In a message dated 6/16/2009 6:53:30 P.M. Eastern Daylight Time, donalmcevoyuk@xxxxxxxxxxx writes: I've looked at this post (below) a few times and it is very learned, no doubt, but really I am too simple-minded to be persuaded by what I don't clearly understand. ---- Let's see if I can do better. You (Donal McEvoy) was asking about CTP -- and the metaphysical realism and the issue of truth. There _is_ a sense in which the Causal Theory of Perception _allows_ for a realist interpretation. Surely if you say, "That pillar box seems red to me" as being *caused* by a pillar box which _seems_ (or is) red, you are bound to be making a connection. But from what I read in Grice -- only Section III of Causal Theory of Perception deals with those metaphysical issues, of truth, etc. Most historically, it seems that 'philosophers of perception' of the Gricean ilk -- Oxford in the 1930s, 1940s, etc. -- were into "Phenomenalism" proper. How to analyse 'reports of sensation' per se. Recall the classic by G. A. Paul, "Is there a problem about sense data?" ---- So, no talk of reality or truth would have appealed the Oxonian, because he was into the 'linguistic botanising' of proper ways to describe our 'sensa' -- J. L. Austin, Sense and Sensibilia. Ayer, a post-Viennese, and others, laughed at the Oxonians, but in retrospect, it seems they did a good job in analysing all sorts of linguistic phenomena that those into 'realism' and 'truth' would never had even dreamed they existed? Cheers, JL Speranza Buenos Aires, Argentina **************Download the AOL Classifieds Toolbar for local deals at your fingertips. (http://toolbar.aol.com/aolclassifieds/download.html?ncid=emlcntusdown00000004) ------------------------------------------------------------------ To change your Lit-Ideas settings (subscribe/unsub, vacation on/off, digest on/off), visit www.andreas.com/faq-lit-ideas.html