact that KL's heart stopped beating at xx time of
> the yy etc.) In flurry of rhet
> h
> orics the statements shows either something about what the speaker th
> ought of 
> the king, or what hearer is supposed to "grasp" etc. it does not say
> anything because the limits of what is said/effable are within the same
> limit of the logical sace, minus contradictions and the negation of
> contradictions.
> ought 
>
>  The twist that LW introduced is to add that something like "317 is
> prime" is equally not 'saying anything', for the somewhat more
> sophisticated reason that the quoted claim is tautological, if you believe
> his theory of numbers, & being tautological it fails to 'exclude' any state
> of affairs actual or possible.
>  it "shows" that 317 is prime, it cannot say it for the reason above.
>  how far one wishes to push such discussion is completely up to the dogma
> that what Wittgenstein said is Talmudically understood, hence it is 'true'
> in some sense or other, the rest is interpretation.
>
>
>
>
> On Wed, May 7, 2014 at 11:34 PM, Omar Kusturica <omarkusto@xxxxxxxxx>wrote:
>
>  I don't see what there is about the say-distinction that cannot be said
> but only shown. "Statements say and pictures show" is a statement, not a
> picture. It is not something unsayable in our language either, instead it
> is a platitude. Now, is true that pictures can also 'say' in a way, and
> statements can also 'show', in a way. But I cannot see statements that
> 'show but do not say', any more than I can understand pictures that 'say
> but do not show.' I conclude that Wittgenstein had a few too much to drink
> when he wrote that, and Donal had a few much too much when he paraphras29
> rue d'Ulm
>
> f-75005 paris france
>
>
>
>
> --
> palma,  e TheKwini, KZN
>
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>  palma
>
> cell phone is 0762362391
>
>
>
>  *only when in Europe*:
> inst. J. Nicod
> 29 rue d'Ulm
> f-75005 paris france
>
>
>
>


-- 
palma,  e TheKwini, KZN












 palma

cell phone is 0762362391




 *only when in Europe*:

inst. J. Nicod

29 rue d'Ulm

f-75005 paris france
[lit-ideas] : lw.5

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