[lit-ideas] Re: Persuasion Redux
- From: wokshevs@xxxxxx
- To: lit-ideas@xxxxxxxxxxxxx, Donal McEvoy <donalmcevoyuk@xxxxxxxxxxx>
- Date: Tue, 25 Dec 2007 16:22:59 -0330
Please see specific replies below ------------------>
Quoting Donal McEvoy <donalmcevoyuk@xxxxxxxxxxx>:
> Others have commented unfavourably on the distinction drawn between
> 'convincing' and 'persuading', but there is the favourable comment:-
>
> >What they all have in common is an overture of
> force, a gangster-esque understatement about them.
> One can indeed be "persuaded" to do something by such force, but one cannot
> >be "convinced" to to so.
>
> This point strikes me as largely verbal: consider the assymetrical way WO
> sets up his case:-
>
> --- wokshevs@xxxxxx wrote:
>
> > I want to say that being convinced by argument is not at all equivalent
> to,
> > or
> > an instance of, being persuaded.
>
> Note "being convinced by argument" is, said to be, not [at
> all?/necessarily?]
> the same as "being persuaded" fullstop.
--------> Note that my claim was not that "being convinced" is "not the same
as"
"being persuaded" which is your rendering of my claim, but rather the more
specific claim we see above.
>
> This would not show that "being convinced by argument" is not the same
> as/similar to "being persuaded by argument"; nor show that "being persuaded"
> not by argument but by threat of force is not the same as/similar to "being
> convinced" by threat of force.
>
> Of course, if we build "by argument" into the definition of "being
> convinced"
> then there is no being convinced by force; but such a stipulation is surely
> arbitrary and merely verbal. We might say that if at gunpoint I am persuaded
> to agree that '2+2=5', I remain unconvinced that '2+2=5' - but equally what
> I
> am persuaded of here is not the truth of '2+2=5' but that _I should agree to
> it_; and, in that sense, I am surely (verbal stipulation aside) entitled to
> say that I am 'convinced' _I should agree it_.
----------> Let's be slightly more precise here. You may well be convinced that
you should agree to the truth of the claim that 2+2=5 without thereby actually
being convinced of the truth of that claim itself.
> Even if there is (as I grant) a substantive difference between
> convincing/persuading by reason/argument and by other means, I suggest it
> takes us into a verbal morass, and does not help, to try to hinge this
> distinction on a distinction in the meaning of concepts like 'convincing',
> 'persuading' etc.
>
> A better approach is to hinge the difference on language functions a la
> Popper/Buhler: reasoned debate requires the argumentative function, whereas
> unreasoned 'persuasion' may be sustained using lower functions i.e. the
> descriptive, the communicative/signalling, and the expressive/symptomatic
> functions.
>
> Seen as such EY is surely right to suggest, afaiu, that the following is
> question-begging..
>
> >One can be convinced only through the
> > provision and assessment of reasons, while one can be persuaded by any of
> a
> > multitude of factors influencing belief and/or judgement
------------> It is only in certain contexts that one can "beg the question."
Simply presenting a truth or rightness claim does not itself beg anything. That
fallacy is committed *in response to* a claim or argument.
Eg:
Pyotr: The bible is the word of God.
Pavel: How do you know that?
Pyotr: It clearly says so.
Pavel: How do you know the bible is correct?
Pyotr: It must be, it's the word of God.
Thus it would be legitimate for me to claim that you and EY are begging the
question against my distinction between convincing/persuading in claiming that
this distinction is merely stipulative.
On the substantive points of my argument: Distinctions transcendentally
(philosophically) required for the possibility of inquiry and argument are not
simply the products of convention, although clearly certain social
institutions must be in place for epistemic distinctions to originate, be
recognized, implemented and acted upon. The latter is but an empirical truth.
That there are courts of law on this planet where judges don't understand the
distinction between, say, infer and imply, truth and belief, validity and
soundness, or being interested in seeing that justice prevails and being
disinterested in whether defendent or plaintive wins the case at hand, is an
empirical matter having no necessary relevance to
the epistemic universality and necessity of such distinctions, I would submit.
Finally, John W's thoughts remind me of the words of that fine philosopher,
Luigi Marinig: "You got a problem with that?"
Walter O.
Waiting patiently for Christmas to come, but celebrating its spirit ahead of
time.
P.S. Only in highly specific circumstances is it not self-contradictory for a
human life form to claim that (s)he is "hiding" on top of a Christmas tree. I
trust Donal will specify those circumstances for us after he comes down from the
tree.
> Donal
> Hiding on top of the Christmas tree
>
>
> __________________________________________________________
> Sent from Yahoo! Mail - a smarter inbox http://uk.mail.yahoo.com
>
> ------------------------------------------------------------------
> To change your Lit-Ideas settings (subscribe/unsub, vacation on/off,
> digest on/off), visit www.andreas.com/faq-lit-ideas.html
>
------------------------------------------------------------------
To change your Lit-Ideas settings (subscribe/unsub, vacation on/off,
digest on/off), visit www.andreas.com/faq-lit-ideas.html
Other related posts:
