[lit-ideas] Re: [lit-ideas]
- From: Omar Kusturica <omarkusto@xxxxxxxxx>
- To: lit-ideas@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
- Date: Sun, 1 Feb 2015 16:30:47 +0100
I propose that the matter be resolved with knives.
O.K.
On Sun, Feb 1, 2015 at 2:38 PM, palma <palmaadriano@xxxxxxxxx> wrote:
> sauf a cause de...
> save for case assignment, nobody can be avec 'tu' in french
>
> bestest
>
> On Sun, Feb 1, 2015 at 3:35 PM, John McCreery <john.mccreery@xxxxxxxxx>
> wrote:
>
>> ありがとうございます。Mercy buckets, as my grandma used to say.
>>
>> Sent from my iPhone
>>
>> On Feb 1, 2015, at 4:50 PM, Julie Campbell <juliereneb@xxxxxxxxx> wrote:
>>
>> Je suis avec tu, John.
>>
>> On Saturday, January 31, 2015, John McCreery <john.mccreery@xxxxxxxxx>
>> wrote:
>>
>>> 我不懂你的意思。你可以用普通话说明吗？ 我不知道你的方言。
>>>
>>> 马
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> Sent from my iPad
>>>
>>> On 2015/01/31, at 18:54, Adriano Palma <Palma@xxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
>>>
>>> Par excellence mon ami basho sait comment rigoler avec les savants.
>>>
>>> Comme d’habitude avec la sottiserie mediatique
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
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>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
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>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> *From:* lit-ideas-bounce@xxxxxxxxxxxxx [
>>> mailto:lit-ideas-bounce@xxxxxxxxxxxxx] *On Behalf Of *John McCreery
>>> *Sent:* 31 January 2015 11:35
>>> *To:* Lit-Ideas
>>> *Subject:* [lit-ideas] Re: [lit-ideas]
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> Have never noticed that your comments are more meaningful than the
>>> barking of a mad dog. Tit for tat, you know. Adieu.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> John
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Sat, Jan 31, 2015 at 4:17 PM, Adriano Palma <Palma@xxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
>>>
>>> Fail to see the points. The idea of body is a senile idiocy of common
>>> sense, likewise the embodiment etc.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> *From:* lit-ideas-bounce@xxxxxxxxxxxxx [mailto:
>>> lit-ideas-bounce@xxxxxxxxxxxxx] *On Behalf Of *John McCreery
>>> *Sent:* 31 January 2015 02:16
>>> *To:* lit-ideas@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
>>> *Subject:* [lit-ideas] Re: The location of location
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> One modern view says that the problem in question is a non-question
>>> because, so far as anyone can actually see, knowledge is always embodied.
>>> Why do we imagine objects embedded in space-time? The answer is
>>> straightforward. Our bodies are so constructed that a limited set of
>>> options, up or down, front or back, left or right, determine how we
>>> naturally think about things. We can force ourselves to imagine worlds with
>>> 1, 2, 4 or 11 dimensions -- mathematicians and physicists do it all the
>>> time. But this is a matter of tweaking or extrapolating from our usual
>>> three-dimensional way of describing the location of things. That may, if
>>> current physics is right, be only a crude approximation of the way the
>>> universe is. (The "11" mentioned above is borrowed from science news
>>> descriptions of the number of dimensions required to account for the
>>> behavior of elementary particles if they work in the ways that current
>>> physics say they do.) It may be of historical interest to wonder how
>>> Descartes (or others reading Descartes) dealt with a problem created by his
>>> ontology. But, given that the ontology in question is pretty much defunct,
>>> the issue is of only historical interest.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> Just saying,
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> John
>>>
>>>
>>> Sent from my iPad
>>>
>>>
>>> On 2015/01/31, at 3:03, Omar Kusturica <omarkusto@xxxxxxxxx> wrote:
>>>
>>> It would surely be contradictory on my part to argue that mind and
>>> knowledge exist in time, and also to argue that they don't exist. :) The
>>> observation that they exist in time clearly entails that they exist in some
>>> sense, the question is how to make sense of that sense. It *might* not
>>> necessarily be separate from the physical, but it might also be. Also,
>>> integrating mind and matter is compatible with some versions of idealism
>>> just as it is compatible with some forms of materialism. (Although radical
>>> idealism seems to have little credibility nowadays, while radical
>>> materialism has some credibility.) I certainly don't aspire to provide
>>> answers to all these Questions here, or probably anywhere.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> O.K.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Fri, Jan 30, 2015 at 6:22 PM, Donal McEvoy <donalmcevoyuk@xxxxxxxxxxx>
>>> wrote:
>>>
>>> >Locating W1 objects within W1 is far more problematic that it might
>>> seem>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> The problem I had in mind was not finding keys when you need them, but,
>>> for example, the problem of explaining how/why W1 objects (that are
>>> extended in Descartes' sense) are located within space/time (that is
>>> unextended in Descartes' sense)? How can an extended object be located
>>> within a field that lacks extension (bearing in mind it is simply a
>>> hypostasization to treat space and time as if they are 'extended' by
>>> referring to them in measurable terms so that it appears they have
>>> varieties of size; and even if it is true that they may be measured in
>>> size, that does not make them extended in Descartes' sense)? [Compare: how
>>> can an 'unextended' force like gravity affect an extended physical object,
>>> even one the size of a sun?]
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> We might suggest the problem of explaining how extended W1 'objects' can
>>> exist in unextended space/time is at least as problematic as the problem of
>>> explaining how W2 or W3 'objects' stand in relation to space/time.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> These kinds of question cannot properly be left only to philosophers,
>>> particularly philosophers without sound understanding of science - they
>>> need to be approached taking into close account what we may conjecture
>>> about these things in the light of our best contemporary theories in
>>> physics.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> Popper would stress that we lack anything like an ultimate explanation
>>> for these things - for example, we lack anything like an ultimate
>>> explanation for how or why W1 objects are located within space/time. It may
>>> be that contemporary physics will be overthrown before we have a better
>>> approach to such questions - e.g. that the relations between space/time and
>>> W1 objects will be theorised to be quite different to how they might be
>>> taken to be in the light of our present physics (itself a difficult and
>>> controversial question).
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> Popper would also argue that ultimate explanations shall never be
>>> achieved in this area - though we may make better or worse guesses in the
>>> light of our evolving scientific knowledge.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> This may help indicate why facing the difficulties of locating W1
>>> objects within W1 is therefore a fair starting-point before facing the
>>> admitted difficulties of locating W2 and W3 content in relation to
>>> space/time and in relation to W1.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> Certainly taking this as a starting-point may dampen the impulse to
>>> doubt the existence of autonomous W2 and W3 content (and its downward
>>> affects on W1) because of these 'location' difficulties - given that we do
>>> not similarly and impulsively conclude that W1 objects and space/time do
>>> not exist simply because there are difficulties in explaining how they
>>> relate to one another.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> Dnl
>>>
>>> Ldn
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Friday, 30 January 2015, 13:37, Donal McEvoy <
>>> donalmcevoyuk@xxxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> >If something changes over time - as both mind and knowledge do - then
>>> it exists in time. It shouldn't even be necessary to make such an obvious
>>> point.>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> While trying to work out something more substantial on these issues of
>>> 'location', I note that, in Popper's conception, W3 is not "timeless" a la
>>> Plato but has a history - and so W3 content would apparently exist in time.
>>> Likewise the succession of thoughts in W2 would seem to imply that W2
>>> content also exists in time.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> I should also add that Popper, unlike Kant, is a realist as to time and
>>> change - and has indeed asserted that the reality of time and change are
>>> the crux of realism.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> But my own workings out began by reflecting on the location of W1
>>> objects within W1 - and particularly within space and time where these are
>>> conceived as dimensions of W1. Locating W1 objects within W1 is far more
>>> problematic that it might seem - and it seems to me these problems should
>>> be addressed first if we are to keep in proper perspective the admitted
>>> problems of localising W2 and W3 content.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> Dnl
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Thursday, 29 January 2015, 16:34, Omar Kusturica <omarkusto@xxxxxxxxx>
>>> wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> If something changes over time - as both mind and knowledge do - then it
>>> exists in time. It shouldn't even be necessary to make such an obvious
>>> point.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> Descartes' mind is obviously burdened with left-overs from Christian
>>> soul, which is supposed to be eternal.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> O.K.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Thu, Jan 29, 2015 at 1:27 PM, Redacted sender Jlsperanza@xxxxxxx for
>>> DMARC <dmarc-noreply@xxxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
>>>
>>> In a message dated 1/26/2015 2:08:03 P.M. Eastern Standard Time,
>>> donalmcevoyuk@xxxxxxxxxxx writes:
>>> I agree it would appear contradictory to argue (1) pain belongs to W2
>>> but
>>> (2) that pain also is located within the W1 brain and (3) W2 is located
>>> in
>>> a way distinct to anything located in W1 [i.e. W2 events, like conscious
>>> pain, do not share the identical spatio-temporal location of any W1
>>> events].
>>> I also agree that there is a large and unresolved problem as to the
>>> 'location' of consciousness, and thus of W2. I would also agree there
>>> is a large
>>> and unresolved problem as to the 'location' of W3 or W3 contents. But
>>> these
>>> admittedly large and unresolved problems are far from conclusive
>>> arguments
>>> against the independence of W2 and of W3 from W1.
>>> I don't intend to suggest a solution to these large problems but here
>>> clarify that Popper's position is that W3 "exists but exists nowhere"
>>> and that
>>> W2 is located not within W1 but somehow adjacent to the W1 brain.
>>> It seems that we have no obvious model for locating anything in space
>>> and
>>> time except in the way we seek to locate W1 objects within W1: and this
>>> creates an admitted problem, for there is a lack of any clear model for
>>> how we
>>> 'locate' W2 or W3 in these terms.
>>> Despite this, it seems overwhelmingly the case that consciousness
>>> exists;
>>> and though it is less overwhelming, the strong case is that
>>> consciousness
>>> is distinct from being a mere W1 process - for there is no analogue of
>>> consciousness in any W1 processes as these are conceived by science.
>>> So we quickly reach one of the immense and weird imponderables of the
>>> mind-body problem, that have given rise to very different reactions -
>>> including
>>> that radical materialism, a la Quine, that takes consciousness to be
>>> merely an illusion. But if consciousness is not simply an illusion, the
>>> mind-body dichotomy surfaces in all its presently unsolvable
>>> strangeness. There is
>>> no present possible position without strangeness - the radical
>>> materialist,
>>> in denying consciousness, is one of the strangest. Against the
>>> strangeness
>>> of these alternative positions [e.g. panpsychism] it might seem less
>>> strange to accept the admitted strangeness of accepting a W3 and a W2
>>> that
>>> cannot readily be 'located', and certainly not 'located' in W1 terms.
>>>
>>> It seems simpler to postulate that space-time belongs in w1 only?
>>>
>>> There's the physical world, and space and time are physical 'concepts'
>>> or
>>> entities or items.
>>>
>>> w2 is the world of thinking.
>>>
>>> Palma:
>>>
>>> "Note that, if Descartes were right, thought can’t have extension
>>> properties, such as temporal properties."
>>>
>>> The implicature is that Descartes ain't right?
>>>
>>> If an item in the world of 'psychology' has spatio-temporal
>>> qualifications, it seems to me because it 'corresponds' in some way to
>>> some item in the
>>> physical world, which necessarily does.
>>>
>>> w3, the world of concepts and stuff surely does not require on the other
>>> hand any sort of Cartesian spatio-temporal coordinate. But surely the
>>> CONTENT of a book on space and time (such as Einstein's) belongs in
>>> this 'third
>>> reich', as Popper's predecessor also called it.
>>>
>>> Cheers,
>>>
>>> Speranza
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> ------------------------------------------------------------------
>>> To change your Lit-Ideas settings (subscribe/unsub, vacation on/off,
>>> digest on/off), visit www.andreas.com/faq-lit-ideas.html
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> --
>>>
>>> John McCreery
>>> The Word Works, Ltd., Yokohama, JAPAN
>>> Tel. +81-45-314-9324
>>> jlm@xxxxxxxxxxxx
>>> http://www.wordworks.jp/
>>>
>>>
>>
>> --
>> Julie Campbell
>> 573-881-6889
>> https://juliesmusicandlanguagestudio.musicteachershelper.com
>>
>>
>
>
> --
> palma, etheKwini, KZN
>
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> palma
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> cell phone is 0762362391
>
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> *only when in Europe*:
>
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>
> 29 rue d'Ulm
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