[lit-ideas] Grice's Implicature -- Cancelled
- From: Jlsperanza@xxxxxxx
- To: lit-ideas@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
- Date: Sun, 17 Jun 2012 21:14:26 -0400 (EDT)
Grice's Seminar on Implicature -- Cancelled
Grice notes that the important implicatures (which he calls
"conversational") are ALWAYS cancellable:
"He has beautiful handwriting; I don't mean to suggest, of course, that he
is hopeless at philosophy".
Witters, on the other hand, was obsessed, like Grice in aspects _beyond the
saying_. But while Grice's genius coined the 'implicature', Witters got
stuck with things that can be shown, never said.
---
Grice's Implicature
What Grice Implicated
-- but never said?
(The unwritten doctrines).
Wittgenstein's Blindness
Ayer's Wittgenstein
In a message dated 6/17/2012 8:58:40 P.M. UTC-02,
donalmcevoyuk@xxxxxxxxxxx writes:
"It was stated clearly in my original post that Ayer was offering the
quoted words not as criticism of W but as a statement of W's position. Then it
was repeated because JLS appeared not the grasp this. Now, as the cock
crows, it is repeated below." "That is, I suggest Ayer's quoted sentence is
presented by Ayer not as criticism of W but as a statement of W's position.
And this is made even clearer in my comments on this in the original post,
which argued this presentation is mistaken as 'exegesis' and it is a mistake
that arises (at least in part) because Ayer does not grasp the 'key
tenet'." "As Ayer is not criticizing W in the quoted passage it must be a
mistake
to think Ayer is criticizing W because W is against the view that
mathematical propositions hold in virtue of their correspondence with
'mathematical
objects'. [A view Ayer is also against afaik]. So the reference to Stanford
is beside the point." "Further, Pt II of the post (which was too long to
posted as one whole) discussed W's constructivism in the light of the 'key
tenet', suggesting how W's view was not that
'we-must-make-it-up-every-step-of-the-way' but was a constructivism compatible
with the view that
'unless-we-take-a-different-direction' in following a "rule" the direction (of
its
development) may be set by the sense of "the rule" as it stands. And this
kind of constructivism is compatible with the 'key tenet' which would
emphasise that the sense of a "rule" as it stands is not said by the "rule"
but
may be shown - shown even by how the "rule" continues to be applied." "[T]he
quoted passage is not a criticism by Ayer and so cannot properly be
interpreted in terms of W's opposition to 'mathematical objects' (especially as
Ayer shares this opposition himself afaik)." "To end on a less repetitious
note: it may be suggested that, in the light of the 'key tenet', commentary
that tries to solve the supposed "paradox" as to rule-following [by saying
there are grounds for correct rule-following (for example, in community
sanctioned criteria) - and that these grounds can be said] is on the wrong
track. The solution to the apparent "paradox" lies in recognising that we
cannot say the sense of a "rule", and therefore we cannot say what amounts to
obeying or going against it, but we can show the sense in particular cases
and show in particular cases that some 'what-is-said' has a sense (or is a
nonsense) [although whether it has sense, or is nonsense, will depend on much
more than 'what-is-said']. If we try to do more than show the sense we end
up trying to say what can only be shown. And if W thought we could do more
than show the sense he would have said so: he quite conspicuously says no
such thing in PI and he doesn't say he has ever said the sense of anything,
including a "rule"."
Oops, sorry my exegesis went wrong. McEvoy may be right that Ayer is not
offering a statement as _criticism_ of Witters, but a wrong exegesis, which
to me, Griceian as I am -- and all -- amounts to the same thing. Imagine if
St. Paul, instead of writing as he did, were to have offered an
interpretation of Jesus Christ's teachings as having been, "Christ defended
free love
in all its forms, even amongst prostitutes, such as Mary Magdalene". It is
part of a writer on X to be knowledgeable about X, and so, even if it
wasn't Ayer's _intention_ to criticise Witters, it criticised 'the
Witters-in-me'.
Not that I'm much of a Wittgensteinian (although some members of
that prestigious family have an appeal with me). In particular, I follow
Grice, rather than Witters, in thinking of soldiers and conscripts and
volunteers, in the army of morality. (Grice, "Conception of Value"). Grice
thinks
of norms as being followed by either conscripts (who indeed follow them
_blindly_) AND volunteers, who don't. Grice grants that once one is RECRUITED
in the army of morality, it doesn't matter if you got into the army of
morality _as a conscript_ (you were drafted onto morality) or, as Grice
prefers, as a _volunteer_.
The issue opposes the Wittgensteinian view that we always follow
rules _blindly_.
So, the commentary above by McEvoy on Witters's problems with
'rule' may add more complexity than shed light on the alleged 'key tenet'.
In any case, a rule can be stated.
"Rule R:" "Smoking not allowed"
NON-SMOKING
Smoking Forbidden -- etc.
One should consider how 'rules' like that are _stated_. Only once we
consider the formulation of a rule can we start to ramble or explore further
what a rule _shows_ rather than _states_ ('says'). Note that 'state' is
possibly a misnomer here since "Don't smoke!" is HARDLY a statement (of fact).
-So, if Witters's incursions into the philosophy of mathematics (simply as
they are) allow us to think about the meaning of "rule" it is still quite
another thing to consider that McEvoy has convinced us that these
reflections support the 'key tenet'. For a 'rule' is not a typical thing for
which we
look for the _logical form_ -- and the original formulation of the
show/say distinction -- and the show-say dogma by Witters ("There are things
which
can not be said, but SHOWN only") is all about logical form (what a
logical form says and what it shows).
The original distinction (AND DOGMA, much refuted by Carnap in his
famous paper on "how Witters got it all wrong, 'some things that cannot be
said can only shown') requires, in any case a substantive criticism.
It is one thing to consider, as McEvoy does, that the 'tenet' HOLDS
for all aspects of Witters's philosophy (it is a generalised 'key' tenet)
and it is, perhaps a more interesting, issue, to consider how Wrong Witters
was when even suggesting "Some things that cannot be said can only be
shown". In my post, "Witters: The Unshowable" I quoted from further evidence
as
to how misguided Witters was in all this. Etc.
Cheers,
Speranza
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