In a message dated 10/12/2015 4:46:37 P.M. Eastern Daylight Time,
rpaul@xxxxxxxx writes:
I don't know if one could learn anything from this, but D McE says I must
send it on. Yrs, RP
---------- Forwarded message ----------
From: Date: Mon, Oct 12, 2015 at 12:34 PM
Subject: Lewis & Clark Philosophy Colloquium, 10/16
To:
"You are cordially invited to the following event."
This as opposed to, as Geary has it, "you are NON-CORDIALLY invited to the
following event". "The use of 'cordially'," Geary adds, "is never otiose --
unless it _is_."
Lewis & Clark Philosophy Colloquium Series
Avram Hi ller ( Portland State University)
will lecture on a conceptual analysis of Knowledge as Justified Stable
Belief
where 'stable' is an adjective and not a noun, as in "Popper at the Augean
stables".
Epistemologists are (almost) in agreement that Edmund Gettier refudiated
the account of knowledge, which he adjudicated to Plato and Ayer, according
to which knowledge can be conceptually analysed as justified true belief
(JTB).
A novel explanation can be given of why the JTB account was wrongheaded
from the outset.
Unfortuantely, a noveler explanation can be given of why the JTB account
was rightheaded from the outset, too. ("Such is philosophy!" -- "A matter of
opinion").
Using an analogy between knowledge and soundness, some have argued that
knowledge should never have been understood as having an independent truth
condition, although this does not mean we deny that knowledge is factive, as
when we say:
"Columbus knew that the earth was round"
which entails
"The earth was round"
back then, and, a fortiori, today.
A post-Gettier move to pursue a theory of warrant – whatever it is that
has been added to true belief to yield knowledge – but some think this is
misguided, as is the longstanding debate about whether warrant entails truth
(vide "Popper at the Augean stables").
However, instead of modifying or jettisoning the "J" condition on
knowledge, or adding a fourth condition, we ought simply to replace the "T"
condition.
And so rather than seeking an account of warrant, epistemologists should
seek an account of what some now stability (vide "Popper at the Augean
stables") which can be defined at the outset as that condition, whatever it is,
that must be added to justified belief to yield knowledge.
A conceptual analysis can thus be offered according to which knowledge
becomes justified STABLE belief (JSB).
Unlike other approaches, the K=JSB view clearly distinguishes internal and
external components of knowledge, and it can be shown that it is thus
salutary for fallibilist internalist accounts of justification.
And Popper was a fallibilist (vide "Popper at the Augean stables" and his
"Objective Knowledge").
Steps can be taken in explaining what stability is and in differentiating
the JSB account from alternative views.
Again, it should be reminded, as Geary does, that 'stable' is sometimes an
adjective, and sometimes a noun. ("This distinction is important when we
are engaged in conceptual philosophical analysis" -- He is reprimanding
Derrida).
One of the main goals of epistemologists since Hintikka has been to
provide a framework of a theory of knowledge which is an alternative to
Timothy
Williamson’s view that knowledge is prime, and so it can beshown how
Williamson’s arguments fail to undermine the reductive nature of the K=JSB
account.
This was AFTER Hintikka attended some of Williamson's classes as Wykeham
professor of logic at Oxford (Is this a piece of justified stable belief?).
Cheers,
Speranza
------------------------------------------------------------------
To change your Lit-Ideas settings (subscribe/unsub, vacation on/off,
digest on/off), visit www.andreas.com/faq-lit-ideas.html
