[lit-ideas] Wittgenstein's Moses
- From: "" <dmarc-noreply@xxxxxxxxxxxxx> (Redacted sender "Jlsperanza@xxxxxxx" for DMARC)
- To: lit-ideas@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
- Date: Tue, 13 May 2014 17:59:36 -0400 (EDT)
Apparently, while Witters KNEW how names worked, he never said it, but at
most _showed_ it. This, according to D. McEvoy, was a necessity -- given
that, even if Witters had TRIED to say what naming amounts to,
philosophically, he would not have succeeded.
We are choosing 'naming' and 'names' as an example given, perhaps, by
Witters, of language's inability to say its sense rather than show it (loosely
put).
In a message dated 5/12/2014 10:17:32 A.M. Eastern Daylight Time,
palmaadriano@xxxxxxxxx writes:
"there remains two or three options (btw, none has anything to do with
definitions by ostension as some brains finer than mine insist, nobody knows
why): 1. tag; 2. predicates, however complicated the predication trusn out t
be; 3. some semi-indexical view. 1 is held by the santa barbarians around
N. Salmon; 2. is held, most recently by Delia Fara Graff; 3. is held among
others by the Italian philosopher F. Orilia as well as by the Spanish
philosopher G. Carpintero. Alas I have no idea of what Grice said on the
matter
since I met only once and we spoke about something completely different."
Well, one claim missing in Witters's commentary on Moses (below) seems to
be
Moses was called "Moses".
which seems to have puzzled Kripke.
"Actually sentences like 'Socrates is called "Socrates"' [and mutatis
mutandis, 'Moses is called "Moses"] are very interesting and one can spend,
strange as it may seem, hours talking about their analysis. I actually did,
once, do that. I won't do that, however, on this occasion. (See how high the
seas of language can rise. And at the lowest points too.)"
(The second) Witters would possibly argue that
Moses was called "Moses".
serves no communicative function, and is thus part of no language game or
form of life. The first Witters would possibly take is as a tautology --
and analytic a priori (a vacuity, for short).
The fact that the chosen name can be a 'vacuous' one (as in Grice's
"Pegasus does not exist" -- see his "Vacuous Names") seems to be irrelevant at
this point.
Cheers,
Speranza
---
In Section 79 of Philosophical Investigations, Wittgenstein writes:
"If one says
i. Moses did not exist.
this may MEAN various things."
"It may mean:
ii. The Israelites did not have a single leader when they withdrew from
Egypt——or:
iii. The Israelite's leader was NOT called Moses——-or:
iv. There cannot have been anyone who accomplished all that the Bible
relates of Moses——or:
v. etc. etc.
"We may say, following Russell: the NAME "Moses" can be defined by means
of
various descriptions."
"For example, as
vi. "Moses" names the man who led the Israelites through the wilderness.
vii. "Moses" names the man who lived at that time and place and was then
called 'Moses'.
viii. "Moses" names the man who as a child was taken out of the Nile by
Pharaoh's daughter.
and so on.
"And according as we assume one definition or another the proposition, our
original utterance
i. Moses did not exist.
acquires a different SENSE, and so does every other proposition about
Moses."
"And if we are told, in general
ib. "N did not exist"
we do ask: "What do you mean? Do you want to say . . . . . . or . . . . .
.
etc.?"
"When I make a statement about Moses,— am I always ready to substitute
some
one of these descriptions for "Moses"?"
"I shall perhaps say as follows."
"By "Moses" I understand the man who did what the Bible relates of Moses,
or at any rate a good deal of it."
"But how much?"
"Have I decided how much must be proved false for me to give up my
proposition as false?"
"Has the NAME "Moses" got a fixed and unequivocal use for me in all
possible cases?
"Is it not the case that I have, so to speak, a whole series of props
inreadiness, and am ready to lean on one if another should be taken from
under me and vice versa?"
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