[lit-ideas] Re: No shock that report Einstein "may have been wrong" may have been wrong
- From: Donal McEvoy <donalmcevoyuk@xxxxxxxxxxx>
- To: "lit-ideas@xxxxxxxxxxxxx" <lit-ideas@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Date: Mon, 26 Sep 2011 14:33:00 +0100 (BST)
There is a lack of clarity in Kuhn's position, so that even the explanatory
tool 'paradigm shift' might itself seem to be shifting.
This lack of clarity may be (at least partly) because a 'paradigm shift' is not
"constituted" by any logical relation between data and theory but by a shift in
perspective or practice or orientation - it is thus a psychological or
sociological notion rather than a logical one (Popper's "Logic of Scientific
Discovery", by contrast, is quite clearly aimed at analysing "science" in
logical terms - in terms of the logical character of certain statements and
their relations, particularly their testability/falsifiability).
Insofar as 'paradigm shift' ['PS'] is some kind of psychological or
sociological phenomenon, it cannot be "constituted" by an empirical finding,
even a new one. And so put, the answer is 'No' as John says. The further
question is the role of a new empirical finding in provoking or stimulating a
'PS'. This would seem to turn out to be a matter of contingent historical fact
as to whether a new empirical finding helped provoke a 'PS'. In these terms,
the impact of the putative 'new empirical finding' as provoking a 'PS' would
remain to be seem.
But from a falsificationist/realist POV, we do not have to 'wait-and-see' to
analyse the logical implications of such a 'new empirical finding' for current
orthodoxy [even if such analysis need not be without controversy]; and, indeed,
if there is such a thing as a 'PS' it may be best viewed as an upshot of this
kind of logical analysis. In this way, Popper would maintain that the correct
approach in the philosophy of science is to take the 'logic of scientific
discovery' as primary and to take science as a sociological phenomenon as
secondary. It is by looking at it this way that we can square the apparent
circle of Popper's theory of 'science' being at root a prescriptive or
normative theory [of what a scientist ought to be doing, given certain logical
considerations that underpin the value of his enterprise], yet one that throws
much descriptive light on the practice of science by offering an accurate
description of what is valuable in what scientists
do.
That said, Popper admitted there was much truth [of a sociological kind] in
Kuhn's eye-opening description of 'normal science' and it was something
important that in Popper's work he had hitherto not taken into account
adequately; but for Popper 'normal science' is a sociological phenomenon that
arose largely in the twentieth century and which he regards as a potential
threat to the 'logic of scientific discovery', which it undermines not because
of its superority but its inferiority in logical/prescriptive terms.
Donal
London
________________________________
From: John McCreery <john.mccreery@xxxxxxxxx>
To: lit-ideas@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
Sent: Sunday, 25 September 2011, 14:02
Subject: [lit-ideas] Re: No shock that report Einstein "may have been wrong"
may have been wrong
Walter asks,
If we find that there really is stuff that runs faster than the speed of light,
is this discovery simply a new empirical fact about the universe we can add to
the other ones, or does it constitute a "paradigm shift" in Kuhn's terms?
The answer is "No." It has been a long time since I read Kuhn, but as I recall
his argument no single finding, however major, would constitute a paradigm
shift, though it might stimulate one. Why? A paradigm is not a theory. A
paradigm is a way of doing science, a set of conventional procedures. A theory
may be invoked to provide a rationale for that set of conventional procedures,
and a finding that contradicts the theory may set in motion changes in practice
that alter the procedures in question. Then again, it may not. The theory may
be adjusted to account for the new finding without fundamentally altering the
way in which the scientists in question go about doing science. This sort of
adjustment is, moreover, commonplace in what Kuhn calls the "normal science"
phase of a science's development.
Of course, my memory could be failing me.
John
--
John McCreery
The Word Works, Ltd., Yokohama, JAPAN
Tel. +81-45-314-9324
jlm@xxxxxxxxxxxx
http://www.wordworks.jp/
Other related posts:
