In a message dated 10/6/2004 4:05:43 AM Eastern Standard Time, donalmcevoyuk@xxxxxxxxxxx writes: Donal will cease to exist when Donal ceases to exist [a tautology perhaps], but what is added to this by claiming that without the Donalling [sic] of Donal that Donal would cease to exist? How is the concept of "Donalling" independent of Donal? ---- We were considering various formulae, including Quine, in "On what there is" -- his policy to eliminate proper-names in discourse --: "Pegasus pegasusises" -- "Pegasus pegasizes" in other versions -- one should check google.com -- and, more to the point, "Donal (is) Donalling" Donal reacts: Donal will cease to exist when Donal ceases to exist [a tautology perhaps], but what is added to this by claiming that without the Donalling [sic] of Donal that Donal would cease to exist? How is the concept of "Donalling" independent of Donal? Well, as a matter of fact, I was trading in some Grice. In 'Reply to Richards', he writes to the effect that an essential property, "E", is such that for any x, if E is one of x's essential properties of x, then, if x ceases to have E, x would cease to exist. These properties contrast with what Aristotle called 'the proprium'. It is proper for a man to laugh, but a man could live all his life without laughing -- hence laughter is not _essential_ to humanity. For Aristotle, 'thinking' was, hence his definition, later taken up by Linnaeus, 'homo homo sapiens sapiens', to oppose to the 'homo australopithecus', of Australia. Etc. The problem here, I grant, is that we are talking of _individual_ essences ("haecceities", in the words of the scholars), i.e. things that make a certain individual (e.g. Donal McEvoy) what she (that individual --) what is. Cheers, JL ------------------------------------------------------------------ To change your Lit-Ideas settings (subscribe/unsub, vacation on/off, digest on/off), visit www.andreas.com/faq-lit-ideas.html