[lit-ideas] Grice's Implicature -- Cancelled

  • From: Jlsperanza@xxxxxxx
  • To: lit-ideas@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
  • Date: Sun, 17 Jun 2012 21:14:26 -0400 (EDT)

Grice's Seminar on Implicature -- Cancelled
Grice notes that the important implicatures (which he calls  
"conversational") are ALWAYS cancellable:
"He has beautiful handwriting; I don't mean to suggest, of course, that he  
is hopeless at philosophy". 
Witters, on the other hand, was obsessed, like Grice in aspects _beyond the 
 saying_. But while Grice's genius coined the 'implicature', Witters got 
stuck  with things that can be shown, never said. 
Grice's Implicature
What Grice Implicated
-- but never said?
(The unwritten doctrines).
Wittgenstein's Blindness
Ayer's Wittgenstein 

In a message dated 6/17/2012 8:58:40 P.M.  UTC-02, 
donalmcevoyuk@xxxxxxxxxxx writes:
"It was stated clearly in my  original post that Ayer was offering the 
quoted words not as criticism of W but  as a statement of W's position. Then it 
was repeated because JLS appeared not  the grasp this. Now, as the cock 
crows, it is repeated below." "That is, I  suggest Ayer's quoted sentence is 
presented by Ayer not as criticism of W but as  a statement of W's position. 
And this is made even clearer in my comments on  this in the original post, 
which argued this presentation is mistaken as  'exegesis' and it is a mistake 
that arises (at least in part) because Ayer does  not grasp the 'key 
tenet'." "As Ayer is not criticizing W in the quoted passage  it must be a 
to think Ayer is criticizing W because W is against the  view that 
mathematical propositions hold in virtue of their correspondence with  
objects'. [A view Ayer is also against afaik]. So the reference to  Stanford 
is beside the point." "Further, Pt II of the post (which was too long  to 
posted as one whole) discussed W's constructivism in the light of the 'key  
tenet', suggesting how W's view was not that  
'we-must-make-it-up-every-step-of-the-way' but was a constructivism compatible  
with the view that 
'unless-we-take-a-different-direction' in following a "rule"  the direction (of 
development) may be set by the sense of "the rule" as it  stands. And this 
kind of constructivism is compatible with the 'key tenet' which  would 
emphasise that the sense of a "rule" as it stands is not said by the  "rule" 
may be shown - shown even by how the "rule" continues to be applied."  "[T]he 
quoted passage is not a criticism by Ayer and so cannot properly be  
interpreted in terms of W's opposition to 'mathematical objects' (especially as 
Ayer shares this opposition himself afaik)." "To end on a less repetitious 
note:  it may be suggested that, in the light of the 'key tenet', commentary 
that tries  to solve the supposed "paradox" as to rule-following [by saying 
there are  grounds for correct rule-following (for example, in community 
sanctioned  criteria) - and that these grounds can be said] is on the wrong 
track. The  solution to the apparent "paradox" lies in recognising that we 
cannot say the  sense of a "rule", and therefore we cannot say what amounts to 
obeying or going  against it, but we can show the sense in particular cases 
and show in particular  cases that some 'what-is-said' has a sense (or is a 
nonsense) [although whether  it has sense, or is nonsense, will depend on much 
more than 'what-is-said']. If  we try to do more than show the sense we end 
up trying to say what can only be  shown. And if W thought we could do more 
than show the sense he would have said  so: he quite conspicuously says no 
such thing in PI and he doesn't say he has  ever said the sense of anything, 
including a "rule"."
Oops, sorry my exegesis went wrong. McEvoy may be right that Ayer is not  
offering a statement as _criticism_ of Witters, but a wrong exegesis, which 
to  me, Griceian as I am -- and all -- amounts to the same thing. Imagine if 
St.  Paul, instead of writing as he did, were to have offered an 
interpretation of  Jesus Christ's teachings as having been, "Christ defended 
free love 
in all its  forms, even amongst prostitutes, such as Mary Magdalene". It is 
part of a writer  on X to be knowledgeable about X, and so, even if it 
wasn't Ayer's _intention_  to criticise Witters, it criticised 'the 
        Not that I'm much of a  Wittgensteinian (although some members of 
that prestigious family have an appeal  with me). In particular, I follow 
Grice, rather than Witters, in thinking of  soldiers and conscripts and 
volunteers, in the army of morality. (Grice,  "Conception of Value"). Grice 
of norms as being followed by either  conscripts (who indeed follow them 
_blindly_) AND volunteers, who don't. Grice  grants that once one is RECRUITED 
in the army of morality, it doesn't matter if  you got into the army of 
morality _as a conscript_ (you were drafted onto  morality) or, as Grice 
prefers, as a _volunteer_.
       The issue opposes the Wittgensteinian  view that we always follow 
rules _blindly_. 
       So, the commentary above by McEvoy on  Witters's problems with 
'rule' may add more complexity than shed light on the  alleged 'key tenet'.
       In any case, a rule can be  stated.
       "Rule R:" "Smoking not allowed"
       Smoking Forbidden -- etc.
One should consider how 'rules' like that are _stated_. Only once we  
consider the formulation of a rule can we start to ramble or explore further  
what a rule _shows_ rather than _states_ ('says'). Note that 'state' is 
possibly  a misnomer here since "Don't smoke!" is HARDLY a statement (of fact).
-So, if Witters's incursions into the philosophy of mathematics (simply as  
they are) allow us to think about the meaning of "rule" it is still quite  
another thing to consider that McEvoy has convinced us that these 
reflections  support the 'key tenet'. For a 'rule' is not a typical thing for 
which we 
look  for the _logical form_ -- and the original formulation of the 
show/say  distinction -- and the show-say dogma by Witters ("There are things 
can  not be said, but SHOWN only") is all about logical form (what a 
logical form  says and what it shows).
      The original distinction (AND DOGMA, much  refuted by Carnap in his 
famous paper on "how Witters got it all wrong, 'some  things that cannot be 
said can only shown') requires, in any case a substantive  criticism.
      It is one thing to consider, as McEvoy does,  that the 'tenet' HOLDS 
for all aspects of Witters's philosophy (it is a  generalised 'key' tenet) 
and it is, perhaps a more interesting, issue, to  consider how Wrong Witters 
was when even suggesting "Some things that cannot be  said can only be 
shown". In my post, "Witters: The Unshowable" I quoted from  further evidence 
to how misguided Witters was in all this. Etc.
To change your Lit-Ideas settings (subscribe/unsub, vacation on/off,
digest on/off), visit www.andreas.com/faq-lit-ideas.html

Other related posts: