[cryptome] Re: The NSA snooping.
- From: Aftermath <aftermath.thegreat@xxxxxxxxx>
- To: cryptome@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
- Date: Sat, 20 Jul 2013 13:21:33 -0700
Some one from a private mailing list I am on just dropped links to these
two documents.that are relevant to the subject. I searched cryptome and did
not find these documents indexed:
https://www.law.upenn.edu/live/files/1718-ambinder10-things.pdf
(not really a document, but interesting):
http://www.barthworks.com/technical/nsaafter911.htm
On Sat, Jul 20, 2013 at 8:56 AM, Al Mac Wow <macwheel99@xxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
> ** ** **
>
> Leaders of the ****US**** security services have been saying that if we
> want to find a needle in a haystack, first we need to have the haystack.**
> **
>
> Based on recent history, it is evident that statement is misleading.****
>
> ** **
>
> The 9/11 investigations found that government agencies collectively had
> sufficient dots to have averted the disaster, if only:****
>
> - The different agencies had shared with each other, the data they
> had. This sharing had been prohibited by legislation in the wake of Church
> Committee, which had found gross violations of civil liberties by the *
> ***US**** security services, by pervasive surveillance of forms which
> have now been made legal by the Patriot Act, FISA court legal
> interpretations, and other means.****
> - Additional related dots might have been helpful.****
> - The security services needed quality data management tools to help
> cross-index or map potentially related dots.****
> - Analysts needed to comprehend the significance of the data, to
> connect relevant dots.****
> - Political leaders needed to act wisely when delivered actionable
> intelligence, instead of letting ideology or partisanship get in the way.
> ****
>
> ** **
>
> There were also problems of mutual cooperation, and speedy
> inter-communications, among government agencies, as the 9/11 attacks and
> aftermath unfolded. Some mid level government workers implemented good
> decisions, without awaiting higher level approval, because higher level was
> effectively paralyzed.****
>
> ** **
>
> Reforms after 9/11 were supposed to fix problems found by the
> investigations, to help the nation lower risk of similar events in the
> future, and to better respond if and when they occurred.****
>
> ** **
>
> The Boston Marathon investigations, just like the 9/11 investigations,
> found that government agencies collectively had sufficient dots to have
> averted that disaster, if only similar reasons. The main difference
> between 9/11 and ****Boston****, is that collectively the government
> agencies were drowning in dots. Due to secrecy, the public does not know
> the quality of analysis tools being used by the security services, but we
> do see the failure of different agencies, each having pieces of the
> haystack, failing to share dots, so that each agency had small pieces of a
> jigsaw puzzle, which could have been combined to map out high risk of
> danger. ****
>
> ** **
>
> There’s also the problem of ordinary people who witnessed important dots
> before the bombing, and they chose to keep them confidential. Those dots
> alone, without the collected haystack, broken down into different agencies
> not sharing dots, could have averted the atrocity.****
>
> ** **
>
> What we have learned, thanks to Ed Snowden leaks, the dots being collected
> by NSA will only help if:****
>
> 1. Intelligence outside, of the dot collection, locate some possible
> enemy outside of the ****USA****.****
> 2. That suspect communicates with someone inside the ****USA****.****
> 3. Security service personnel dream up good enough queries of the
> dots, and are able to act promptly enough to prevent the attack.****
>
> ** **
>
> This dot collection does not help with purely home grown challenges, like
> the OK City bomber, Sikh Temple, Denver Theater shooting, Sandy Hook
> School, etc. There are other gaps, of potential threats, which this system
> won’t catch.****
>
> ** **
>
> Alister William Macintyre****
>
Other related posts:
