[lit-ideas] Re: Griceian Numbers
- From: Donal McEvoy <donalmcevoyuk@xxxxxxxxxxx>
- To: "lit-ideas@xxxxxxxxxxxxx" <lit-ideas@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Date: Sat, 16 Jun 2012 20:00:08 +0100 (BST)
Unfortunately, JLS' posts (rightly or wrongly, but probably wrongly) stray from
my posts in ways that make it harder to match them up for discussion.
Nevertheless...
________________________________
From: "Jlsperanza@xxxxxxx" <Jlsperanza@xxxxxxx>
>---- Ayer is being simplistic in using, if he does, 'about'. Aboutness is a
rather technical term in pragmatics, and whether the 'number word' belongs
in the subject (topic) or predicate (comment, focus) will determine
whether we are entitled to say that an expression is, strictly, ABOUT a number
word.>
This is (unfortunately) JLS' interpolation - this "about" - i.e. it is JLS who
translated what I quoted from Ayer into Ayer saying that "Bring three apples"
is "about apples and about three". Ayer didn't say this; and I am unsure how
this 'translation' at all helps. So JLS introduces it and then accuses Ayer of
"being simplistic" in using it, when Ayer didn't, JLS did. And it is no excuse
in my view that JLS adds "if he does" - JLS should not waste time introducing
misconceived paraphrase.
It is remarkable (to me anyway) how often JLS cannot stick to the point. (If he
were a lawyer, the judge would be tearing his hair out), The original point
gets lost in some tenuous translation and then the translation sprouts a whole
series of other points, some so far removed from what was initially at stake
that it frustrates rational discussion. Somehow we have got from my post, which
did not bring up "aboutness" at all, to "Aboutness is a rather technical term
in pragmatics.." This, I suggest, is not my fault.
>I haven't checked philosophies of number to see if Ayer's criticism, or
Witters' main point, figure.>
Well, gee. So?
Now we come to what may be an important point:-
>Witters can be all the antiphilosophical or antimetaphysical he wants; it's
how historians consider his views that matter; and the worst metaphysics,
for Grice, is anti-metaphysics (for to deny a metaphysical claim is to HOLD
one).>
First, no, it is not how historians consider his views that matters (this
smacks of daft historicism) - what matters is the merits of W's views. Nor do I
think we can easily say the worst metaphysics is anti-metaphysics: the
metaphysics that lies behind the rise of fascism, for example, [a series of
metaphysical beliefs including 'historicism', 'ethical positivism',
'biological/racial determinism', and Hegelian reification of the state] surely
did much more damage than anti-metaphysics such as Hume's kind of positivism?
That leaves one important claim:- that "to deny a metaphysical claim is to HOLD
one". Now, this may be correct - and I think Popper would agree it is correct:
i.e. an anti-metaphysical position is itself a kind of metaphysical position
(in Popper's approach any claim that is not testable by observation is
'metaphysical'). But this does not refute all forms of anti-metaphysical stance
- which are as old, we might say, as any metaphysical stance (the debate about
the worth of philosophy is as old as philosophical debate). And while Popper
abandoned as mistaken his early view that only scientific discussion could be
"rational", the "rationality" of metaphysical discussion may be thought as
being of a much, more limited order than the rationality of science.
There are certain possibly self-refuting kinds of anti-metaphysical stance. The
view that ''only the propositions of natural science may be true" is not a
proposition of natural science and so cannot be true (according to itself). The
view that ''only the propositions of natural science have sense" is
not a proposition of natural science and so cannot have sense (according
to itself). If not actually self-refuting there is something obviously v
problematic about this kind of stance.
But if we view the later W in terms of the 'key tenet' his anti-metaphysical
stance is not of this obviously v problematic type. For W's opposition is not
to 'metaphysics' per se but to attempts to say 'what is the case'
metaphysically, since W takes the view these attempts are misconceived because
they are trying to say a 'what-is-the-case' that cannot be said in language but
where the truth may only be shown. And this 'key tenet' is the fundamental
point of continuity between the W of theTractatus and of the Investigations. W
is not denying there is a metaphysical world but is denying we can say much
about it: and what we may show, in the later W's view, does not constitute a
theory or thesis about this metaphysical world.
Of course, we may say this position - that what metaphysics tries to say strays
beyond what can be said with sense - is itself a metaphysical position. But it
escapes the character of being self-refuting if we accept that this position is
not put forward as something said or that can be said, but as a position that
may be only be shown. And the very form of presentation that W uses in
Investigations is to put his position forward as one that may be shown - not as
something said: so the 'key tenet' itself is left implicit or as shown by what
is said. This is also why W is so adamant he is not presenting a theory or
thesis - i.e. saying anything metaphysical - for of course this would undermine
his anti-metaphysical stance. Instead his work is a kind of therapy on certain
kinds of metaphysical 'illnesses' that arise when we try to go beyond what can
be said with sense.
It is clear enough that in Investigations we find a W who thinks a logicist
programme [such as perhaps JLS finds in Grice] is but another misconceived to
say what cannot be said. That this view is as easily dismissed as JLS thinks,
seems to me a mistake. It is a mistake not to take seriously that there are
"limits to language" and that these "limits" may have vital implications for
philosophy and in particular any programme that seeks to put philosophy on a
logicist footing. These "limits" may put many dreamt-up programmes for
philosophy into a category of futile attempts to say what goes beyond what can
be said with sense.
Donal
Salop
Seeing that McEvoy's point (focus, and interest) is about what he calls a
'key tenet' -- that the show/say distinction applies to ALL the Witters --
of TLP and PI notably -- I concentrated on his point about _sense_.
I provided the dissertation reference as one against a simplistic take on
the "sense" of 'two' (for "Three apples were rotten" is consistent with "The
whole twelve apples in the package were rotten" -- and so on).
I provided the view that it's best to treat number words as "SPECIFIC
quantifiers". I should revise the literature in that area.
Only then can we start to analyse what contributes to the 'key tenet' as to
the alleged "sense" of a 'number word' (like 'two') is only SHOWN but not
SAID, in something as simple as a mason (I think the profession Witters is
focusing) saying,
Three red bricks, please.
And so on.
Cheers,
Speranza
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