[lit-ideas] Re: Persuasion Redux
- From: Jlsperanza@xxxxxxx
- To: lit-ideas@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
- Date: Mon, 24 Dec 2007 07:21:59 EST
For some reason, in my previous post, the bits in Latin that were _worth_
having correctly came out with some odd symbols like NOBR, NOBR, and more NOBR.
So I'm rephrasing the things for clearer expression and hoping I have
_caught_ a distinction _worth_ maintaining when it comes to 'vincing' and
'suading'.
As I said, 'convincing' and 'persuading' are typical Latinates with prefixes
that the Romans themselves found otiose. Thus 'vincing' and 'suading' are
things you'd hear in Rome, and naturally enough (but it didn't catch up) in
England.
Re 'convince', it brings a lot of light to see that it's a sophisticated
verison of 'vince', which is to 'win'. Thus 'invincible' would be unwinnable
(and 'vincible' winnable.
Apparently, the first to recognise this was Cromwell, in his Selected Papers
of Henry VIII, (1530) vol. I, p. 367, where he writes:
"The Florentines do still continue and defend the power of the
Pope,
and it is supposed that they shall vince."
Grice once told Austin -- after he had gone to the dictionary with 'feeling
+ adj" and had lost his patience with 'feel bizantine' and noting that for all
adjectives the phrase made sense. "I don't care what the dictionary says!".
And that's where you make your big mistake, Austin retorted.
The root here is then, L. convincere, to overcome, conquer, convict,
demonstrate, f. con- altogether, wholly + vincere, to conquer.] There's also
Latin
vincibilis. The OED notes: "In Higden (Rolls) IV. 167 vincible occurs as an
error for invincible", which is just correlative to inflammable meaning
flammable, and one is not sure if that is an 'error' or a reanalysis of the
meaning of 'in-'.
I would propose we stick to forms like
convincing that p.
-- or vincing that p.
--- The need for this restriction will be evident later. It has to do with
arguments of the Gricean type to restrict types of meaning to "meaning that the
cat is on the mat" and "meaning that the cat BE on the mat". It's to the
core of the 'philosophy of mind' argument regarding what's going on when a
vincing is taking place, and what range of propositions fall under it.
For 'persuade', the story is similar. Again, the prefix was just ornamental,
and for the Romans it was 'suading', and 'suasion' -- It's cognate with
'suave', which should give an indication why McCreery uses 'professional
persuader' (and not convincers), and why it must be only slang and an irony the
use
of spurs to mean 'small persuaders', since there's little suave about a
bayonet -- but there's room for disagreement here, as we'll see.
Here the English quote, is just one year later than 'vince' (CRAMER in
Strype Mem. App. i (1694) 3):
He suades that with such goodly eloquence.
Again, the root is 'persuadere', from per+ suadere, to advise, recommend,
urge as desirable. Suade, partly ad. L. suadere, f. root suade (see SUAVE);
partly by aphæresis. The noun 'suasion' is used by Chaucer in Boeth. II, pr.
i (1374) (1868), p. 30:
"Come now further we further the suasion of sweet rethorics.
Again, I suggest we focus on 'suading' or persuading that p. That the cat is
on the mat or that the cat BE on the mat.
So back to McEvoy's example. He is right that when it comes to a proposition
known to be false by the subject on whom the suading and vincing is taken
place, it _must_ involve, as per necessary condition, the subject's commitment
to the truth (or 'satisfactoriness', as I prefer) of the claim. Truth would
be okay for things like "the cat is on the mat". Other type of
'satisfactoriness' would be okay for things like "Let the cat be on the mat",
or "That the
cat be on the mat" -- which cannot be true or false as it's the expression of
the utterer's desire that her will be done, and it become _true_ that the cat
_is_ on the mat.
I won't accept as real uses (but merely 'scare quote use') of vincing and
suading McEvoy's examples:
The gunner vinced me that a baker's dozen is made up of _13_ items.
The gunner suaded me that a baker's dozen is made up of _13_ items.
Of course, the example was found intentionally to refute McEvoy who thinks
of 2 + 2 = 5 as something unconceivable (or unconvincing, i.e. invincible and
unsuadable). By noting the analogy with the mere _convention_ that a baker's
dozen means "13" one can see that McEvoy need _not_ such stubborness.
When it comes to the lower function ('make a horse drink, shit, eat, think,
talk...') I think it's good that we can compare, alla Parker, horses and
whores. My point is that there is no such _vital_ difference.
It also points to the only Anglo-Saxon possible way to understand the
latinate terms, suading and vincing, viz., via the forms:
MAKE A ... [think/desire] [that p]
Thus we are dealing with two types of 'force' (assertoric and
non-assertoric) for two types of 'perlocutions': suading and vincing. If we
distinguish
between horses and whores (where the latter are meant to be thought as
"minimally rational") we would have 8 cases:
(i) I convinced the horse that the water was drinkable
(scenario: I drank the water myself, and the horse recognised
that he too could drink it) -- assertoric force.
(ii) I convinced the horse to drink.
(PROBLEMATIC)
(iii) I persuaded the horse I drank.
(iv) I persuaded the horse to drink
(PROBLEMATIC? Not if 'persuade' is understood as 'train').
---- Now the four cases of the whore:
(v) I convinced Mary Lou I would pay extra.
(vi) I convinced Mary Lou to drink (or 'swallow', as it sounds more refined).
(vii) I persuaded Mary Lou it was a reasonable pay.
(viii) I persuaded Mary Lou to leave the room.
----- For whores we don't have a problem. So the main problematic point is
convincing the horse to drink. Of course with 'be thirsty' the problematic
cases multiply:
Cfr. I convinced the *horse/*whore she was thirsty.
I convinced the *horse/*whore to be thirsty.
I persuaded the *horse/*whore that he was thirsty.
I persuaded the *horse/*whore to be thirsty.
Here we are in the field of McEvoy's accepting or agreeing to false claims,
but not necessarily being persuaded or convinced of them. It may well be that
after a long conversation at the Algonquin, it is Mary Lou who persuaded me
that I should get more drinks than I officially should. But I'd draw a line
with her succeeding in convincing me or pesuading me that I am thirsty, or
worse, that I'd be thirsty.
Mothers (and grandmothers) are like that:
"John. Come and have a glass of milk. You must be dying of thirst!"
when John isn't. And John can later claim, "The bad thing about grandmother
is that she can _persuade_ you to be thirsty -- and you realise you were not
by vomiting soon afterwards the hot milk makes it through your throat".
So, it seems that the rational vs. 'lower' function is not so apt a
distinction, as McEvoy thought it was. First, rational beings also indulge in
non-rational, lower-function things (like pee, or burp).
I may be persuaded that it's wrong to burp at the table; but one cannot
really _persuade_ Little Johnny _not to burp_. Farting is different. With
yawning, I always think it's good to at least _cover_ your mouth while you do
it.
Think of Aristotle's example -- discussed by Geary: the erector set of the
penis via air.
Here, no whore could persuade Aristotle that his membrum viriles be 'infused
with air', unless I suppose she blew it.
Etc.
J. L. Speranza
Linguistic Botanizer
BA, Arg.
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