[lit-ideas] Re: Transcendental and otherwise
- From: Eric Dean <ecdean99@xxxxxxxxxxx>
- To: <lit-ideas@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Date: Tue, 8 Jan 2008 22:39:14 +0000
Walter O. writes:
"For all [understandings of philosophy other than as a transcendental form of
inquiry] as far as I am aware, we have other terms to describe the form of
inquiry and practice being referred to within such conceptions. Understanding
philosophy as a transcendental form of inquiry is intelligible and justifiable,
in my mind, since no other form of inquiry can be said to be unique to the
discipline of philosophy. Only philosophy can do transcendental analysis, and
all transcendental analysis is philosophical."
I read Walter, here, as giving a relatively standard explanation of the role of
philosophy as a professional discipline. The explanation rests on a
presumption that different disciplines -- "forms of inquiry and practice" --
should each have their unique labels and their unique attributes.
But I'm not quite sure why that's the case. It seems to me that biologists
find themselves constantly applying results from physics, chemistry,
mathematics, etc. Why might not philosophy be such a discipline, i.e. one in
which the forms of inquiry and practice of other disciplines are regularly
brought to bear and possibly critiqued?
And if one might object to that by saying the biologist who's applying
chemistry is *applying* chemistry, not *doing* chemistry, I first would ask why
the deciphering of the structure of DNA -- something I think biologists could
legitimately claim as their discipline's accomplishment -- isn't also first
order chemistry, since it amounts to the analysis of a class of chemical
compounds? and second, would assert that my point could have been made by
saying that the biologist is doing applied chemistry, mathematics and physics,
each of which can be considered disciplines in their own rights.
Why is it wrong to apply the term 'philosophy' to a discipline that applies the
forms of inquiry and practices of other disciplines? Why, in other words, must
there be a form of inquiry that is unique to philosophy in order for philosophy
to be a 'justifiable' discipline?
Even there is a form of inquiry and practice which is unique to philosophy --
transcendental analysis -- I think further explanation is needed for why that
uniqueness somehow defines philosophy. One could single out lots of things
unique to identifiable forms of activity but which do not necessarily represent
the essence of the activity. For example, one might assert that only the
framing
carpenter can nail together the roof struts, and all nailing together of roof
struts is framing carpentry. But there is much more to framing
carpentry than nailing together roof struts.
I suppose one counter would be that my analogy is ill-formed.
Transcendental analysis is to philosophy as
nailing frames together is to framing carpentry, not as nailing a particular
class of frames together is. But that's exactly
what I for one was suggesting needs explaining. Exactly why is it that
transcendental analysis is so essential to philosophy? It looks to me like a
portion of a branch of the discipline, not the trunk or tap root of the whole
thing.
Finally, John McCreery has asked for a definition of transcendental analysis.
Walter earlier has said that transcendental analysis is the attempt to identify
the conditions of possibility for statements, period. But I think that's an
impossibility, because too many things can be the conditions of possibility.
For example, one of the conditions of possibility for a moral judgment is that
the judgment is not the box on the other table in this room, because if the
judgment were the box in this room it would no longer be a judgment. And on
and on. What, exactly, is it that makes such an assertion a silly or pointless
condition of possibility and other things, like the conditions Habermas puts on
moral judgments, not so silly and pointless?
I think it can be productive to try to assert the (substantial) conditions of
possibility for moral judgment, but not because anyone's going to resolve the
question of whether the asserted list contains all and only the conditions of
possibility, but because doing so may help illuminate some corner of the human
condition in a way otherwise not readily available. I think of it as a highly
elaborated form of the questions Socrates posed to the unwary. Socrates,
though, in Plato's earlier dialogs anyway, had the modesty not to presume to
have found the answers to his own questions. And The Parmenides, it seems to
me, provides Plato's cautionary tale on taking even the more expository
passages in his later work as too literal a rendering of Plato's own views
about answers Socrates might have been willing to accept.
Asking apposite, incisive questions seems to me a skill worth cultivating.
Transcendental analyses can provide very useful tools for the questioner, so I
wouldn't jettison them. But the idea that they constitute the whole or even
the soul of philosophy seems misguided to me.
Regards to one and all.
Eric Dean
Washington DC
Other related posts:
