[lit-ideas] Re: lw
- From: "Walter C. Okshevsky" <wokshevs@xxxxxx>
- To: lit-ideas@xxxxxxxxxxxxx, Omar Kusturica <omarkusto@xxxxxxxxx>
- Date: Thu, 8 May 2014 20:08:54 -0230
I have 2 children. In both cases, whenever I tried to teach them the meaning of
a word by pointing, they would look from my finger up my arm to my shoulder.
Today, one is a successful veterinarian, the other, a lion tamer with Cirque de
Soleil.
Cheers, Walter
Quoting Omar Kusturica <omarkusto@xxxxxxxxx>:
> Okay, I acknowledge that the Investigations does not say that language is
> never ever learned or taught by pointing at stuff, only that it is a
> simplistic and incomplete account. This wasn't exactly the main point of
> contention, I mentioned it because it seems to be the account of language
> learning and use largely assumed in The Tractatus, and later at last
> partially rejected in the PI.
>
> Now, I don't have kids, so I would ask those of yous who are parents and
> grandparents whether you often used pointing at things to teach your kids /
> grand-kids the first language.
>
> O.K.
>
>
> On Thu, May 8, 2014 at 11:53 PM, Donal McEvoy
> <donalmcevoyuk@xxxxxxxxxxx>wrote:
>
> >
> > >The theory that language is learned by pointing at things is attacked in
> > the Investigations. (The poor Augustine is made the culprit for it.)>
> >
> > What theory? Investigations may (rightly) reject any idea that the mere
> > act of pointing itself conveys the necessary sense (for what the pointing
> > seeks to convey cannot be determined by the mere act of pointing) - and so
> > "pointing at things" cannot be sufficient to teach the requisite sense
> > (e.g. that "table" is a name). But where does Investigations suggest that
> > "pointing at things" plays no role in our learning language (i.e. that we
> > never learn a noun, like "table", via any "pointing at things")? Nowhere.
> > On the contrary "pointing at things" is one of many tools used in teaching
> > and learning language.
> >
> > A great deal of interpretative voodoo has been written about
> > Investigations and then passed off as if this secondhand account is
> > Wittgenstein's account.
> >
> > It is true that Investigations is against the idea that language is
> > learnt merely by pointing at things (a "merely" not stated in Omar's
> > contention), but equally it is false to say Investigations attacks the
> > idea that "pointing at things" may be involved (indeed importantly
> > involved) in learning a language.
> >
> > Wittgenstein's fundamental point about the Augustinian picture of learning
> > names is not that it is false but that we should not be mislead that this
> > "picture" captures in language the naming-relation. The "picture" makes
> > sense as a picture of how we learn names because we already understand
> > the naming-relation and interpret the "picture" in that light (and
> > because we have been shown names in ways that appear to correspond to the
> > "picture"): but a creature with no understanding of a naming-relation
> would
> > not necessarily have the naming-relation conveyed to them by the
> > Augustinian picture, and a creature that only learnt a very different
> sense
> > of a word via "pointing at things" might interpret the "pointing at
> things"
> > in Augustine's "picture" as showing that very different sense (and not as
> > conveying the sense of words as names) - i.e. the "picture" does not say
> > the sense of the naming-relation, although it may show that
> > naming-relation to a user of language who understands how the
> > naming-relation may be shown as Augustine pictures.
> >
> > Donal
> > On Thursday, 8 May 2014, 20:02, Omar Kusturica <omarkusto@xxxxxxxxx>
> > wrote:
> > That was to be: (the aforementioned) "were saying intelligible though
> > not necessarily true things about language in language." (I didn't mean to
> > suggest that they the things they were saying were tautologies.)
> >
> > O.K.
> >
> >
> > On Thu, May 8, 2014 at 8:57 PM, Omar Kusturica <omarkusto@xxxxxxxxx>wrote:
> >
> > As I understand, it is being argued that such terms as 'meaning' or
> > 'reference' cannot be explained in language since they are about language,
> > and language cannot be used self-referentially. What do we 'show', then,
> to
> > explain to someone the meaning of 'meaning' ? Honestly I have no idea. If
> I
> > needed to teach someone whose first language is other than English the
> > meaning of 'the word 'meaning', I am pretty sure that the last thing I
> > would try would be to draw something on the board. If I cannot translate
> it
> > into his native language, I would have to use explanations, examples etc.
> > drawn from (English) language.
> >
> > The theory that language is learned by pointing at things is attacked in
> > the Investigations. (The poor Augustine is made the culprit for it.)
> >
> > The notion that language cannot be used self-referentially strikes me as
> > clearly false. Consider the following:
> >
> > This sentence is short.
> >
> > I would think that this is a perfectly intelligible (and true)
> > self-referential statement. In fact, we do use language to talk about
> > language very often, and at least some of the time intelligibly. People
> > like Russell, Putnam, Kripke and others have all said intelligible (though
> > necessarily true) things about language in language.
> >
> > O.K.
> >
> >
> > On Thu, May 8, 2014 at 6:31 PM, Donal McEvoy
> <donalmcevoyuk@xxxxxxxxxxx>wrote:
> >
> >
> > >3. We are now challenged to disprove the thesis by saying things in
> > language which we are told in advance are unsayable, even though we have
> no
> > idea what such things might be.
> >
> > 4. In such form, the challenge obviously cannot be met, so 1. and 2. are
> > taken as proven.>
> >
> > At to 4, no: if W is right, his POV can only be shown - it cannot be
> > proved, still less expressed (though we may use expressions to show it).
> >
> > As to 3, no: the challenge is to give an account that explains how names
> > name - it is left open whether this can be done, even though W's position
> > is that it cannot. No question is begged: and it is assumed that, if such
> > an account can be given, it will not be "saying" the "unsayable" but
> rather
> > showing that what W thinks is unsayable can in fact be said.
> >
> > JLS' post might allude to the view that 'Fido' names the dog Fido if it is
> > used as a name of Fido: but this does not *explain* *how *'Fido' names
> > Fido (it no more does this than saying "'The snow is white' is true iff
> the
> > snow is white" *explains how* the linguistic statement can refer to a
> > non-linguistic reality). To give examples where names name is not to give
> > an explanation of the naming-relation but merely to illustrate it: what
> the
> > challenge asks is to provide an explanation so that the relation is
> > captured in language, perhaps by way of some "theory" or "criterion" by
> > which we can determine that a word is being used as a name and not
> > otherwise.*
> >
> >
> > Dnl
> > Ldn
> > *Consider the difference between a dog owner uttering 'Fido' when (a)
> > asked the name of his dog (b) shouting at Fido - (b) is not a use of
> 'Fido'
> > to *name* Fido in the same sense as (a), or perhaps at all (and even in
> > (a) 'Fido' may *report *Fido's name rather than 'name' Fido in some other
> > sense, as when (c) the Queen *names* a ship 'Fido').
> > On Thursday, 8 May 2014, 13:05, palma <palmaadriano@xxxxxxxxx> wrote:
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> > âwittgenstein was confused in a rather benign way.
> > in his view a statement of the form "king Leonidas is brave" is not
> > 'saying' anything since it fails to be a representation/proposition of a
> > fact (the traditional cretinism of thinking that the abstract is not
> > representable coupled with crappy early behaviorism is the key to
> > understand the view, hence "KL died defending the Thermooilis" is a
> > representation of the fact that KL's heart stopped beating at xx time of
> > the yy etc.â) In flurry of rhet
> > âhâ
> > orics the statements shows either something about what the speaker th
> > âought of â
> > the king, or what hearer is supposed to "grasp" etc. it does not say
> > anything because the limits of what is said/effable are within the same
> > limit of the logical sace, minus contradictions and the negation of
> > contradictions.
> > âought â
> >
> > The twist that LW introduced is to add that something like "317 is
> > prime" is equally not 'saying anything', for the somewhat more
> > sophisticated reason that the quoted claim is tautological, if you believe
> > his theory of numbers, & being tautological it fails to 'exclude' any
> state
> > of affairs actual or possible.
> > it "shows" that 317 is prime, it cannot say it for the reason above.
> > how far one wishes to push such discussion is completely up to the dogma
> > that what Wittgenstein said is Talmudically understood, hence it is 'true'
> > in some sense or other, the rest is interpretation.
> >
> >
> >
> >
> > On Wed, May 7, 2014 at 11:34 PM, Omar Kusturica
> <omarkusto@xxxxxxxxx>wrote:
> >
> > I don't see what there is about the say-distinction that cannot be said
> > but only shown. "Statements say and pictures show" is a statement, not a
> > picture. It is not something unsayable in our language either, instead it
> > is a platitude. Now, is true that pictures can also 'say' in a way, and
> > statements can also 'show', in a way. But I cannot see statements that
> > 'show but do not say', any more than I can understand pictures that 'say
> > but do not show.' I conclude that Wittgenstein had a few too much to drink
> > when he wrote that, and Donal had a few much too much when he paraphras29
> > rue d'Ulm
> >
> > f-75005 paris france
> >
> >
> >
> >
> > --
> > palma, e TheKwini, KZN
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> > palma
> >
> > cell phone is 0762362391
> >
> >
> >
> > *only when in Europe*:
> > inst. J. Nicod
> > 29 rue d'Ulm
> > f-75005 paris france
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
>
------------------------------------------------------------------
To change your Lit-Ideas settings (subscribe/unsub, vacation on/off,
digest on/off), visit www.andreas.com/faq-lit-ideas.html
Other related posts:
