[lit-ideas] Re: On whether to rescue Finland in 1939
- From: "Lawrence Helm" <lawrencehelm@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
- To: <lit-ideas@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Date: Tue, 16 May 2006 14:18:24 -0700
I may have a book on this subject someplace, but I donât feel like looking.
I donât have any axe to grind but it would surprise me if Morgenthau were
wrong. He has the big rep and his book is the Bible for the Political
Realists. Also, the one I have, the sixth edition was gone over by one of his
students, Kenneth W. Thompson.
I had occasion to check the qualifications of Wikipedia at one point and
apparently anyone can submit an article, and then anyone else can revise it.
This doesnât mean itâs wrong, but the article in question hasnât been
gone over to the same extent that Politics Among Nations has and while that
doesnât prove anything, I remain doubtful that Morgenthau is wrong.
Here is a site that seems a bit closer to Morgenthauâs comments:
http://www.fco.gov.uk/servlet/Front?pagename=OpenMarket/Xcelerate/ShowPage
<http://www.fco.gov.uk/servlet/Front?pagename=OpenMarket/Xcelerate/ShowPage&c=Page&cid=1007029396185>
&c=Page&cid=1007029396185
Lawrence
-----Original Message-----
From: lit-ideas-bounce@xxxxxxxxxxxxx [mailto:lit-ideas-bounce@xxxxxxxxxxxxx] On
Behalf Of Teemu Pyyluoma
Sent: Tuesday, May 16, 2006 1:30 PM
To: lit-ideas@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
Subject: [lit-ideas] Re: On whether to rescue Finland in 1939
How Morgenthau came to the conclusion that France and
Great Britain were acting out of moral and legal
obligation to help Finland, and not out of
self-interest is not clear. See for example Wikipedia
on the Winter War:
"Within a month, the Soviet leadership began to
consider abandoning the operation and Finland's
government was approached with preliminary peace
feelers (via Sweden's government), first on January
29. Until then, Finland had factually fought for its
existence. When credible rumours of this reached the
governments in Paris and London, the incentives for
military support were dramatically changed. Now
Finland fought "only" to keep as much as possible of
its territory that lay near Leningrad. To maintain
public opinion, though, none of this information was
publicized Ãââ neither in Finland, nor abroad.
Finland's fight remained considered a life and death
struggle.
"In February 1940, the Allies offered to help: the
Allied plan, approved on February 5 by the Allied High
Command, consisted of 100,000 British and 35,000
French troops that were to disembark at the Norwegian
port of Narvik and support Finland via Sweden while
securing the supply routes along the way. The plan was
agreed to be launched on March 20 under the condition
that the Finns plead for help. On March 2, transit
rights were officially requested from the governments
of Norway and Sweden. It was hoped this would
eventually bring the two still neutral Nordic
countries, Norway and Sweden to the Allied side Ãââ by
strengthening their positions against Germany,
although Hitler had, by December declared to the
Swedish government that Western troops on Swedish soil
would immediately provoke a German invasion, which in
practice meant that Nazi Germany would take the
populated southern part of Scandinavia while France
and Britain would fight in the furthest North.
"However, only a small fraction of the Western troops
were intended for Finland. Proposals to enter Finland
directly, via the ice-free harbour of Petsamo, had
been dismissed. There were suspicions that the
objective of the operation was to capture and occupy
the Norwegian shipping harbour of Narvik and the vast
mountainous areas of the North-Swedish iron ore
fields, from which the Third Reich received a large
share of its iron ore, critical to war production. If
Franco-British troops moved to halt export to Germany,
the area could become a battleground for the armies of
the Allies and the Third Reich. As a consequence,
Norway and Sweden denied transit. Only after the war
did it become known that the commander of the Allied
expedition force was actually instructed to avoid
combat contact with the Soviet troops.
"The Franco-British plan initially hoped to capture
all of Scandinavia north of a line
StockholmÃââGÃÂteborg or StockholmÃââOslo, i.e. the
British concept of the Lake line following the lakes
of MÃÂlaren, HjÃÂlmaren, and VÃÂnern, which would
contribute with good natural defence some
1,700Ãââ1,900 kilometres south for Narvik. The
expected frontier, the Lake line, involved not only
Sweden's two largest cities, but its consequence was
that the homes of the vast majority of the Swedes
would be either Nazi-occupied or in the war zone.
Later, the ambition was lowered to only the northern
half of Sweden and the rather narrow adjacent
Norwegian coast.
"The Swedish government, headed by Prime Minister Per
Albin Hansson, declined to allow transit of armed
troops through Swedish territory. Although Sweden had
not declared itself neutral in the Winter War, it was
neutral in the war involving France, Britain, and
Germany. Granting transit rights to a Franco-British
corps was at that time considered too great a
departure from international laws on neutrality.
"The Swedish Cabinet also decided to reject repeated
pleas from the Finns for regular Swedish troops to be
deployed in Finland, and in the end the Swedes also
made it clear that their support in arms and munitions
could not be maintained for much longer.
Diplomatically, Finland was squeezed between Allied
hopes for a prolonged war and Scandinavian fears of a
continued war spreading to neighbouring countries (or
of the surge of refugees that might result from a
Finnish defeat). Also, the Wilhelmstrasse was offering
distinct advice for peace and concessions Ãââ the
Germans suggested that concessions "could always later
be mended."
"While Berlin and Stockholm pressured Helsinki to
accept peace on bad conditions, Paris and London had
the opposite objective. From time to time, different
plans and figures were presented for the Finns. To
start with, France and Britain promised to send 20,000
men to arrive by the end of February, although under
the implicit condition that on their way to Finland
they were given opportunity to occupy
North-Scandinavia.
"By the end of February, Finland's Commander-in-Chief,
Field Marshal Mannerheim, was pessimistic about the
military situation. Therefore, on February 29 the
government decided to start peace negotiations. That
same day, the Soviets commenced an attack against
Viipuri.
"When France and Britain realized that Finland was
seriously considering a peace treaty, they gave a new
offer for help: 50,000 men were to be sent, if Finland
asked for help before March 12. Only 6,000 of these
would have actually been destined for Finland. The
rest were intended to secure harbours, roads and iron
ore fields on the way.
"Despite the feeble forces that would have reached
Finland, intelligence about the plans reached the
Soviet Union and contributed heavily to their decision
to sign the armistice ending the war. It is argued
that without the threat of Allied intervention,
nothing would have eventually stopped the Soviets from
conquering all of Finland by sheer mass and seemingly
endless reserve troops."
Cheers,
Teemu
Helsinki, Finland
__________________________________________________
Do You Yahoo!?
Tired of spam? Yahoo! Mail has the best spam protection around
http://mail.yahoo.com
------------------------------------------------------------------
To change your Lit-Ideas settings (subscribe/unsub, vacation on/off,
digest on/off), visit www.andreas.com/faq-lit-ideas.html
Other related posts:
