As a layperson rather than expert, and on a serious note, on reviewing the passages below I do not see how 410 adds to what precedes it: for example, if 410 were omitted I do not see that we would find something important missing from the passages preceding it, something that on reading 410 we might go 'A-ha! That explains it'. Which is to say, I don't see how 410 much clarifies or develops what precedes it. At least it is unclear how 410 does this - and you would need some commentary to form a bridge between 410 and what precedes it: but if that commentary must go beyond 410, then 410 might seem inadequate as it stands. On the face of it, 410 simply recapitulates in more general terms what has been said previously: "For the main point is: I did not say that such-and such a person was in pain, but "I am . . . . . " Now in saying this I don't name any person." If we try to put aside the semantics of 'name' by admitting that naming/name is used 410 in a sense more restrictive than when all words might be regarded as kinds of names [when 'running' might be viewed as the name of a certain action (as W seems to allow it might when discussing the Augustine picture of language), and the connective 'and' might name a certain relation between other items of language etc.]: then there is clear enough sense in which 'I' is not straightforwardly a name. Nor does it seem to me "jejeune" in an objectionable way to say this sense is reflected in the fact it would appear wrong to say "My name is I".But so? And how does this connect with the foregoing in PI? What we may perhaps agree is that it would be a mistake to view these passages as propounding a thesis [perhaps to be extracted by analysis], at least that is not their purpose. Their purpose is to help us not be carried away with certain turns of thought that our language may make tempting, by reflecting on what may be said with sense and what may not be said with sense (so that the possibility that seems contained in the latter forms of expression is seen as a mirage). That is, these passages are intended as therapeutic for certain kinds of philosophical flights of thought. Permit me to tie this in with the ubiquitous 'key tenet': for at the back of this therapy is the view that we can only try to show what can be said with sense and what cannot. W is not interested in trying to say what constitutes 'I' or 'naming' or 'sense' or 'pain' or 'person' etc. To try to say anything of this character would conflict with the 'key tenet', and so it is an implicit consequence of the 'key tenet' that W nowhere seeks to say any such thing. W rather takes such terms and, without saying anything of this character, seeks to show what may be said with sense and what may not (using certain thought-experiments to bring this out). For example, I would suggest that 410 should be viewed consistent with W being open to the possibility that we could construct a language-game where 'I' did name a person: but W would then seek to show that, if we did so, this would not get us anywhere in terms of some philosophical argument that an 'I' is [or is not] a 'person'. So when W claims something like '"I" is not the name of a person, nor "here" of a place, and "this" is not a name.', he should not be taken as setting down some grammatical remarks that hold for any possible language-game but as drawing his remarks from looking at how we actually and typically use these items of language. Yet I do not see any greater importance in 410, in terms of developing W's POV, than my "jejeune" post indicates. It seems more a recapitulation. Donal ________________________________ From: Robert Paul <rpaul@xxxxxxxx> To: lit-ideas@xxxxxxxxxxxxx Sent: Tuesday, 26 June 2012, 22:29 Subject: [lit-ideas] Re: In Grice's Name Donal wrote >> Unfortunately Robert's quotation is not given any commentary so that we >> might be enlightened as to whether W means more than merely the >> following: >> >> 'I' does not name a person: hence we do not say 'My name is I' etc. >> >> 'I' may refer to a person: e.g. 'I am a person not a machine, Mr. >> Turing'. >> >> If something more profound or interesting is afoot we should perhaps be >> told. In particular, if W is denying that 'I' may refer to a person just >> as 'there' may refer to a place (on the face of it W doesn't deny they >> may so refer). —————————————————————————————— This short section (§ 410) comes at the end of a discussion that begins at (§ 403). You, as a scholar of Wittgenstein might have seen that it has nothing to do with your jejeune questions—or at least to have done some work yourself, by turning to the passage in question. I sent the post which contains it as a comment on something JL said, and I grant that without a setting it might seem to a layperson to lack any real point. However, in discussions of Wittgenstein, that isn't how you present yourself. 403. If I were to reserve the word "pain" solely for what I had hitherto called "my pain", and others "L.W.'s pain", I should do other people no injustice, so long as a notation were provided in which the loss of the word "pain" in other connexions were somehow supplied. Other people would still be pitied, treated by doctors and so on. It would, of course, be no objection to this mode of expression to say: "But look here, other people have just the same as you!" But what should I gain from this new kind of account? Nothing. But after all neither does the solipsist want any practical advantage when he advances his view! 404. "When I say 'I am in pain', I do not point to a person who is in pain, since in a certain sense I have no idea who is." And this can be given a justification. For the main point is: I did not say that such-and such a person was in pain, but "I am . . . . . " Now in saying this I don't name any person. Just as I don't name anyone when I groan with pain. Though someone else sees who is in pain from the groaning. What does it mean to know who is in pain? It means, for example, to know which man in this room is in pain: for instance, that it is the one who is sitting over there, or the one who is standing in that corner, the tall one over there with the fair hair, and so on.—What am I getting at? At the fact that there is a great variety of criteria for personal 'identity'''.Now which of them determines my saying that '/' am in pain? None. 405. "But at any rate when you say 'I am in pain', you want to draw the attention of others to a particular person."—The answer might be: No, I want to draw their attention to myself.— 406. "But surely what you want to do with the words 'I am. . . .' is to distinguish between yourself and other people."—Can this be said in every case? Even when I merely groan? And even if I do 'want to distinguish' between myself and other people—do I want to distinguish between the person L.W. and the person N.N.? 407. It would be possible to imagine someone groaning out: "Someone is in pain—I don't know who!"—and our then hurrying to help him, the one who groaned. "Someone is in pain—I don't know who!"—and our then hurrying to help him, the one who groaned. 408. "But you aren't in doubt whether it is you or someone else who has the pain!"—The proposition "I don't know whether I or someone else is in pain" would be a logical product, and one of its factors would be: "I don't know whether I am in pain or not"— and that is not a significant proposition. 409. Imagine several people standing in a ring, and me among them. One of us, sometimes this one, sometimes that, is connected to the poles of an electrical machine without our being able to see this. I observe the faces of the others and try to see which of us has just been electrified.—Then I say: "Now I know who it is; for it's myself." In this sense I could also say: "Now I know who is getting the shocks; it is myself." This would be a rather queer way of speaking.—But if I make the supposition that I can feel the shock even when someone else is electrified, then the expression "Now I know who . . . ." becomes quite unsuitable. It does not belong to this game. 410. "I" is not the name of a person, nor "here" of a place, and "this" is not a name. But they are connected with names. Names are explained by means of them. It is also true that it is characteristic of physics not to use these words. —————————————————————————————— The material taken from the online version of Anscombe's translation of the PI, may not wrap correctly, but I'm not able to do anything about it. Sorry. Robert Paul ------------------------------------------------------------------ To change your Lit-Ideas settings (subscribe/unsub, vacation on/off, digest on/off), visit www.andreas.com/faq-lit-ideas.html