Palma thinks that perception offers a counterexample to Hintikka's theorem: If x knows that p, x knows that he knows that p. --- He must having hallucinations in mind (not in Palma's mind, but in x's mind). We are discussing McEvoy's claim that a theory of truth is INSUFFICIENT (he does not say _for what_). McEvoy grants that a theory of truth need NOT be a theory of 'knowledge'. He even uses 'decide' as synonym for 'know'. The point seems to be that Tarski offers a theory of truth alla Grice (to use Grice's example): "Smith is happy" is true iff Smith is happy. But fails to provide us with an algorithm or decision procedure ('a theory of knowledge', in McEvoy's grand phrase) regarding "Smith is happy" itself. Indeed, Grice wrote an essay, on "Happiness" and he provides SIX necessary and sufficient conditions for "happy". Provided with have encapsulated who Smith is, we may want to decide if "Smith is happy" is true after having read Grice (or Aristotle, for that matter -- Grice quotes from his student J. L. Ackrill on "Aristotle on happiness". Palma adds: In a message dated 6/13/2012 5:02:33 A.M. UTC-02, Palma@xxxxxxxxxx writes: that kap entails KKap is false (look at perception) ---- We are considering Grice's claim: Grice KNOWS that Smith is happy. This entails, for McEvoy, the simpler (or is it more complex?) Grice knows that it is true that Smith is happy (Note that Grice, like me, avoids quotes, which Tarski overused). ---- Enns similarly made the remark that truth is a precondition of language. I disagree: TRUST is a precondition of appropriate conversational moves. The category Grice calls, ironically, QUALITY. Do not say what you believe to be false (the first conversational maxim falling one of the four categories -- the others, echoing Kant, being naturally QUANTITY, RELATION, and MODE. --- But as B. Williams and others (unlike Apel) have noted, it's "be trustworthy!" the maxim operating. And 'trust' does not really relate to 'truth'. One can be trustworthy even if one keeps uttering falsities. In a recent essay in NYT, S. Hawkins disagrees with correspondence being the criterion for truth. And indeed, to quote from R. Paul (quoting Hobbes), 'true' can be pretty vacuous --. It is true that there are a few correspondences at play. Regarding two communicating creatures we have at least six correspondences: On the part of the communicator, we have a correspondence between the facts and his thoughts ("It is raining"). Then we have a correspondence between his thoughts and his utterance, "It is raining". Similarly, on the part of the communicatee, the reasoning goes from the utterance, "It is raining" as heard -- the implication that the utterer BELIEVES that it is true that it is raining. -- and second, from the belief on the part of the communicatee that the communicator believes what he says (and that the communicatee trusts the communicator) to the formation of the belief on the part of the communicatee that it is raining (never mind true). In these correspondences, there's nothing like a theory of truth (never mind knowledge) presupposing anything --. It's just a plain Griceian picture. To get a theory of truth or knowledge we must build it step by step from a previous, more basic, theory of communication, alla Grice, of course. Cheers, Speranza ------------------------------------------------------------------ To change your Lit-Ideas settings (subscribe/unsub, vacation on/off, digest on/off), visit www.andreas.com/faq-lit-ideas.html