[lit-ideas] A Few Obvious Options on Iran
- From: Eric Yost <eyost1132@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- To: lit-ideas@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
- Date: Sun, 09 Apr 2006 04:38:27 -0400
Andreas: Details on the number of targets, the
size of the attack...
Many, many options are being contemplated. Here
are just a few of the more obvious ones:
[from Cordesman & Al-Rodhan: Iranian Nuclear
Weapons, The Options of Diplomacy Fails 4/7/06
Page 40]
Demonstrative, Coercive, or Deterrent Strikes
• Conduct a few cruise missile or stealth strikes
simply as a demonstration or warning of the
seriousness of US intentions if Iran does not
comply with the terms of the EU3 or UN.
• Hit at least one high value target recognized by
IAEA and EU3 to show credibility to Iran, minimize
international criticism.
• Might strike at new sites and activities to show
Iran cannot secretly proceed with, or expand its
efforts, by ignoring the UN or EU3.
• Could carrier base; would not need territory of
Gulf ally.
• International reaction would be a problem
regardless of the level of US action.
• Might trigger Iranian counteraction in Iraq,
Afghanistan, and dealing with Hezbollah.
Limited US attacks
• Limited strike would probably take 16-20 Cruise
missile and strike sorties. (Total sorties in Gulf
and area would probably have to total 100 or more
including escorts, enablers, and refuelers.
• Might be able to combine B-2s and carrier-based
aircraft and sea-launched cruise missiles. Might
well need land base(s) in Gulf for staging,
refueling, and recovery.
• Goal would be at least 2-3 of most costly and
major facilities critically damaged or destroyed.
• Hit at high value targets recognized by IAEA and
EU3 to show credibility to Iran, minimize
international criticism.
• Might strike at new sites and activities to show
Iran cannot secretly proceed with, or expand its
efforts, by ignoring the UN or EU3.
• Might slow down Iran if used stealth aircraft to
strike at hard and underground targets, but impact
over time would probably still be more
demonstrative than crippling.
• Hitting hard and underground targets could
easily require multiple strikes during mission,
and follow-on restrikes to be effective.
• Battle damage would be a significant problem,
particularly for large buildings and underground
facilities.
• Size and effectiveness would depend very heavily
on the quality of US intelligence, and suitability
of given ordnance, as well as the time the US
sought to inflict a given effect.
• Iran’s technology base would survive; the same
would be true of much of equipment even in
facilities hit with strikes. Little impact, if
any, on pool of scientists and experts.
• Iranian response in terms of proliferation could
vary sharply and unpredictably: Deter and delay
vs. mobilize and provoke.
• Likely to produce cosmetic Iranian change in
behavior at best. Would probably make Iran
disperse program even more, and drive it to deep
underground facilities. Might provoke to implement
(more) active biological warfare program.
• Any oil embargo likely to be demonstrative.
• Would probably trigger Iranian counteraction in
Iraq, Afghanistan, and dealing with Hezbollah.
• International reaction could be a serious
problem; US might well face same level of
political problems as if it had launched a
comprehensive strike on Iranian facilities.
Major US attacks on Iranian CBRN and major missile
targets
• 200-600 cruise missiles and strike sorties;
would have to be at least a matching number of
escorts, enablers, and refuelers. Period of
attacks could extend from 3 to 10 days.
• Hit all suspect facilities for nuclear, missile,
BW, and related C4IBM.
• Knock out key surface-to-air missile sites and
radars for future freedom of action
• Would need to combine B-2s, carrier-based
aircraft and sea-launched cruise missiles, and
used of land base(s) in Gulf for staging,
refueling, and recovery.
• Threaten to strike extensively at Iranian
capabilities for asymmetric warfare and to
threaten tanker traffic, facilities in the Gulf,
and neighboring states.
• At least 7-10 days to fully execute and validate.
• Goal would be at least 70-80% of most costly and
major facilities critically damaged or destroyed.
• Hit at all high value targets recognized by IAEA
and EU3 to show credibility to Iran, minimize
international criticism, but also possible sites
as well.
• Strike at all known new sites and activities to
show Iran cannot secretly proceed with, or expand
its efforts, unless hold back some targets as
hostages to the future.
• Impact over time would probably be crippling,
but Iran might still covertly assemble some
nuclear device and could not halt Iranian
biological weapons effort.
• Hitting hard and underground targets could
easily require multiple strikes during mission,
and follow-on restrikes to be effective.
• Battle damage would be a significant problem,
particularly for large buildings and underground
facilities.
• Size and effectiveness would depend very heavily
on the quality of US intelligence and suitability
of given ordnance, as well as the time the US
sought to inflict a given effect.
• Much of Iran’s technology base would still
survive; the same would be true of many equipment
items, even in facilities hit with strikes. Some
impact, if any, on pool of scientists and experts.
• Iranian response in terms of proliferation could
vary sharply and unpredictably: Deter and delay
vs. mobilize and provoke.
• A truly serious strike may be enough of a
deterrent to change Iranian behavior, particularly
if coupled to the threat of follow on strikes in
the future. It still, however, could as easily
produce only a cosmetic Iranian change in behavior
at best. Iran might still disperse its program
even more, and shift to multiple, small, deep
underground facilities.
• Might well provoke Iran to implement (more)
active biological warfare program.
• An oil embargo might be serious.
• Iranian government could probably not prevent
some elements in Iranian forces and intelligence
from seeking to use Iraq, Afghanistan, support of
terrorism, and Hezbollah to hit back at the US and
its allies if it tried; it probably would not try.
• International reaction would be a serious
problem, but the US might well face same level of
political problems as if it had launched a small
strike on Iranian facilities.
Major US attacks on military and related civilian
targets
• 1000-2,500 cruise missiles and strike sorties
• Hit all suspect facilities for nuclear, missile,
BW, and C4IBM, and potentially “technology base”
targets including universities, dual use facilities.
• Either strike extensively at Iranian
capabilities for asymmetric warfare and to
threaten tanker traffic, facilities in the Gulf,
and neighboring states or threaten to do so if
Iran should deploy for such action.
• Would require a major portion of total US global
assets. Need to combine B-2s, other bombers, and
carrierbased aircraft and sea-launched cruise
missiles. Would need land base(s) in Gulf for
staging, refueling, and recovery. Staging out of
Diego Garcia would be highly desirable.
• Would probably take several weeks to two months
to fully execute and validate.
• Goal would be 70-80%-plus of most costly and
major CBRN, missile and other delivery systems,
key conventional air and naval strike assets, and
major military production facilities critically
damaged or destroyed.
• Hit at all high value targets recognized by IAEA
and EU3 to show credibility to Iran, minimize
international criticism, but also possible sites
as well.
• Strike at all known new sites and activities to
show Iran cannot secretly proceed with, or expand
its efforts, unless hold back some targets as
hostages to the future.
• Hitting hard and underground targets could
easily require multiple strikes during mission,
and follow-on restrikes to be effective.
• Impact over time would probably be crippling,
but Iran might still covertly assemble some
nuclear device and could not halt Iranian
biological weapons effort.
• Battle damage would be a significant problem,
particularly for large buildings and underground
facilities.
• Size and effectiveness would depend very heavily
on the quality of US intelligence and suitability
of given ordnance, as well as the time the US
sought to inflict a given effect.
• Much of Iran’s technology base would still
survive; the same would be true of many equipment
items, even in facilities hit with strikes. Some
impact, if any, on pool of scientists and experts.
• Iranian response in terms of proliferation could
vary sharply and unpredictably: Deter and delay
vs. mobilize and provoke.
• Such a series of strikes might be enough of a
deterrent to change Iranian behavior, particularly
if coupled to the threat of follow on strikes in
the future. It still, however, could as easily
produce only a cosmetic
Iranian change in behavior at best. Iran might
still disperse its program even more, and shift to
multiple, small, deep underground facilities.
• Might well provoke Iran to implement (more)
active biological warfare program.
• An oil embargo might be serious.
• Iranian government could probably not prevent
some elements in Iranian forces and intelligence
from seeking to use Iraq, Afghanistan, support of
terrorism, and Hezbollah to hit back at the US and
its allies if it tried; it probably would not try.
• International reaction would be a serious
problem, and far greater than strikes that could
be clearly associated with Iran’s efforts to
proliferate.
Delay and then strike
• The US could execute any of the above options,
and wait until after Iran provided proof was
proliferating.
Such a “smoking gun” would create a much higher
chance of allied support, and international
tolerance or consensus
• Iran will have committed major resources, and
created much higher value targets
• The counter-risk is an unanticipated Iranian
break out; some form of Iranian launch on warning
(LOW), launch under attack (LUA), or survivable
“ride out” capability.
• Iranian dispersal and sheltering may be much better.
• Iran might have biological weapons as a counter
• Allied and regional reactions would be
uncertain. Time tends to breed tolerance of
proliferation.
------------------------------------------------------------------
To change your Lit-Ideas settings (subscribe/unsub, vacation on/off,
digest on/off), visit www.andreas.com/faq-lit-ideas.html
Other related posts:
- » [lit-ideas] A Few Obvious Options on Iran
