Well, another thing is, if there are things that cannot be said, does it follow that they can be shown ? If the aroma of coffee is difficult to describe, where is the picture of it ? Off to sleep. O.K. On Thu, May 15, 2014 at 1:16 AM, Redacted sender Jlsperanza@xxxxxxx for DMARC <dmarc-noreply@xxxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote: > In a message dated 5/14/2014 6:45:21 P.M. Eastern Daylight Time, > omarkusto@xxxxxxxxx writes: > It seems that Donal is going into lingiustic philosophy as well. > > quoting: > > "No, it's not. It's not. It's really not.* > This construction may be an example, btw, of one that shows its sense - > and where it would miss that sense to interpret it merely as a set of > "otiose" repetitions. (We may say the sense it shows is, in part, one > where > writing imitates a common aspect of speech, where speech sometimes shows > this > kind of repetitious emphasis.)" > > One problem here is that what McEvoy states the thing _shows_ he manages to > _say_. > > Actually, the 'dictiveness' (versus what I call the 'ostensiveness') is > accountable in terms of conversational implicature. One 'maxim' goes: > > do not be more informative than is required. > > But McEvoy's utterance was, inter alia, > > It's not. It's not. > > It may be argued that the second 'it's not' is over-informative, and > indeed, to quote McEvoy's, 'repetious[ly] emphatic' if not an 'otiosity'. > But > 'conversational implicatures' are ESPECIALLY _triggered_ when maxims such > as > those are _flouted_. On the other hand, while if Witters wants to give a > mystic status to 'what is shown' because it 'cannot be said', that remains > some sort of 'wishful thinking' wherever we find ways of _saying_ what is > _shown_. > > Cheers, > > Speranza > > > > > ------------------------------------------------------------------ > To change your Lit-Ideas settings (subscribe/unsub, vacation on/off, > digest on/off), visit www.andreas.com/faq-lit-ideas.html >