[lit-ideas] Re: Griceian Numbers
- From: Jlsperanza@xxxxxxx
- To: lit-ideas@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
- Date: Sat, 16 Jun 2012 09:36:00 -0400 (EDT)
In a message dated 6/16/2012 7:22:36 A.M. UTC-02,
donalmcevoyuk@xxxxxxxxxxx writes:
"JLS also overlooks that my criticism was not so much of Ayer taking the
view that we need to mark a (metaphysical) distinction between number and
object, but that Ayer's exegesis is mistaken: it is mistaken for Ayer to
suggest that it is W's point to say that the sense of numbers and objects [as
in "Pass me three apples"] must be shown in different ways [because of the
different metaphysical character of numbers and objects]. To attribute this
kind of metaphysical POV to W runs against W's actual POV."
Perhaps then we should provide further illustrations -- of 'language games'
if you mustn't.
"Pass me three apples"
is perhaps insufficient, in that I was making a point about
'three' and 'red'.
I think Witters uses:
"Three bricks"
in which case, to complicate, we may add an adjective,
"three red bricks" -- supposing the house being build will use both red
and, say, yellow, bricks.
----
In my longish posts on Grice on numbers, I take this from the review which
I linked:
"Apart from the core use of the specification of
cardinality, these include the numeral as a label, the numeral as a
temporal indicator and the numeral as a mathematical primitive."
and further uses of 'number words' in discourse. I don't think Witters --
never mind Ayer -- attempted such an analysis. But Grice (and I) would hold
that 'botany' (linguistic botany) about 'x' is a prerequisite for any
enlightment on the part of a philosopher about 'x'. This dissertation I was
mentioning analysed 1,000 occurrences of the word 'two' in the British
National
Corpus. The author concludes that to speak of the _sense_ of "two" does
not really make sense.
I would disagree, but would disagree in view of the LOGICAL FORM (as in the
reference to the underspecification, in the review) of an expression
containing a number word.
As in:
Pass me three bricks.
Pass me three red bricks.
Three bricks
Red bricks
---- Ayer is being simplistic in using, if he does, 'about'. Aboutness is a
rather technical term in pragmatics, and whether the 'number word' belongs
in the subject (topic) or predicate (comment, focus) will determine
whether we are entitled to say that an expression is, strictly, ABOUT a number
word.
I haven't checked philosophies of number to see if Ayer's criticism, or
Witters' main point, figure.
Witters can be all the antiphilosophical or antimetaphysical he wants; it's
how historians consider his views that matter; and the worst metaphysics,
for Grice, is anti-metaphysics (for to deny a metaphysical claim is to HOLD
one).
Seeing that McEvoy's point (focus, and interest) is about what he calls a
'key tenet' -- that the show/say distinction applies to ALL the Witters --
of TLP and PI notably -- I concentrated on his point about _sense_.
I provided the dissertation reference as one against a simplistic take on
the "sense" of 'two' (for "Three apples were rotten" is consistent with "The
whole twelve apples in the package were rotten" -- and so on).
I provided the view that it's best to treat number words as "SPECIFIC
quantifiers". I should revise the literature in that area.
Only then can we start to analyse what contributes to the 'key tenet' as to
the alleged "sense" of a 'number word' (like 'two') is only SHOWN but not
SAID, in something as simple as a mason (I think the profession Witters is
focusing) saying,
Three red bricks, please.
And so on.
Cheers,
Speranza
Chierchia, G. 2004. Scalar Implicatures, Polarity Phenomena, and the
Syntax/Pragmatics Interface. In Belletti, B. (ed.), Structures and
Beyond: The Cartography of Syntactic Structures. Vol. 3. New York,
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Geurts, B. 1998. Scalars. In Ludewig, P. and Geurts, B. (eds.)
Lexicalische Semantik aus Cognitiver Sicht. Tuebingen: Gunter Narr.
95-117.
Horn, L. 1972. On the Semantic Properties of Logical Operators in
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Musolino, J. 2004. The semantics and acquisition of number words:
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Noveck, I. 2001. When children are more logical than adults:
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van Rooy, R. and Schulz, K. 2004. Exhaustive interpretation of
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491-519.
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