[lit-ideas] Re: TLP1: Elements and their relations in giving the sense of 'p'
- From: John McCreery <john.mccreery@xxxxxxxxx>
- To: lit-ideas@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
- Date: Mon, 16 Feb 2009 20:28:49 +0900
On Mon, Feb 16, 2009 at 7:38 PM, Donal McEvoy <donalmcevoyuk@xxxxxxxxxxx>wrote:
>
>
> 7. Let us assume that distinction between "elements" and their relations is
> one that can only be shown and that cannot be said. It is nevertheless a
> separate issue to the one at 5. whether we adopt the traditional view and
> take the TLP as offering propositions about unsayable matters that, though
> they are strictly nonsense, are trying to say what is true – or whether we
> take the Conant-Diamond view that the TLP itself is on the same level as the
> kind of nonsense it condemns philosophers for traditionally offering because
> they are trying to say what cannot be said. On the first view the
> distinction between "elements" and their relations, though unsayable, would
> nevertheless be true (and perhaps even "unassailable and definitive"). On
> the second view the distinction, while not true and indeed nonsense, is
> still needed as a ladder from which to gain a perspicuous view of the
> character of 'p's and their sense.
>
First, a warm thank-you to Donal for taking the time to so cogently
articulate an interesting argument. The following remarks should be taken as
tangential, since they involve no claims whatsoever about what W was
intending to say in TLP, a topic on which I am totally ignorant.
Serendipitously, I am hard at work on a bit of research involving social
network analysis (SNA), in which social relationships are idealized and
formalized in terms of graph theory, with actors represented by vertices and
relationships between them represented by (undirected) edges or (directed)
arcs. One interesting thing about this form of analysis is that, while it
requires two discrete sets of primitives, the vertices and the links (the
set L comprising the union of E, the edges, and A, the arcs), the specific
content of these sets is irrelevant to the mathematics of the software I am
using.
Getting down, then, to specifics, I am looking at (1) a set of prize-winning
ads published in the Tokyo Copywriters Club Annual and (2) a set of creators
who were members of the the teams that created the ads. The software is
entirely unconcerned with whether I designate the creators as the vertices,
with the ads forming the links between them, or, conversely, treat the ads
as the vertices connected by the creators.
Because this project is much on my mind, I read 7. above and find myself
wondering if something similar couldn't be said about the elements and
relations to which Donal refers. To be sure, when we compare "The cat on the
mat" with "The dog on the mat," we "naturally" assume that the elements in
question are the cat, the dog and the mat and the relation in question is
that implied by "on." But is the "naturalness" with which we draw the
distinction tell us something about the real world or the way that human
brains and nervous systems process information, or is it an artifact of the
languages we speak? Could "on" be the element, while "cat," "dog," and "mat"
are relationships between different instances of "on"?
Anyway, thanks again to Donal. The little grey cells are stirring, and that
feels good.
John
--
John McCreery
The Word Works, Ltd., Yokohama, JAPAN
Tel. +81-45-314-9324
jlm@xxxxxxxxxxxx
http://www.wordworks.jp/
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