[lit-ideas] Re: Can we do what we ought to do? Is the Metropolit Orthodox?
- From: wokshevs@xxxxxx
- To: lit-ideas@xxxxxxxxxxxxx, Phil Enns <phil.enns@xxxxxxxxxxx>
- Date: Fri, 18 Aug 2006 17:09:37 -0230
Maybe this would be a helpful way of putting things. (I'll avoid the references
to the postulations of a Supreme Lawgiver or Cause of Nature, because K.
believes, correctly in my view, that reliance on such a construct is a sign of
heteronomy in moral matters.)
I think K. believes that if we have an obligation to P, then we can P. The
converse is of course false. K. also believes that as the finite, fallible
beings we are, we have no certainty that any action performed is done from
duty. Actions performed in accordance with duty are demonstrable as such. But
whether our actions (or maxims) really are performed solely from (i.e.,
"determined in their ground by") the motive of respect for moral law is never a
question we can answer with certainty. (I like to think I make donations to our
campus foodbank for reasons other than the conditional desire to go to heaven,
should there be a god.) Thgis is not, alas, something I can know. Morality for
Kant is not a matter of theoretical knowledge; it commands, doesn't describe.
The moral worth of our dispositions is determined by the extent to which we try
to be moral agents. (Camus, again.) It's a kind of infinite task, given all the
great cars, etc. around to tempt us otherwise. (Interestingly, despite all the
supposed severity, austerity and rigour of Kant's moral theory, he says very
little about blaming people for doing wrong.)
Cheers, Walter
Walter C. Okshevsky
Memorial U
Quoting Phil Enns <phil.enns@xxxxxxxxxxx>:
> Walter Okshevsky wrote:
>
> "I think what Kant means is that there is no asurance that she who does
> her duty from duty will reap any rewards of happiness, well-being or
> even a great deal from Geico. (I think Kant subscribes to the view that
> 'ought' implies 'can.')"
>
> I would like to suggest that the discussion about happiness is really a
> discussion about 'ought implies can'. Note that in the passage I
> quoted, Kant's interest lies in the harmonization of will and practical
> principles. If there is not a harmonization of nature and practical
> principles, there will never be certainty that one's actions are the
> instantiation of any particular practical principle. How can one know
> that any particular course of action is moral if there is no certainty
> that moral principles can be acted on? Without this harmony, the
> relationship between will and practical principle is an unhappy one. In
> order for the individual to have happiness in this regard, one must
> postulate a necessary connection between the world and practical reason
> so that where we ought to act morally, we can.
>
>
> I had written:
>
> "If one cannot be certain that acting morally will produce good
> consequences, then how can one be certain that moral acts are even
> possible?"
>
> to which Walter replied:
>
> "By coming to recognize that the good will is not defined by its
> successes and failures as effects of its willing?
>
> Again, I would like to suggest that the problem for Kant is not about
> whether being moral gets one a fast car and beautiful women, but whether
> one can be successfully moral. Imagine one is working on one's golf
> swing. How does one know that one has got the swing right? Well, one
> watches the flight of the golf ball. Now the ball may land in the rough
> because one wasn't properly lined up, or the ball may hit a player
> playing ahead because one wasn't patient enough, or the ball may end up
> in a divot. Getting the swing right doesn't ensure a perfect lie, but
> it will ensure that the ball takes the proper flight. So also with
> moral actions. There must be a successful enactment of a practical
> principle if one is to consider that one is being moral.
>
>
> I had written:
>
> "So, while the moral law functions independently of consequences, the
> moral law requires a certainty that moral acts and the proper
> consequences will necessarily follow from such acts."
>
> to which Walter replied:
>
> "You lose me on the second part: consequences have no "necessity" about
> them since they display empirical connections (with causes) and are as
> such contingent."
>
> Imagine that a cashier at a store gives me too much change. The proper
> thing to do is to return the excess. However, imagine that I discover
> the excess change only after the store has closed. In this case
> returning the change will require that I return when the store re-opens.
> That is, doing the right thing requires not only that I intend to return
> the money but that the money is actually returned. The store having the
> excess change back in its possession is a necessary element of the moral
> act. That this cashier gave the excess change to me and that the store
> was closed when I discovered the excess, are all contingent elements.
> However, being moral requires that the relevant moral principle can
> necessarily be applied to these contingencies in such a manner that it
> is possible to identify a moral act in progress. If the proper
> consequences do not follow, for example the store not ever having the
> excess change back in its possession, then there can be no moral act.
>
>
> Walter:
>
> "Could you provide a reference for: 'if one does not assume a Supreme
> Lawgiver, then one cannot assume that the causality required for moral
> activity is possible in the world.'"
>
> Sure. I gave it in the post, but here it is again:
>
> "Therefore, the highest good in the world is possible only insofar as a
> supreme cause of nature having a causality in keeping with the moral
> disposition is assumed." (5:125)
>
> According to Kant, without postulating an intelligent being that
> harmonizes the causality of nature with the moral law, one cannot be
> certain that one can do what one ought to do.
>
>
> Sincerely,
>
> Phil Enns
> Toronto, ON
>
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