[lit-ideas] Re: [lit-ideas]
- From: John McCreery <john.mccreery@xxxxxxxxx>
- To: "lit-ideas@xxxxxxxxxxxxx" <lit-ideas@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Date: Mon, 2 Feb 2015 07:47:42 +0900
Korean chopsticks# and matzo balls at ten paces.
#The slippery metal ones. Anyone who can toss matzo balls with them must know
the ultimate mysteries.
Sent from my iPhone
> On Feb 2, 2015, at 12:30 AM, Omar Kusturica <omarkusto@xxxxxxxxx> wrote:
>
> I propose that the matter be resolved with knives.
>
> O.K.
>
>> On Sun, Feb 1, 2015 at 2:38 PM, palma <palmaadriano@xxxxxxxxx> wrote:
>> sauf a cause de...
>> save for case assignment, nobody can be avec 'tu' in french
>>
>> bestest
>>
>>> On Sun, Feb 1, 2015 at 3:35 PM, John McCreery <john.mccreery@xxxxxxxxx>
>>> wrote:
>>> ありがとうございます。Mercy buckets, as my grandma used to say.
>>>
>>> Sent from my iPhone
>>>
>>>> On Feb 1, 2015, at 4:50 PM, Julie Campbell <juliereneb@xxxxxxxxx> wrote:
>>>>
>>>> Je suis avec tu, John.
>>>>
>>>>> On Saturday, January 31, 2015, John McCreery <john.mccreery@xxxxxxxxx>
>>>>> wrote:
>>>>> 我不懂你的意思。你可以用普通话说明吗？ 我不知道你的方言。
>>>>>
>>>>> 马
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> Sent from my iPad
>>>>>
>>>>>> On 2015/01/31, at 18:54, Adriano Palma <Palma@xxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Par excellence mon ami basho sait comment rigoler avec les savants.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Comme d’habitude avec la sottiserie mediatique
>>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> From: lit-ideas-bounce@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
>>>>>> [mailto:lit-ideas-bounce@xxxxxxxxxxxxx] On Behalf Of John McCreery
>>>>>> Sent: 31 January 2015 11:35
>>>>>> To: Lit-Ideas
>>>>>> Subject: [lit-ideas] Re: [lit-ideas]
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Have never noticed that your comments are more meaningful than the
>>>>>> barking of a mad dog. Tit for tat, you know. Adieu.
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> John
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> On Sat, Jan 31, 2015 at 4:17 PM, Adriano Palma <Palma@xxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Fail to see the points. The idea of body is a senile idiocy of common
>>>>>> sense, likewise the embodiment etc.
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> From: lit-ideas-bounce@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
>>>>>> [mailto:lit-ideas-bounce@xxxxxxxxxxxxx] On Behalf Of John McCreery
>>>>>> Sent: 31 January 2015 02:16
>>>>>> To: lit-ideas@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
>>>>>> Subject: [lit-ideas] Re: The location of location
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> One modern view says that the problem in question is a non-question
>>>>>> because, so far as anyone can actually see, knowledge is always
>>>>>> embodied. Why do we imagine objects embedded in space-time? The answer
>>>>>> is straightforward. Our bodies are so constructed that a limited set of
>>>>>> options, up or down, front or back, left or right, determine how we
>>>>>> naturally think about things. We can force ourselves to imagine worlds
>>>>>> with 1, 2, 4 or 11 dimensions -- mathematicians and physicists do it all
>>>>>> the time. But this is a matter of tweaking or extrapolating from our
>>>>>> usual three-dimensional way of describing the location of things. That
>>>>>> may, if current physics is right, be only a crude approximation of the
>>>>>> way the universe is. (The "11" mentioned above is borrowed from science
>>>>>> news descriptions of the number of dimensions required to account for
>>>>>> the behavior of elementary particles if they work in the ways that
>>>>>> current physics say they do.) It may be of historical interest to wonder
>>>>>> how Descartes (or others reading Descartes) dealt with a problem created
>>>>>> by his ontology. But, given that the ontology in question is pretty much
>>>>>> defunct, the issue is of only historical interest.
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Just saying,
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> John
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Sent from my iPad
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> On 2015/01/31, at 3:03, Omar Kusturica <omarkusto@xxxxxxxxx> wrote:
>>>>>>
>>>>>> It would surely be contradictory on my part to argue that mind and
>>>>>> knowledge exist in time, and also to argue that they don't exist. :) The
>>>>>> observation that they exist in time clearly entails that they exist in
>>>>>> some sense, the question is how to make sense of that sense. It *might*
>>>>>> not necessarily be separate from the physical, but it might also be.
>>>>>> Also, integrating mind and matter is compatible with some versions of
>>>>>> idealism just as it is compatible with some forms of materialism.
>>>>>> (Although radical idealism seems to have little credibility nowadays,
>>>>>> while radical materialism has some credibility.) I certainly don't
>>>>>> aspire to provide answers to all these Questions here, or probably
>>>>>> anywhere.
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> O.K.
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> On Fri, Jan 30, 2015 at 6:22 PM, Donal McEvoy
>>>>>> <donalmcevoyuk@xxxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
>>>>>>
>>>>>> >Locating W1 objects within W1 is far more problematic that it might
>>>>>> >seem>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> The problem I had in mind was not finding keys when you need them, but,
>>>>>> for example, the problem of explaining how/why W1 objects (that are
>>>>>> extended in Descartes' sense) are located within space/time (that is
>>>>>> unextended in Descartes' sense)? How can an extended object be located
>>>>>> within a field that lacks extension (bearing in mind it is simply a
>>>>>> hypostasization to treat space and time as if they are 'extended' by
>>>>>> referring to them in measurable terms so that it appears they have
>>>>>> varieties of size; and even if it is true that they may be measured in
>>>>>> size, that does not make them extended in Descartes' sense)? [Compare:
>>>>>> how can an 'unextended' force like gravity affect an extended physical
>>>>>> object, even one the size of a sun?]
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> We might suggest the problem of explaining how extended W1 'objects' can
>>>>>> exist in unextended space/time is at least as problematic as the problem
>>>>>> of explaining how W2 or W3 'objects' stand in relation to space/time.
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> These kinds of question cannot properly be left only to philosophers,
>>>>>> particularly philosophers without sound understanding of science - they
>>>>>> need to be approached taking into close account what we may conjecture
>>>>>> about these things in the light of our best contemporary theories in
>>>>>> physics.
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Popper would stress that we lack anything like an ultimate explanation
>>>>>> for these things - for example, we lack anything like an ultimate
>>>>>> explanation for how or why W1 objects are located within space/time. It
>>>>>> may be that contemporary physics will be overthrown before we have a
>>>>>> better approach to such questions - e.g. that the relations between
>>>>>> space/time and W1 objects will be theorised to be quite different to how
>>>>>> they might be taken to be in the light of our present physics (itself a
>>>>>> difficult and controversial question).
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Popper would also argue that ultimate explanations shall never be
>>>>>> achieved in this area - though we may make better or worse guesses in
>>>>>> the light of our evolving scientific knowledge.
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> This may help indicate why facing the difficulties of locating W1
>>>>>> objects within W1 is therefore a fair starting-point before facing the
>>>>>> admitted difficulties of locating W2 and W3 content in relation to
>>>>>> space/time and in relation to W1.
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Certainly taking this as a starting-point may dampen the impulse to
>>>>>> doubt the existence of autonomous W2 and W3 content (and its downward
>>>>>> affects on W1) because of these 'location' difficulties - given that we
>>>>>> do not similarly and impulsively conclude that W1 objects and space/time
>>>>>> do not exist simply because there are difficulties in explaining how
>>>>>> they relate to one another.
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Dnl
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Ldn
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> On Friday, 30 January 2015, 13:37, Donal McEvoy
>>>>>> <donalmcevoyuk@xxxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> >If something changes over time - as both mind and knowledge do - then
>>>>>> >it exists in time. It shouldn't even be necessary to make such an
>>>>>> >obvious point.>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> While trying to work out something more substantial on these issues of
>>>>>> 'location', I note that, in Popper's conception, W3 is not "timeless" a
>>>>>> la Plato but has a history - and so W3 content would apparently exist in
>>>>>> time. Likewise the succession of thoughts in W2 would seem to imply that
>>>>>> W2 content also exists in time.
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> I should also add that Popper, unlike Kant, is a realist as to time and
>>>>>> change - and has indeed asserted that the reality of time and change are
>>>>>> the crux of realism.
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> But my own workings out began by reflecting on the location of W1
>>>>>> objects within W1 - and particularly within space and time where these
>>>>>> are conceived as dimensions of W1. Locating W1 objects within W1 is far
>>>>>> more problematic that it might seem - and it seems to me these problems
>>>>>> should be addressed first if we are to keep in proper perspective the
>>>>>> admitted problems of localising W2 and W3 content.
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Dnl
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> On Thursday, 29 January 2015, 16:34, Omar Kusturica
>>>>>> <omarkusto@xxxxxxxxx> wrote:
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> If something changes over time - as both mind and knowledge do - then it
>>>>>> exists in time. It shouldn't even be necessary to make such an obvious
>>>>>> point.
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Descartes' mind is obviously burdened with left-overs from Christian
>>>>>> soul, which is supposed to be eternal.
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> O.K.
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> On Thu, Jan 29, 2015 at 1:27 PM, Redacted sender Jlsperanza@xxxxxxx for
>>>>>> DMARC <dmarc-noreply@xxxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
>>>>>>
>>>>>> In a message dated 1/26/2015 2:08:03 P.M. Eastern Standard Time,
>>>>>> donalmcevoyuk@xxxxxxxxxxx writes:
>>>>>> I agree it would appear contradictory to argue (1) pain belongs to W2
>>>>>> but
>>>>>> (2) that pain also is located within the W1 brain and (3) W2 is located
>>>>>> in
>>>>>> a way distinct to anything located in W1 [i.e. W2 events, like conscious
>>>>>> pain, do not share the identical spatio-temporal location of any W1
>>>>>> events].
>>>>>> I also agree that there is a large and unresolved problem as to the
>>>>>> 'location' of consciousness, and thus of W2. I would also agree there
>>>>>> is a large
>>>>>> and unresolved problem as to the 'location' of W3 or W3 contents. But
>>>>>> these
>>>>>> admittedly large and unresolved problems are far from conclusive
>>>>>> arguments
>>>>>> against the independence of W2 and of W3 from W1.
>>>>>> I don't intend to suggest a solution to these large problems but here
>>>>>> clarify that Popper's position is that W3 "exists but exists nowhere"
>>>>>> and that
>>>>>> W2 is located not within W1 but somehow adjacent to the W1 brain.
>>>>>> It seems that we have no obvious model for locating anything in space
>>>>>> and
>>>>>> time except in the way we seek to locate W1 objects within W1: and this
>>>>>> creates an admitted problem, for there is a lack of any clear model for
>>>>>> how we
>>>>>> 'locate' W2 or W3 in these terms.
>>>>>> Despite this, it seems overwhelmingly the case that consciousness
>>>>>> exists;
>>>>>> and though it is less overwhelming, the strong case is that
>>>>>> consciousness
>>>>>> is distinct from being a mere W1 process - for there is no analogue of
>>>>>> consciousness in any W1 processes as these are conceived by science.
>>>>>> So we quickly reach one of the immense and weird imponderables of the
>>>>>> mind-body problem, that have given rise to very different reactions -
>>>>>> including
>>>>>> that radical materialism, a la Quine, that takes consciousness to be
>>>>>> merely an illusion. But if consciousness is not simply an illusion, the
>>>>>> mind-body dichotomy surfaces in all its presently unsolvable
>>>>>> strangeness. There is
>>>>>> no present possible position without strangeness - the radical
>>>>>> materialist,
>>>>>> in denying consciousness, is one of the strangest. Against the
>>>>>> strangeness
>>>>>> of these alternative positions [e.g. panpsychism] it might seem less
>>>>>> strange to accept the admitted strangeness of accepting a W3 and a W2
>>>>>> that
>>>>>> cannot readily be 'located', and certainly not 'located' in W1 terms.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> It seems simpler to postulate that space-time belongs in w1 only?
>>>>>>
>>>>>> There's the physical world, and space and time are physical 'concepts'
>>>>>> or
>>>>>> entities or items.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> w2 is the world of thinking.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Palma:
>>>>>>
>>>>>> "Note that, if Descartes were right, thought can’t have extension
>>>>>> properties, such as temporal properties."
>>>>>>
>>>>>> The implicature is that Descartes ain't right?
>>>>>>
>>>>>> If an item in the world of 'psychology' has spatio-temporal
>>>>>> qualifications, it seems to me because it 'corresponds' in some way to
>>>>>> some item in the
>>>>>> physical world, which necessarily does.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> w3, the world of concepts and stuff surely does not require on the other
>>>>>> hand any sort of Cartesian spatio-temporal coordinate. But surely the
>>>>>> CONTENT of a book on space and time (such as Einstein's) belongs in
>>>>>> this 'third
>>>>>> reich', as Popper's predecessor also called it.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Cheers,
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Speranza
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> ------------------------------------------------------------------
>>>>>> To change your Lit-Ideas settings (subscribe/unsub, vacation on/off,
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>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> --
>>>>>>
>>>>>> John McCreery
>>>>>> The Word Works, Ltd., Yokohama, JAPAN
>>>>>> Tel. +81-45-314-9324
>>>>>> jlm@xxxxxxxxxxxx
>>>>>> http://www.wordworks.jp/
>>>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> --
>>>> Julie Campbell
>>>> 573-881-6889
>>>> https://juliesmusicandlanguagestudio.musicteachershelper.com
>>
>>
>>
>> --
>> palma, etheKwini, KZN
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> palma
>>
>> cell phone is 0762362391
>>
>>
>>
>> *only when in Europe*:
>> inst. J. Nicod
>> 29 rue d'Ulm
>> f-75005 paris france
>
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