In a message dated 6/28/2013 10:47:28 A.M. Eastern Daylight Time, donalmcevoyuk@xxxxxxxxxxx writes: it may tend – at least as Popper presents it – to over-assimilate artistic content to the kinds of propositional content that lie at the basis of mathematics and science. And such criticism might be part of a more general criticism that Popper in his theory of knowledge tends to over-assimilate all knowledge to some kind of rational model of trial-and-error and critical feedback:- for example, while Popper sees rationality as central to morality, even if we accept that rational consciousness is a precondition for exercising a moral conscience, nevertheless rationality may not be very central to what constitutes our moral sense. In a similar vein, we might accept that some kind of rational consciousness plays a role in artistic creation (though a role perhaps more tenuous that its role in moral thought), yet rationality may not be central to the value of art – or at least not central to all art, and not central to all the most valuable art, and perhaps not central to nearly all the most valuable art. It is only fair to note that this possible criticism is of a possible tendency in Popper’s thought, and that Popper’s view of the role of rationality in human knowledge I think I have quoted Catherine Lord's essay on Griceanism -- a type of instrumentalism; as published in the British Journal of Aesthetics -- where art theory belongs. On the other hand, it may do to doublecheck keywords like POPPER/aesthetics. It seems Popper leaves 'intention' quite out of the picture, here. -- unlike of course Grice. More perhaps, later, Cheers, Speranza ------------------------------------------------------------------ To change your Lit-Ideas settings (subscribe/unsub, vacation on/off, digest on/off), visit www.andreas.com/faq-lit-ideas.html