Excelente entrevista!!! gracias.
Betty
2016-02-07 19:10 GMT+01:00 william mejia <dmarc-noreply@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>:
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*From:* "'niem.migr' NIEM.migr@xxxxxxxxx [niem_rj]" <
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*Sent:* Sunday, February 7, 2016 7:12 AM
*Subject:* [NIEM] Europa .
http://www.eldiario.es/interferencias/Javier-Lucas-Union-Europea-inmigrantes_6_478812126.html
Javier de Lucas: “La Unión Europea está, de facto, en una situación de
guerra contra los inmigrantes”
Organismos internacionales calculan que unos 3.771 refugiados y migrantes
murieron el año pasado al intentar cruzar el mar Mediterráneo rumbo a
Europa. La Unión Europea es cómplice de la tragedia. ¿Hay otras políticas
migratorias y de asilo posibles?
Entrevista con Javier de Lucas, profesor de filosofía del derecho, sobre
políticas migratorias europeas, prácticas de resistencia y el giro
securitario tras los atentados de París.
Amador Fernández-Savater
<http://www.eldiario.es/autores/amador_fernandez-savater/> - Amarela
Varela
29/01/2016 -
[image: Javier de Lucas (1952, Murcia)]
Javier de Lucas (1952, Murcia)
Organismos internacionales calculan que unos 3.771 refugiados y migrantes
murieron el año pasado al intentar cruzar el mar Mediterráneo rumbo a
Europa. La Unión Europea es cómplice de la tragedia. ¿Hay otras políticas
migratorias y de asilo posibles?
Javier de Lucas
<https://es.wikipedia.org/wiki/Francisco_Javier_de_Lucas_Mart%C3%ADn> trabaja
desde 2004 en el Instituto de Derechos Humanos de la Universidad de
Valencia. Es profesor de filosofía del Derecho y de filosofía política,
especializado fundamentalmente en problemas relacionados con los derechos
humanos, las políticas migratorias y de asilo, la pluriculturalidad y la
democracia.
Invitado en diciembre por la Feria del Libro de Guadalajara de México a
presentar su último trabajo,* El mediterráneo: el naufragio de Europa
<http://www.tirant.com/editorial/libro/mediterraneo-el-naufragio-de-europa-javier-de-lucas-9788416349890>*,
Javier de Lucas impartió también un seminario en la UNAM sobre políticas
migratorias, al que fue invitado por la profesora, investigadora, activista
y amiga Amarela Varela.
En ese contexto, Amarela Varela, Javier de Lucas y yo mantuvimos la
siguiente conversación sobre las políticas migratorias y de refugiados ,
las prácticas de resistencias a la violencia estatal, y los cambios del
paisaje global tras los atentados de París.
* ¿Crisis de refugiados? *
* 1. Javier, ¿podrías resumirnos qué perseguías con la escritura de este
libro? *
* Javier de Lucas.* Sí, lo explico muy brevemente. El objetivo principal
es analizar, a la luz de las políticas migratorias y de asilo, el fracaso
de la Unión Europea como proyecto político: el proyecto de un espacio común
de libertad, seguridad y justicia, presidido por la noción de Derechos
Humanos. De hecho, frente al deseo y al proyecto de trazar una política
común, a lo que estamos asistiendo sobre todo en los últimos diez años es a
una * renacionalización* de las políticas migratorias. El pretexto es que
las migraciones tocan el ámbito de la soberanía de los estados, lo cual es
cierto, pero se supone que la UE era un proyecto político que buscaba
precisamente superar la lógica de acción propia de los Estados-nación.
* 2. Se habla en los últimos tiempos de “crisis de refugiados”, de un
“reto humanitario sin precedentes” en Europa...*
* Javier de Lucas.* Yo tengo claro que la crisis de refugiados existe
desde que existen los refugiados. Si hablamos más de ello ahora no es
porque constituya una novedad, sino porque hay un factor que genera
movimientos de refugiados: la guerra * incivil* en Siria. Hay cuatro
millones seiscientos mil ciudadanos sirios que han tenido que salir del su
país forzosamente.
Pero no es cierto que Europa haya tocado un límite en su capacidad de
acogida. El 85% de los refugiados sirios son acogidos por cuatro países
limítrofes al conflicto: Líbano, Jordania, Irak y Turquía (que acoge a dos
millones de personas). La situación de emergencia la viven estos países. La
UE se ha propuesto acoger sólo a 160.000 personas.
El mensaje institucional y mediático de que estamos amenazados por una
corriente de refugiados que desborda nuestra capacidad de acogida es una
mentira demagógica y muy peligrosa. Una visión etnocéntrica y miope. No se
trata de una crisis de refugiados, sino de una crisis del proyecto político
de la UE.
* Estado de excepción permanente*
* 3. ¿En qué sentido hablas de “fracaso” de la UE, al hilo de la crisis de
refugiados?*
* Javier de Lucas. *Si la UE es algo más que un proyecto de mercado para
establecer beneficios comunes, si también es un proyecto político presidido
por la noción de Estado de Derecho, hay que decir alto y claro que lo
primero que ha naufragado en esta crisis son precisamente los derechos
humanos, no ya sólo los derechos humanos de “los otros”, sino la *
cultura jurídica* del respeto a los derechos humanos (y la arquitectura
institucional que los garantiza).
Con motivo de la crisis se ha creado lo que algunos juristas llaman “el
estado de excepción permanente” del estatuto jurídico de los inmigrantes y
los refugiados. Se trata de un régimen de excepcionalidad absolutamente
incompatible con las exigencias del Estado de Derecho en el que se suspende
la vigencia de las reglas comunes y se crea una figura de “infrasujetos de
derecho” que permanecen en un régimen de laberinto jurídico administrativo,
trato discriminatorio y estigmatización penal.
* 4. ¿Qué efectos concretos tiene este “estado de excepción” sobre los
migrantes y los refugiados?*
* Javier de Lucas. *Los elementos básicos del Estado de Derecho -el
principio de presunción de inocencia, el principio de igualdad en el
estatus de los ciudadanos, etc.- son suspendidos, pero no provisionalmente,
sino como régimen jurídico para todos los inmigrantes y, en el colmo de la
perversión jurídica, también para los refugiados. Despreciando así, por un
lado, los derechos de los que son titulares los inmigrantes, no ya sólo en
tanto que seres humanos, sino como tales inmigrantes. E ignorando, por el
otro, el estatuto jurídico propio de los refugiados, que es obligatorio
para todos los Estados que forman parte del sistema internacional de
Derecho, establecido en el convenio de Ginebra (1951) y en el protocolo de
Nueva York (1966).
¿Qué efectos tiene esto? Un ejemplo: la distinción que se hace de los
refugiados que llegan por nacionalidades, religión o procedencia, dándoles
a unos el reconocimiento pleno del estatus de refugiados y regateándoselo a
otros hasta el punto de devolverlos -expulsarlos, mejor dicho- al país que
les persigue. La inmensa mayoría de los refugiados que llegan son objeto de
este segundo tratamiento.
* Derecho de circulación, deber de socorro*
* 5. Se está usando además, según explicas en el libro, una vía perversa
para negar el derecho de asilo a los refugiados: las “políticas de
externalización”. ¿En qué consisten esas políticas de externalización?*
* Javier de Lucas.* Son políticas que ya se han experimentado contra los
flujos migratorios. Mediante concesiones de dinero o ayuda disfrazadas de
cooperación al desarrollo, se busca que los estados de origen y/o de
tránsito realicen funciones de policía, bien contra sus propios ciudadanos,
impidiendo la libre circulación, bien contra ciudadanos de terceros países
en tránsito, impidiéndoles llegar a la UE.
Nada de esto es secreto. Es explícitamente el objetivo descarnado de la UE
en sus negociaciones con los países de origen o tránsito de flujos
migratorios, como nos muestra la reciente Cumbre de La Valeta en Malta.
Allí la UE ha conseguido acordar, por el precio de 1800 millones de euros,
que los países de la Unión Africana se conviertan en gendarmes de sus
propios ciudadanos o de las personas que transitan por su territorio.
Y lo mismo ocurre con los tratados bilaterales que tiene España con
Mauritania, Nigeria, Senegal o Marruecos, o el que tiene Francia con Mali,
o el que tuvo Italia con el régimen libio de Gadafi, un escándalo de
dimensiones insólitas. Esa política de pactos bilaterales es una política
que bordea lo delictivo porque pretende impedir el derecho a la libre
circulación.
* 6. Pero no es el único caso de políticas migratorias criminales. En el
libro hablas por ejemplo de lo que ocurrió con la operación Mare Nostrum
<https://es.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operaci%C3%B3n_Mare_nostrum>.*
* Javier de Lucas. *Italia sostuvo en solitario durante 2014 la operación
Mare Nostrum de rescate y salvamento en las costas italianas y libias, con
un coste aproximado de 120 millones de euros. En determinado momento, el
gobierno de Renzi pidió a la UE que asumiese el relevo, con una operación
de calibre similar pero con un costo dividido equitativamente entre los 28
países miembros.
¿Y qué pasó? El Reino Unido, Francia y España se negaron en un primer
momento a relevar a Italia enunciando abiertamente la tesis de que las
operaciones de salvamento y rescate generan “efecto llamada”. En resumidas
cuentas, dijeron que hay que omitir el deber de socorro porque si no va a
venir más gente.
Impedir el derecho de circulación mediante políticas de externalización,
omitir el deber de socorro para evitar que llegue más gente: son dos
ejemplos clarísimos de políticas que violan la ley. Dos ejemplos de que la
política europea está presidida por designios manifiestamente incompatibles
con las reglas garantistas del Estado de Derecho.
* La UE en guerra contra los inmigrantes*
* 7. MigreEurop <http://www.migreurop.org/?lang=es>, red de organizaciones
promigrantes y antirracistas en Europa, ha llegado a decir que la UE está
en una situación de guerra contra los refugiados y los migrantes. ¿Es esto
exagerado?*
* Javier de Lucas. *No, la UE está de facto en una situación de guerra
contra los inmigrantes. Es decir, una lucha por todos los medios, sin
respetar procedimientos legales, con el único objetivo de detener la
supuesta “avalancha” de inmigración y refugiados. Uno de los instrumentos
privilegiados de esta lucha son los mecanismos de control policiales que ya
no se distinguen prácticamente de los militares.
Un ejemplo: la UE sustituyó finalmente la operación Mare Nostrum por dos
operaciones de carácter policial, una de ellas incluso con carácter
militar. Me refiero a la operación Sofía
<http://www.elmundo.es/internacional/2015/10/07/561502a046163f1a4b8b4634.html>
que plantea una fase de intervención policial sobre el terreno para
destruir mediante fuerzas armadas los “barcos de la muerte” que estén
anclados o transiten por el canal central de la UE (¡con el riesgo de que
los traficantes usen a los inmigrantes como escudos humanos!).
No hay que ser un experto para advertir que una operación de esta
envergadura, que apunta a destruir las infraestructuras dispersas de esas
mafias u organizaciones, muchas veces vinculadas a bandas militares y
tribales sobre el territorio, está destinada al fracaso. El precedente de
las intervenciones terrestres en Libia o Siria es tan nefasto que sólo
puedo pensar que esto tendría consecuencias muchísimo peores que las de las
dos guerras ilegítimas en Irak.
* 8. En los últimos años hemos asistido a la construcción de una Europa
comunitaria capaz de imaginarse adaptable a las condiciones que marcan las
potencias económicas, por ejemplo, el reciente TTIP
<http://www.eldiario.es/agendapublica/proyecto-europeo/preguntas-Tratado-Transatlantico-TTiP-respuesta_0_315669128.html>
que impuso Estados Unidos, pero al mismo tiempo los arquitectos de la
eurozona se declaran “no competentes” para elaborar un programa común que
garantice el asilo. Es decir, no hay una política europea común para
proteger y garantizar el derecho al asilo político, pero sí la hay para
lanzar operaciones policiaco-militares o para controlar “economías en
crisis”, como en Grecia.*
* Javier de Lucas. *Efectivamente. Se quiere convertir a los inmigrantes
en el chivo expiatorio de la crisis para las clases populares (y ahora
también la clase media) que ya no se identifican con el Estado porque éste
ya no garantiza derechos sociales, económicos, etc. Hay que denunciar la
idea de que los flujos migratorios son una amenaza para la soberanía
nacional porque introducen delincuencia, competencia desleal en el mercado
de trabajo o factores de erosión de la identidad. Son falacias que no
tienen sustento en la realidad que se vive cotidianamente en los países
europeos.
En definitiva, las políticas represivas sobre los flujos migratorios no
tienen fundamento democrático, criminalizan a las personas sólo por su
diferencia y las castigan con sanciones penales que pueden llegar a la
privación de libertad sin sentencia judicial ninguna de por medio, como
ocurre en esos espacios de excepción a medio camino entre las cárceles y
los centros de acogida que son los CIES. Este es el * verdadero naufragio
de Europa*.
* Más allá del Estado, la respuesta ciudadana *
* 9. Javier, hay un actor del que no habla tu libro y por el que te
queríamos preguntar: ¿cuál es la respuesta de las poblaciones europeas a
esta situación? Hay resistencias en favor de los migrantes, se han creado
redes de acogida, ¿qué opinión te merece esto?*
* Javier de Lucas. *Yo soy de los que piensan que Europa está a cinco
minutos del abismo. La respuesta a la crisis de los refugiados ha supuesto
una renuncia a lo que quedaba de proyecto europeo. Pero como dice el famoso
texto del poeta Hölderlin, “donde crece el peligro, crece también la
salvación”. En los movimientos ciudadanos que han surgido hay elementos de
respuesta crítica y también de otro modelo político para Europa. No ya sólo
la queja o la indignación ante el impacto de estímulos puntuales con una
fuerte carga simbólica y emocional, como la fotografía del cadáver del niño
Aylan Kurdi en las costas turcas.
Me parece por ejemplo muy positiva la reacción institucional, con la
iniciativa de la alcaldesa de Barcelona Ada Colau, secundada por Manuela
Carmena y otros dos ayuntamientos muy importantes, como son el de La Coruña
y Valencia. Estos ayuntamientos, presionados por los movimientos ciudadanos
que se activaron para acoger a los refugiados que llegaban, lanzaron la
propuesta de crear una red europea de ciudades-refugio
<http://www.eldiario.es/catalunya/Crece-acoger-refugiados-Barcelona-Catalunya_0_425908147.html>.
Creo que si esta propuesta llega a encarnarse tendría una potencialidad
increíble. Mostraría que se pueden adoptar iniciativas que vayan más allá
del margen de actuación de los Estados y que además es posible hacerlo
coordinadamente a nivel europeo, contando con recursos públicos y sociedad
civil.
* 10. ¿Dirías que la naturaleza de estas iniciativas es asistencial o
también política?*
* Javier de Lucas.* El primer impulso es seguramente de tipo humanitario.
Una activación de saberes y recursos de todo tipo al servicio de las
necesidades de eventuales candidatos de refugio y asilo. Pero creo que no
se queda ahí. Porque al interpelar y entrar en contacto con los
ayuntamientos, la masa crítica de solidaridad supone un desafío político
que puede ayudar a cambiar a escala local los modos de ejercer la política,
de fijar prioridades y de asignar los recursos.
El límite claro de las acciones ciudadanas de resistencia se encuentra en
el hecho de que el propio mecanismo internacional de refugiados concede
toda la competencia a las instituciones del Estado-nación. Es el Estado
quien decide quién es refugiado o no. Por tanto, es importantísimo montar
infraestructuras ciudadanas de acogida para recibir a los que llegan, pero
también hay que transformar políticamente el marco jurídico-institucional y
la propia lógica de acción.
Porque la lógica operativa del Estado-nación es insuficiente ante
fenómenos globales como los refugiados o las migraciones. Hay que cambiar
las categorías políticas zombies asociadas al Estado-nación. Esa red
europea de ciudades-refugio sería un ejemplo de política transnacional,
cosmopolita, al servicio de derechos y sujetos que van más allá de los
límites nacionales y exigen respuestas de otro orden. Las redes de
resistencia transnacionales están más cerca de ese orden y esa escala que
los propios Estados nacionales.
* Políticas migratorias tras los atentados de París*
* 11. Por último, queríamos preguntarte por los ataques terroristas en
París. Desde diversos análisis, se interpretan como acontecimientos de la
magnitud del 11S. Ya es un lugar común -aunque no del todo cierto- que tras
el 11S se impone una gubernamentalidad securitaria sobre las migraciones.
Te pedimos un ejercicio de prognosis y un poco de brujería: ¿qué impacto
crees que van a tener los ataques terroristas y el estado de emergencia
decretado en París en el gobierno de los flujos migratorios y de
refugiados?*
* Javier de Lucas.* Me temo que lo peor ya está aquí. La aplicación de
una lógica militar extrema que repercute dolorosamente en el marco de
discusión de las políticas de gestión de refugiados e inmigrantes. Hollande
ha declarado que Francia está en guerra y ha declarado un estado de
emergencia, que es el mismo tipo de estado de excepción que decíamos antes
que ha contaminado las políticas migratorias y de asilo.
La excepcionalidad jurídica se acompaña siempre de un estado policial (y/o
militar). Estaríamos ante un “enemigo” ante el que no valen las armas
normales y que requiere armas excepcionales que suponen el fin del Estado
de Derecho: la presunción de inocencia, las garantías legales, el proceso
justo y debido, el principio de igualdad, etc. Del derecho penal común y
garantista pasamos al llamado “derecho penal del enemigo”. Y los flujos
migratorios son criminalizados y se gestionan según esta categoría de
“enemigo” contra el que todo vale.
* 12. ¿Crees que estas políticas van a continuar o que se trata de una
reacción momentánea, emocional y puntual a los atentados?*
* Javier de Lucas. *Me temo que van a continuar y es un escenario
terrorífico. El escenario de guerra es un escenario de muerte porque
funciona mediante el recurso más primitivo a plantear un panorama maniqueo
de nosotros (el bien) frente a ellos (el enemigo monstruoso). La lógica del
chivo expiatorio, de la amenaza exterior, de la eficacia ante todo y por
encima de todo, de la xenofobia y el discurso del miedo como políticas de
Estado.
Se trata de una simplificación terrible de un panorama extraordinariamente
confuso. Porque no estamos para nada en un típico escenario binario o
bipolar entre dos bandos, buenos y malos. Entre los contendientes hay mil
alianzas impuras. Pensemos en el papel esquizofrénico de Arabia Saudí, que
sostiene financieramente a las redes terroristas y al mismo tiempo es
aliado de EEUU. Y algo muy parecido ocurre con Rusia, Israel, Turquía...
Hay una macedonia compleja de intereses entremezclados.
¿Hemos aprendido algo del 11S? Me gustaría pensar que se impondrá una
política prudente y de sentido común, pero creo que no va a ser así. Pero
si Francia o un ejército de tropas occidentales pone los pies sobre el
terreno, las consecuencias serán tan graves por lo menos como las de la
Guerra del Golfo y de Irak. En primer lugar, un avance imparable del
yihadismo y además un deterioro delos derechos y libertades que afectará
ante todo a inmigrantes y refugiados, pero inexorablemente a todos los
ciudadanos, comenzando por los más vulnerables. Esta guerra de los Estados
de la UE y de la UE se libra al coste de un deterioro del Estado de Derecho
y la democracia y por eso los afectados no son sólo "los otros", sino
también nosotros.
* Esta entrevista está dedicada a la memoria de las miles de personas, un
importante número de ellas niños, ahogadas en el mar Mediterráneo. Las
últimas ayer mismo, frente a las costas griegas
<http://www.jornada.unam.mx/ultimas/2016/01/28/grecia-18-muertos-la-mitad-ninos-en-naufragio-migrante-3195.html>.http://www.euractiv.com/sections/justice-home-affairs/pegida-plans-anti-islam-demos-across-europe-321285
<http://www.euractiv.com/sections/justice-home-affairs/pegida-plans-anti-islam-demos-across-europe-321285>*
PEGIDA plans anti-Islam demos across Europe
26 Jan 2016 - 06:29
A PEGIDA protest in Germany - and to be seen around Europe in the coming
year. [Metropolico.org/Flickr]
<https://www.flickr.com/photos/95213174@N08/16952054557/in/photolist-rPZHdH-s9bdf7-qso2q5-qaTFNY-qMGqJZ-rvrBcZ-qMrfR6-qMr6CM-rcvABz-qBcr4X-rgqgEj-rgpdwf-qBcdZ6-qBcdBn-rxSB5K-rxYtEM-reEbZZ-qBcbAZ-rxSYyY-reEav6-qBc9VK-qBc9yx-rgp84w-qBbVat-rgwaRT-qBbS1x-rxSDZy-qBbRpT-rRThbv-rRK59E-rRLeSY-rRT9LF-s72Htw-s72Fgf-rRSpeR-rPZyhg-s72yvw-rgpzQN-qBczZ2-rgqr1o-rgpwj9-rgwMmk-rxTjdC-rgptw5-reEtPF-qAZibh-rxYJfP-rgpGA3-rgpGeS-rgw6jX>
Until now, the right-wing PEGIDA group has limited itself just to Germany.
But the xenophobic movement wants to widen its reach, with demonstrations
planned in 14 different countries for the beginning of February. EurActiv's
partner Tagesspiegel reports.
<http://www.tagesspiegel.de/politik/kundgebungen-in-14-laendern-pegida-vernetzt-sich-mit-rechtsradikalen-in-europa/12874568.html>
At the weekend, Lutz Bachmann, the Dresden-based group's founder, spoke in
Roztoky, a small Czech town near Prague, alongside one of the movement's
leading figures, Tatjana Festerling. On the table in front of them was a
copy of TIME magazine <http://time.com/>, in which PEGIDA recently
appeared as a feature.
The point of the meeting, which was attended by anti-Islam groups from
Austria, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Italy, Netherlands, Poland and
Slovakia, was to coordinate protests against the "Islamisation of Europe"
on 6 February. Festerling announced that the demonstrations would be
carried out in 14 different countries. "The fight against the Islamisation
of Europe is our common goal," she said.
<http://www.euractiv.com/sections/global-europe/merkels-open-door-policy-under-serious-threat-321055>
All of the conference participants signed a memorandum which stated that,
"We will not leave Europe to our enemies." They proclaimed their
willingness to defend themselves against political Islam, Islamists and
their European collaborators, and would possibly put their own lives on the
line to reach their goal, as the previous generation had done. The global
elites had only promoted "unemployment, corruption, chaos an moral
collapse". Festerling added on her website that "the peoples of Europe"
would oppose these policies through "two possibilities: submission or
rebellion".
The Czech meeting was organised by the xenophobic and anti-European group,
Block Against Islam. The movement's leader, Martin Konvicka, labelled
European refugee policy as "stupid and suicidal". Usvit or Dawn - National
Coalition, a right-wing populist Czech party, also participated in the
event.
Usvit belongs to the far right of the Czech political spectrum and in
2013, gained 14 seats in the parliamentary election. German media cited
their deputy-leader, Jan Zilvar, as saying, "It [Islam] threatens our
values and to introduce the Koran. I don't want to see Prague Castle blown
up by Muslims."
The fact that PEGIDA has gone to the Czechs is no coincidence. President
Miloš Zeman flirts ever closer with anti-Islamic speech and statements. His
predecessor, Václav Klaus, has committed himself to speak at an event
organised by the Alternative For Germany (AFD) party in Stuttgart. The
majority of Czechs are against the country accepting civil war refugees,
and a study released last week showed that only 2% of the population would
be in favour of them staying permanently in the Central European republic.
"Their aim of making Dresden and Saxony the starting-point of a
pan-European movement, should, for the time being, be considered a
failure," said Hans Vorländer and other political scientists in their book
on PEGIDA, published in January. But now, it seems like the group wants to
double their efforts in launching a pan-European network.
<http://www.euractiv.com/sections/justice-home-affairs/new-refugee-card-could-add-germanys-bureaucratic-woes-321026>
Earlier this month, Bachmann was in the Belgian port of Antwerp at an
anti-Islam rally, at the invitation of the Flemish right-wing group Vlaams
Belang. A few days later, he was the guest of the Austrian Freedom
Party (FPÖ) where he received praise from the radical party's leader,
Heinz-Christian Strache.
The FPÖ chief suggested to his guests that PEGIDA and the AFD collaborate,
a proposal that Bachmann and Festerling immediately leapt upon. AFD leader
Frauke Petry was a little more reserved in regard to the issue.
In Switzerland, French Front National founder Jean-Marie Le Pen hopes to
speak in Basel on 3 February, where he would share a stage with, among
others, the National Democratic Party's number two man, Karl Richter.
The 87-year old "welcomed" the invitation to speak and hopes that his
health will allow him to travel to Switzerland and "give a good
performance". It was reported that AFD leader Petry would also be speaking,
but this was subsequently denied by the party. Basel police have in the
meantime banned the February rally, a decision which PEGIDA has refused to
accept.
In regard to the Europe-wide PEGIDA protests, journalist Günther Lachmann
had published details of the plan in mid-January, in both the Geolitico
<http://www.geolitico.de/> portal and Die Welt am Sonntag
<http://www.welt.de/>. He wrote that, "PEGIDA is no longer just a German
phenomenon." According to Lachmann, the movement has grown to the stage
where "those who no longer feel represented by the established parties"
have another outlet.
PEGIDA, or Patriotic Europeans Against the Islamisation of the Occident,
was founded in Dresden in October 2014 and has organised large-scale
protests against Muslims, refugees, politicians and the media.
Demonstrators have regularly vented their frustrations against the media
and journalists have been attacked in the past.
*This article was also published by **EurActiv Germany.*
<http://www.euractiv.de/sections/eu-aussenpolitik/pegida-fremdenfeindliche-bewegung-plant-eu-weit-aufmaersche-321280>
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/12/20/magazine/has-europe-reached-the-breaking-point.html?_r=1
<http://www.middleeasteye.net/columns/muslims-cologne-and-future-europe-1504380542>
Has Europe Reached
the Breaking Point?
A refugee crisis, a Greek debt showdown, Russian aggression and terrorism
in the streets. How 2015 has threatened to undo the European Union.
By JIM YARDLEY
<http://topics.nytimes.com/top/reference/timestopics/people/y/jim_yardley/index.html>DEC.
15, 2015
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Recent
Comments
Steve December 21, 2015
Reading these comments I have to wonder whether any of these writers have
been to Europe or know anything at all about Europe. Perhaps...
Hyphenated American December 21, 2015
This is how "liberal" Utopias end. They eventuallyLy run out of other
people's money. Vote for the democrats if you want USA to follow...
Fred December 21, 2015
This article shows many ways that nations positition over rule decisions
by EU or change EU decisions. The Eastern Europeon Nations who are...
A few weeks ago, I visited the fence that made Hungary a symbol of
European anxiety. Chain-link and razor wire, it slices through pastures as
it traces Hungary’s southern border. More than 100 miles long, it was
constructed quickly this summer as refugees streamed into the country,
heading toward Austria and Germany. Police officers and soldiers were
stationed every few hundred yards, and they examined my passport at almost
every checkpoint. They seemed bored, perhaps because the flood of refugees
and migrants had mostly abated. The fence had sealed Hungary off, and that
made Laszlo Toroczkai — the 37-year-old mayor of Asotthalom, a Hungarian
farming town on the Serbian border, and a rising ultranationalist star of
far-right European politics — very happy.
Before Hungary’s government started building the fence, Toroczkai argued
for months that something had to be done to stop the refugees. Once the
fence was up, he posted his version of a ‘‘Dirty Harry’’ video on YouTube
<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=fgJRjy2Xc0c>. Stone-faced and wearing a
black jacket, Toroczkai warns illegal immigrants to steer clear of his
town. The video cuts to images of unsmiling Hungarian guards, patrolling
the border on horseback and motorcycles. It even includes a map that shows
migrants en route to Germany how they can skirt Hungary and go through
Croatia and Slovenia instead.
‘‘Hungary is a bad choice,’’ Toroczkai says, staring into the camera.
‘‘Asotthalom is the worst.’’
Photo
[image: alt]
Place de la République in Paris. Credit Tomas Munita for The New York
Times
It might seem odd that a chain-link fence could threaten the order of the
European Union, but one of modern Europe’s singular accomplishments is its
open internal borders. The treaty that made this possible, known as the
Schengen Agreement, began going into effect in 1995 and expanded to include
26 countries in and around the European Union. It immediately provided a
potent symbol of both the ideals and the real benefits of European
integration. Elites believed unity would guarantee peace and prosperity and
dispel the demons of nationalism. Over time, the European Union built a
rich and diverse economy, exerting global influence through the clout of
its scale and the soft power of its liberal, democratic values — a Western
superpower without the bellicosity or the laissez-faire hardheartedness of
the United States. Workers’ rights were protected. Generous social-welfare
programs flourished. The open borders bound the member nations together in
subtler ways, too: Italians could soon go skiing in Austria with ease and
without a passport, or head to the Côte d’Azur for a swim as if Europe were
all one country. Workers could commute between Brussels and Paris without
hassle.
Hungary’s southern fence was erected along its external borders with
Serbia and Croatia, which are not Schengen countries. But it caused a chain
reaction that shook European politics to the core, as the distinctions
between internal and external borders blurred. First, it led to more
fences. Neither Slovenia (which is a Schengen country) nor Croatia was
fully prepared for the surge of frantic migrants and refugees suddenly
diverted toward them. Slovenia quickly constructed its own fence on the
Croatian border. Austria later began building a fence on its boundary with
Slovenia and established other border controls, as did other countries.
Prime Minister Viktor Orban of Hungary said he was defending the Schengen
area, while other leaders said these new barriers were intended to provide
an orderly route north for refugees, not to block them. Nonetheless, the
rapid proliferation of fences across a region defined by free movement was
an unmistakable sign that the external Schengen borders had broken down and
the founding values of the system were under terrible strain.
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By the time of my visit, the broader question in Hungary and throughout
the member nations was whether the European Union itself was falling apart.
Twice in 11 months, Paris had been hit by vicious terrorist attacks,
raising fears about European security and stirring anti-Muslim xenophobia.
Europe’s far right was gaining strength, including the National Front in
France. Europe’s undisputed leader, Chancellor Angela Merkel of Germany,
was in political trouble. Greece was still a financial mess. A demographic
crisis loomed, given the rapid aging of many European countries. Out on the
European periphery, Russia’s president, Vladimir Putin, was making bloody
mischief in Syria and Ukraine. And the United Kingdom was contemplating
withdrawing from the union altogether.
The European Union was supposed to be an economic superpower, but after
seven years it is still struggling to recover from the global economic
crisis. Economic growth is sluggish at best (and uneven, given the divide
between a more prosperous north and a debt-burdened south). Adjusting for
inflation, the gross domestic product of the 19 countries now sharing
Europe’s common currency, the euro, was less in 2014 than it was in 2007.
Widespread joblessness and diminishing opportunities confront an entire
generation of young Europeans, especially in Spain, Italy, France and
Greece. The economic malaise tinges everything: Young people resist
marriage for lack of economic opportunity. Poorer European countries are
experiencing brain drains as many of their best young professionals and
college graduates move abroad. Numerous Greek doctors, for instance, now
work in more prosperous Germany while Greece’s health system is in crisis.
Even as Toroczkai pushed back against migrants, he complained to me that
too many young Hungarians had to leave for London or elsewhere to find work.
The migrants only accentuate the European paradox: A place of deepening
pessimism for many of its own young people has become a beacon of hope and
safety for migrants, many of them Syrian refugees who have been through the
horrors of civil war. Many are young and educated, seemingly a timely fit
for a region with an aging population. Except Muslim immigrants present a
challenge to European ideals of tolerance, especially in a year of terror
attacks, as far-right extremists and conservative political leaders like
Orban warn that Europe’s security and ‘‘Christian values’’ are threatened —
a reminder of just how fragile the European system has become.
*Currently composed of 28 member* states, from Germany, the industrial
giant, to Malta, the tiny archipelago, the European Union is a bureaucratic
machine jerry-built in pursuit of a utopian dream, the post-World War II
vision that a unified Europe would be a peaceful and prosperous Europe.
Nationalism and extremism had led to Hitler and the Holocaust and, before
that, centuries of war. The New Europe was supposed to make future wars
impossible and create harmony. The reality never matched the ambition, but
considerable accomplishments ensued: the world’s largest single market; the
open borders of the Schengen countries; the euro; and a progressive social
and legal framework that has made the European Union a leader in
environmental protection, renewable energy and human rights.
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Modern Europe was put together incrementally, beginning with an industrial
agreement in the early 1950s among six countries, with France and Germany
at the center. Next came the Treaty of Rome in 1957, which created the
European Economic Community, the European Union’s forerunner, at that point
encompassing only Belgium, France, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and
West Germany. The Maastricht Treaty in 1992 introduced requirements and a
timetable to establish the common currency. Other treaties gradually
brought in more member states, drawn to European prosperity and security,
including the Baltics and parts of Eastern Europe in 2004 and 2007, in a
final triumph over the Cold War.
Photo
[image: alt]
Khalil Merroun, of the Évry-Courcouronnes mosque near Paris. Credit
Tomas Munita for The New York Times
But then came the 2008 economic crisis, followed by the convulsive
aftermath of the Arab Spring, followed by the aggression of a revanchist
Russia. Europe’s collaborative, consultative political style began to
resemble indecisiveness. The inadequacy and weakness of the European
Union’s institutions were glaringly exposed. Washington was mostly focused
elsewhere, and European leaders continued to practice the high art of
muddling through, in hopes that the broader European economy would revive
soon and bring brighter political prospects. Instead, 2015 became the year
that pushed Europe to the brink.
It began on Jan. 7, with the year’s first Paris terror attacks
<http://www.nytimes.com/2015/01/08/world/europe/charlie-hebdo-paris-shooting.html>,
when two French-Algerian brothers opened fire with automatic weapons inside
the offices of the satirical magazine Charlie Hebdo. A third gunman, a
criminal-turned-Islamist, later killed a police officer and stormed a
kosher grocery. In total, 17 people were killed. But the focus quickly
shifted southward to Greece. On Jan. 25, the Greeks staged a revolt,
electing as prime minister a radical leftist, Alexis Tsipras, who famously
refused to wear a tie. Just 40, Tsipras had promised to put an end to
economic austerity, the German-led European Union policy of trying to
promote growth by reducing national budget deficits through mandated tax
increases, spending cuts and structural reforms. Yet debt levels had grown
in Greece, unemployment remained above 20 percent and its economy over the
past five years had contracted by 25 percent.
In February, Tsipras and his flamboyant finance minister, Yanis Varoufakis
<http://www.nytimes.com/2015/05/24/magazine/a-finance-minister-fit-for-a-greek-tragedy.html>,
toured European capitals to urge Greece’s creditors to change the terms of
the loans that had kept their country afloat. Germany, Finland and other
creditors thought Greece was ungrateful and resisting the tough reforms
needed to reverse decades of bad governance. In late June, everything blew
up. Unable to secure more bailout money, Tsipras called a surprise national
referendum, asking Greek voters to decide on the latest offer from
creditors. They voted ‘‘no’’
<http://www.nytimes.com/2015/07/06/world/europe/greek-referendum-debt-crisis-vote.html>
— to no avail. Greece effectively defaulted on an I.M.F. loan as the
government began running out of money. Tsipras closed banks, put capital
controls in place and finally capitulated in July. He signed a new bailout
deal with creditors that included the same sort of austerity measures he
had spent months fighting. In August, he resigned. And in September, he was
re-elected, though now his job in part was to carry out the terms of the
new deal. Austerity had prevailed, even if fewer and fewer people thought
it worked.
<http://www.nytimes.com/2015/12/20/magazine/has-europe-reached-the-breaking-point.html?_r=1#story-continues-6>
The Greek crisis was about an inward-looking Europe grappling with its own
internal contradictions. But by summer and early autumn, Europe’s external
contradictions had become even more acute. Two pillars of foreign policy —
engagement with Russia and the maintenance of stability on the European
periphery — were trembling. Ukraine was in crisis and at the center of a
confrontation between the European Union and Putin. Dealing with him became
even more complicated when Russia began bombings in Syria, aggravating a
refugee crisis that already dominated the European agenda.
By midsummer, Syrian refugees discovered a shortcut to Europe through
Lesbos, the Greek resort island. From January through October, according to
Europe’s border-security agency, 1.2 million migrants illegally entered the
European Union, a fourfold increase from a year earlier, many arriving on
inflatable rubber dinghies or rickety boats. Europeans could have seen this
as an affirmation of their exceptionalism — Syrians, Afghans, Eritreans,
Gambians and others escaping war and poverty for the European dream. But
Europe was overwhelmed and fearful, and largely unprepared.
In September, Angela Merkel nonetheless welcomed all Syrians to Germany
<http://www.nytimes.com/2015/09/06/world/europe/migrant-crisis-austria-hungary-germany.html>,
opening the door to as many as one million people this year — even though
doing so meant suspending European Union rules. Europe’s power dynamics
changed instantly. Germany is accustomed to dominating the agenda, but many
countries refused to accept even modest refugee quotas from European
officials in Brussels. The far right rose in polls in some countries, and
national conservative leaders became increasingly bold. Orban, Hungary’s
prime minister, declared himself the protector of Europe. Even in Germany,
which had been so welcoming to refugees, arsonists attacked some refugee
centers, while far-right extremists in Dresden staged demonstrations.
Across Europe, anti-Muslim, anti-immigrant sentiment was rising.
On a gray day in November, I went to discuss this growing sentiment with
Khalil Merroun, rector of the Grand Mosque of Évry-Courcouronnes in a
suburb of Paris, one of the largest mosques in France. Big-bellied and
jovial, Merroun, 69, is establishment Islam. He is a founding board member
of the French Council of the Muslim Faith, the quasi-governmental body that
regulates Muslim activities. His friend Manuel Valls, now France’s prime
minister, personally awarded him the Legion of Honor, the country’s highest
prize, and wrote the foreword to Merroun’s 2010 book, ‘‘French and Muslim:
Is It Possible?’’
Photo
[image: alt]
Soldiers in the Grand Place central square in Brussels. Credit Tomas
Munita for The New York Times
Merroun slipped out of his white burnoose and into his suit jacket,
smiling as he settled into a chair. He had just finished Friday’s lunchtime
prayers. ‘‘Five thousand people,’’ he said, gazing out his office window as
a throng of Muslim worshipers streamed out of the prayer hall. Outside his
office, two black-jacketed bodyguards assigned by French officials sat in
the hallway. The security detail had been with Merroun since the January
attacks in Paris, which had a profound impact on France. Flaws were exposed
in French security and intelligence gathering. Debates erupted over French
secularism and freedom of expression. Distrust of French Muslims deepened.
In response, Merroun and other religious leaders held interfaith gatherings
to promote tolerance.
Merroun leaned forward in his chair. Terrorism is ‘‘not jihad,’’ he said.
The jihad of one’s self is about personal betterment and seeking greater
understanding.
‘‘Today, you did a great jihad by coming to see me,’’ he said. ‘‘You
called yesterday, you took the Metro, it was raining and you came here for
a noble cause, to inform people. And I also made an effort, a jihad: I
listened to you, I welcomed you and tried to transmit a message to better
inform people, to try and dispel misconceptions and spread our true
message, thousands of kilometers away, in the United States.’’
Merroun didn’t discount the venom directed at Muslims or refugees — this
explained his security detail — but he thought the sour public mood was
rooted in broader frustrations, like the lack of jobs. ‘‘So far, things
have managed to remain relatively stable,’’ he said.
Our interview finished up shortly after 2 o’clock. I took the train back
into Paris with a colleague. That night, less than eight hours later, three
teams of suicide bombers and other heavily armed radical Islamists
attacked Paris
<http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2015/11/13/world/europe/paris-shooting-attacks.html>,
killing 130 people.
*To see why the European Union is* breaking down, you must look under the
hood, and the place to do that is Brussels. Recently, along Rue Montoyer,
one of the many streets lined with law firms and interest groups that lobby
European institutions, I found Emily O’Reilly, 58, a native of Ireland who
holds the title of ombudsman for the entire European Union.
That same morning, Prime Minister David Cameron of Britain had announced
what he required
<http://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/11/world/europe/cameron-britain-eu-membership.html>
to keep his country in the European bloc. During the British general
elections in May, Cameron sought to appease anti-Europe factions by
promising to hold a referendum on whether Britain should remain in the
European Union. A date for the vote has not been announced — it will happen
at some point before the end of 2017 — and it is too soon to know in which
direction voters will lean. But the possibility that Britain could leave is
already stirring dread in Brussels, especially because public disgust with
European governance is also rising in France and even Germany.
Photo
[image: alt]
People gathering to pay their respects to victims of the November
terrorist attacks in Paris. Credit Tomas Munita for The New York Times
‘‘They want more Britain and less Europe,’’ O’Reilly said, distilling the
essence of the British revolt.
O’Reilly’s job is to shine a light on the European system and redress a
widely perceived lack of bureaucratic accountability. It is not a simple
task, given the immensity and confusing powers of the European Union. She
recently tried, and failed, to clearly explain to her husband the
differences between the European Council, the Council of the European Union
(sometimes called the Council of Ministers) and the Council of Europe. I
mentioned that I was trying to figure the system out. ‘‘If you do that,
come back,’’ she said. ‘‘Tell us all and make your fortune here.’’
O’Reilly is not naturally cynical about the European Union. She left
school in 1975, two years after Ireland joined the European Economic
Community. As a condition of membership, Irish lawmakers passed a new labor
law that helped eliminate gender discrimination in the workplace. Those
laws enabled O’Reilly to become a journalist before moving into her
government career. European governance literally changed her life for the
better. Now, though, young women and men in Europe are staring at
joblessness, and the European Union is regarded as part of the problem.
‘‘What has to happen is that the experience I had as a young woman, as a
young girl back in the ’70s, has to be replicated for the young girls in
Greece and Italy and in Eastern Europe,’’ she said. ‘‘That hope and that
potential that the E.U. held out for my generation has to be given to
others.’’
Critics often use ‘‘Brussels’’ as shorthand for the whole sprawling
European project, hence the ‘‘Brussels Bubble.’’ There is a basic
institutional structure, with a certain degree of checks and balances. The
European Commission is roughly equivalent to an executive branch. Then
there is an elected legislative branch, the European Parliament. A third
branch, the European Council, consists of the elected leaders of the 28
member states (and shares a building with the Council of the European
Union, a forum for national ministers to hash out various shared policies).
Beneath those main branches is a labyrinthine bureaucracy that in flowchart
form would resemble an M.C. Escher print. The overall processes of
lawmaking and governing can be elusively fluid and deliberately opaque,
which is one reason the credibility of European governance is so easily
attacked. Many ordinary people have little idea how it works.
The European Union has no equivalent to the United States Constitution but
is a product of the succession of treaties ratified by member states, a
process closer to that of the Articles of Confederation, America’s original
governing document, which ultimately failed. If these treaties have
steadily pushed Europe toward greater integration, the job is far from
complete.
European Union institutions have vast regulatory powers over everything
from data roaming to environmental standards to trade deals to antitrust
rules. But power is not shared equally. The European Commission, for
example, is supposed to enforce the bloc’s treaties — yet it must sometimes
tiptoe around big member states like France and Germany. And as a whole,
the institutions often lack the structural power, political decisiveness
and bureaucratic efficiency to act collectively when faced with big,
unforeseen problems like the Greek crisis, the surge of migrants or the
standoff with Putin over Ukraine. National leaders are often forced to
decide these issues in marathon emergency meetings in Brussels at the
European Council, and even then, only incremental progress is made. It is a
perfect recipe for public cynicism: a system of intrusive regulators whose
tentacles can spread into your personal life, even as leaders appear
indecisive in the face of genuine crises.
Photo
[image: alt]
A Hungarian police officer patrolling the border with Serbia, where a
fence has been erected to prevent the flow of illegal migrants. Credit
Tomas Munita for The New York Times
Because the system is incomplete, workarounds are often needed to get
things done. O’Reilly explained one element of the ad hoc system of power
sharing that has grown up in Brussels with a term of art: ‘‘trilogue.’’
Trilogues are semiofficial meetings, often conducted with minimal
transparency, of lawmakers from the European Parliament, representatives
from national governments and bureaucrats from the European Commission.
Together they hammer out legislation that is later put to a vote in the
European Parliament and other European Union institutions. It is back-room
politics, Brussels-style. O’Reilly, who is investigating the practice, said
many people think trilogues help cut through bureaucracy to get things
done, but they also raise questions about transparency and a broader lack
of checks and balances.
To many experts across Europe, this messy, opaque style of governance
undermines the credibility of a European experiment intended to be a model
of democracy. They say the solution to this arguably antidemocratic form of
democracy is obvious: a new treaty ratified by all member states that would
further consolidate political and financial authority in Brussels while
improving systemic shortcomings. Or exactly the sort of dilution of
national sovereignty that is now fueling far-right populist anger in
Europe. Almost no one believes a new treaty could be approved anytime soon.
A decade ago, when the European Union was trying to ratify a treaty that
would establish a European Constitution, President Jacques Chirac of France
supported the choice, in a national referendum, that would have given more
authority to Brussels over a range of issues, from foreign policy to
housing to fisheries. Voters in France shocked political elites by rejecting
the Constitution
<http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/05/29/AR2005052900644.html>,
partly out of fear that the measure would erode French sovereignty. Soon
after, voters in the Netherlands did the same thing.
‘‘Ever since then, we’ve been on a slippery slope,’’ Fredrik Erixon, the
director of the European Center for International Political Economy in
Brussels, told me. ‘‘Every elected national leader knows there is no
political mileage to try to lead on European issues or push for more
integration. The European idea is now a rapidly declining trend.’’
*Five days after the attacks in* Paris, I met Laszlo Toroczkai in his
office in Asotthalom. He told me he respected Islam but found it unsuitable
for Europe. ‘‘My third daughter is about to be born,’’ he said. ‘‘I’m not
bringing up my daughter to marry into a Muslim man’s harem.’’
It was the sort of overtly bigoted remark that has become more common in
Hungary and elsewhere in Europe (and not so unfamiliar in the United States
too). Many Hungarians mocked his anti-illegal-immigrant video, but
Toroczkai’s stature rose within Europe’s far right. Earlier in November, he
was invited to speak at a Polish Independence Day rally in Warsaw, where
thousands of far-right supporters waved flags and displayed banners with
messages like ‘‘Stop Islamization.’’ Toroczkai told me that the Paris
attacks — two of whose perpetrators apparently passed through Greece posing
as refugees — had proved him correct.
If the migrant crisis had exposed fault lines in the Schengen system, this
second Paris attack threatened to demolish it. Some suspected terrorists
had traveled to and from Syria. Others had seemingly moved freely back and
forth between Brussels and Paris. Open borders now meant Europe was more
open to terror.
‘‘Migration is just going to lead to bloody conflict,’’ Toroczkai said.
‘‘European politicians will have to listen to public opinion, which is
radicalizing all over Europe as a result of this migration crisis.’’
Photo
[image: alt]
The European Commission’s headquarters in Brussels. Credit Tomas Munita
for The New York Times
Above all, the crisis, like the Hungarian fence, had underscored the fact
that erasing borders never quite erased divisions among countries with
different languages, customs and histories. The European Union expansion in
2004, which took in parts of Eastern Europe, stirred deep economic anxiety
in France and contributed to the defeat the next year of the French effort
to approve a European Union Constitution. Its opponents invoked the
‘‘Polish plumber’’ as a symbol of cheap outside labor that threatened the
French working class. Now the arrival of migrants is again challenging
European ideals.
Europe is not usually considered a continent of immigrants. When countries
like France and West Germany recruited workers from Algeria and Turkey in
the 1960s to fill labor shortages, the common expectation was that many of
them would eventually return home. Anyone riding the subway in Paris can
see that the French capital is one of the most diverse places in the world,
yet France has struggled to absorb even second- and third-generation
French Muslims, often because of difficulty balancing Islam with French
secularism. In Germany, Islam is managed in part through diplomacy; many
imams are provided, by agreement, by a religious ministry of the Turkish
government. France has a similar setup with Morocco, Algeria and other
majority-Muslim countries.
The chief defender of European openness has been Merkel, but she has paid
a political price. Far-right parties quickly made gains in the polls while
her support dropped, and fellow conservatives criticized her sharply.
(Germany eventually announced border restrictions
<http://www.nytimes.com/2015/09/14/world/europe/germany-emergency-measures-european-migrant-crisis.html>
on migrants entering the country.)
On Nov. 2, I traveled to Darmstadt, in south-central Germany, to watch
her conduct a meeting with hundreds of rank-and-file members of her
conservative Christian Democratic Union party. An outpouring of German
volunteers had helped migrants, but many here were concerned. A software
engineer worried that the migrants would be an extra burden at a time when,
he feared, Germany was losing its competitive edge. Another man bemoaned
that Germany was losing its Christian values. Others lamented that there
were not enough jobs or warned that towns and villages were already
overwhelmed.
Merkel listened to each remark, dutifully took notes and then offered
roughly the same response: We can do it, she said again and again. Germany
has to lead on this. *We will be fine*. Everyone applauded, but the mood
seemed heavy. There still didn’t seem to be a plan. Afterward, I cornered
an engineer named Martin Spruch, who had told Merkel that the rest of
Europe had abandoned Germany on the matter of refugees. ‘‘We cannot do this
all alone,’’ he told me.
Since the Paris attacks, President François Hollande of France has stood
by the country’s commitment to receive a modest number of refugees. Yet he
has instituted border controls and warned that Europe must secure external
borders or risk member countries sealing themselves off. And this, he
added, would amount to a ‘‘dismantling of the European Union.’’ In early
December, Marine Le Pen, the leader of the National Front in France, scored
major victories in regional elections, raising the once-unthinkable
possibility that the far right has a chance at the presidency in 2017.
On the day I visited the Hungarian fence, I noticed a black van parked
outside the town hall in Asotthalom. Inside was a small delegation of
politicians from Belgium, led by Filip Dewinter, the leader of the
far-right Vlaams Belang party. Belgium was reeling after investigators
discovered that some of the suspected organizers of the Paris attacks lived
only a few miles from the European Parliament. For days, the police locked
down the city searching for suspects.
Photo
[image: alt]
Afghan immigrants at a former school near Bünde, Germany, which is now
used as a refugee center. Credit Tomas Munita for The New York Times
Dewinter, whose party once notoriously used a photo
<http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2095862/Belgian-Vlaams-Belang-risks-Muslim-backlash-picture-daughter-burka-bikini.html>
of his teenage daughter in a bikini and a niqab as part of a ‘‘Women
Against Islamization’’ campaign, had come to Hungary on a ‘‘fact-finding
mission’’ about the fence and to film videos. His party had fared poorly in
Belgium’s last election, but he thought the combination of the migrant
crisis and the Belgian connection to the Paris attacks boded well for him.
He thought the fence was a great idea.
*Eight days after the Paris attacks, I walked through* the Maidan, the
central square of Kiev and the symbolic heart of Ukraine. This is where
Ukraine’s Maidan revolution began two years earlier, when people took to
the streets, furious over a promise broken by President Viktor Yanukovych.
He had backed away from signing a political and economic ‘‘association
agreement’’ with Europe and turned toward Russia. Images of the protests,
which spread to other cities, were carried around the world and showed
crowds of young Ukrainians, waving European Union flags, desperate to be
part of the West.
Today was the anniversary. It rained on this day two years ago, and it was
raining now, but otherwise everything felt different. Ukraine had endured
two years of war, economic collapse and political upheaval, with thousands
dead and more than a million displaced. Europe had stumbled into a new Cold
War and learned the costs of misjudging Russia. Ukraine was never supposed
to be a problem for Europe; in fact, it was thought to be the opposite of
that, a chance to expand Europe’s orbit and stabilize its periphery — on
its own terms and on the strength of its soft power.
For centuries, power politics in Europe meant guns and wars (and the
influence of the Vatican, given the sometimes belligerent role of past
popes). But the European Union has been a relatively pacifist body, most
prominently when France and Germany strongly opposed the George W. Bush
administration’s invasion of Iraq. Britain and France are still military
powers, and the Italian Navy remains active in the Mediterranean, but the
European Union has sought to exercise global influence through its economic
strength and democratic values. Leaders saw trade and closer ties as enough
to maintain stability on the European borders.
Ukraine changed that. First, Putin shattered Europe’s sense of security
after the Maidan protests grew violent. The police attacked; protesters
died. Under pressure, Yanukovych fled to Russia. Putin responded by seizing
Crimea <http://www.nytimes.com/2014/03/19/world/europe/ukraine.html>, the
Ukrainian peninsula where Russia leased a port for its Black Sea fleet.
Then pro-Russia separatists, backed by Russian forces, escalated the war
in Ukraine’s industrial east, where sporadic shooting still continues
despite a fragile cease-fire — even as skeptics say neither side really
wants to implement the accord. In the midst of all this, Ukraine elected a
coalition government that signed the association agreement with the
European Union and pledged to carry out reforms. Ukraine’s government is
also negotiating for visa-free access to European Union countries. That
would be a tangible success, signaling closer ties, but those talks have
been complicated by European concerns about border security after the Paris
attacks. The government is also trying to satisfy European demands that
would allow Ukraine to enter a free-trade pact with the European Union.
But Ukrainian reformers want more European involvement, money and
commitment, even a path to eventual European Union membership, as they try
to rebuild a country still hobbled by corruption, dominated by oligarchical
interests, divided ethnically and locked in a confrontation with Russia.
Their argument is that Ukraine can never become secure or democratic
without Europe, and that Europe can never be secure, or truly fulfill its
ideals, without a stable, democratic Ukraine.
‘‘Ukraine needs this success,’’ Ostap Semerak, a pro-reform lawmaker,
told me. ‘‘And the European Union needs this success.’’
Photo
[image: alt]
A memorial to people killed during protests in Kiev, Ukraine. Credit
Tomas Munita for The New York Times
Europe itself, though, is increasingly ambivalent. Russia, not Ukraine,
has long been the greater concern. Led by the Germans, Europe long pursued
a foreign policy rooted in the belief that economic interdependence with
Russia would ensure political stability, just as it had between once-mortal
enemies like France and Germany. Russia sold natural gas to Europe. Europe
sold machinery and luxury goods to Russia. Europe’s east, meanwhile,
inevitably became a place of geopolitical competition, as new member states
like Lithuania and Poland regarded the integration of Ukraine in some
fashion as a security priority.
Europe’s internal crises are now dominating its agenda, with some leaders
eager to normalize relations with Russia and effectively return to business
as usual. Merkel and Hollande are trying to secure a lasting peace
agreement between Russia and Ukraine, but European attention has shifted to
Syria, refugees and terrorism. Hollande is focused on trying to put
together a coalition against the Islamic State — one that would include
Russia. Merkel traveled to Istanbul to woo President Recep Tayyip Erdogan
of Turkey — despite her prior criticism of his authoritarian impulses — and
in November, the European Union agreed to pay three billion euros to Turkey
to help stanch the flow of migrants pouring across Turkish borders. It even
reopened talks about Turkey’s long-stalled bid to join the European Union.
Europe had dumped soft-power diplomacy for a scrambling, even desperate,
embrace of realpolitik.
I visited a handful of reformers and analysts in Kiev during the Maidan
anniversary weekend, and Europe’s sudden overtures to Russia had not gone
unnoticed. Anxious scenarios circulated: A Europe desperate to strike at
terrorists might cut a deal for Putin’s help (because his military was also
now involved in Syria), possibly ending the economic sanctions put on
Russia in response to its aggression in Ukraine or making concessions in
the peace talks.
During the anniversary on the Maidan, people walked slowly in the rain,
stopping at different memorials. Two teenage girls huddled under an
umbrella, crying as they stood beside rows of photographs of people who
died. ‘‘Mostly, Europe doesn’t care what is happening in Ukraine,’’ Anne
Levchuk, who said she was 17, told me. ‘‘They can’t really feel what we
feel.’’
*The fundamental uncertainty about* Europe’s future is when prosperity
will return. Will things soon turn around? Or is Europe in the midst of a
crippling decline similar to Japan’s lost decade? The European Central Bank
is trying to play the role of savior — pumping money into the financial
system — but the question is whether it, alone, can pull it off.
<http://www.nytimes.com/2015/12/20/magazine/has-europe-reached-the-breaking-point.html?_r=1#story-continues-15>
European countries once managed to have strong economies and generous
social safety nets, as social democracy became Europe’s political
mainstream. That formula collapsed in the 2008 economic crisis, though even
today Europe is divided on where to place the blame — a bloated welfare
state or decades of corrupt governance, or both. Europe’s left defended the
old socialistic model even as the consensus in Berlin and Brussels had long
since shifted to pro-market, ‘‘neo-liberal’’ policies. Greece became a
battleground for different economic visions but also a test case of how
Europe handles an effectively bankrupt state in its midst, with a legacy of
political corruption.
Ten days after the Paris attacks, I went to Greece to visit Alexis
Tsipras. He adjusted the two wing chairs in his office, catching the light
through the window, and invited me to sit down. Tsipras wore a blazer and
khakis, still tieless, still prime minister. He seemed weary, even a touch
forlorn, staring down at his lap. Can an entire country seem exhausted?
‘‘I think it’s not so easy to change Europe when you are alone,’’ Tsipras
said, speaking in practiced English.
Tsipras is beaten, but he still thinks he is right. The euro crisis is not
solved. Europe has a common currency but not a common financial system.
Greek debt is still unsustainable. The ‘‘recipe,’’ as he calls austerity,
has been proved wrong. Why, he asks, has economic growth and employment
recovered so much faster in the United States than in Europe? He still
attacks the consensus in Berlin and Brussels as straitjacketed economics
enforced by creditors, in defiance of logic, unable to produce real growth.
Many economists agree. But Tsipras’s critics argue that he offered no real
alternative other than old-style Greek clientelism. He misplayed his
confrontation with Berlin and Brussels. (They did, too.) His job now is to
administer what he regards as the wrong medicine, hope his country doesn’t
implode while he makes it attractive to private investors and then try to
recover and ‘‘regain our sovereignty.’’
‘‘We saw that there is no other way,’’ he said. ‘‘Our European partners
and Germany were very, very tough.’’
The Greek crisis was never only about the country’s problems; it was also
about Europe’s power equations, as well as volatility in the financial
markets. To renegotiate Greece’s debt and make real concessions meant
possibly opening the door to renegotiations with debtor countries like
Italy, Portugal and Spain. Other creditors would be staring at new
liabilities and infuriated voters. Even the Baltic countries and the
Eastern Europeans had more contempt than sympathy for Greece, because of
Greece’s higher standard of living. A crisis rooted in economics was fought
in the realm of politics, infused by moralism (Lazy Greeks versus Mean
Germans) and national self-interests. A common currency intended to bring
nations together had done the opposite.
It might never have been realistic to envision a United States of Europe.
Yet the prospect of a weaker Continent is something that should alarm
Washington; Europe and America are trade partners, are bound together
militarily by NATO and share a commitment to democracy. Many European
bureaucrats and officials cling to the belief that crisis has always made
Europe stronger and more integrated. Yet the optimism that carried the
project forward to stop wars and create prosperity is dwindling. Now the
challenge of the European Union is whether it can succeed in continuing to
bring a better and more secure life to a larger and more diverse group of
citizens. Has the European Union reached the practical limits of the ideal
of an ever-closer union? Europe’s binding glue now might well be fear —
fear of the unknown, of what will happen if Greece does tumble out of the
eurozone, or if Britain chooses to leave the European Union.
Tsipras said he still considers himself pro-Europe, as most Greeks are,
and took heart from rising leftist parties in Portugal and Spain. ‘‘Greece
is not alone anymore,’’ he noted. But he described Brussels as ‘‘the
kingdom of bureaucracy,’’ a place where ‘‘there is a lack of democracy —
the most important decisions are taken behind closed doors.’’ It might have
sounded like resentment from someone who tried and failed to knock down the
palace gate. But it was what I heard everywhere I went. Indeed, Tsipras
seemed to capture the European moment.
‘‘I am very, very skeptical for the future,’’ he said.
Jim Yardley is the Rome bureau chief for The Times. He last wrote for the
magazine about the Chinese Basketball Association
<http://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/05/magazine/NBA-in-China.html>.
http://www.middleeasteye.net/columns/muslims-cologne-and-future-europe-1504380542
What the Cologne attacks tell us about Europe #Refugees
<http://www.middleeasteye.net/topics/refugees>
[image: Daniel Renwick's picture]
<http://www.middleeasteye.net/users/daniel-renwick>
Daniel Renwick <http://www.middleeasteye.net/users/daniel-renwick>
Monday 18 January 2016 08:00 UTC
Europe needs migrants and refugees as much as migrants and refugees need
Europe - and sexual violence is not specific to any ethnicity
I don’t know if you’ve heard this one, but there’s an "Islamic invasion"
<https://www.rt.com/op-edge/328378-europe-demoralized-invaded-violated/>
of Europe happening and the white population face eradication by an army of
young, Muslim men.
Such claims are usually followed by a shrill call to "wake up," before
some level of conspiracy is drawn upon to justify naked and violent racism,
like what we’ve seen in Germany’s Leipzig, where over 200 far-right
militants affiliated to Legida - a local branch of the anti-Muslim movement
Pegida – ran riot
<http://www.dw.com/en/leipzig-police-arrest-hundreds-after-far-right-hooligans-violent-rampage/a-18974153>,
seeking to destroy Muslim and Arab-run businesses and stoke fear on the
streets of the country’s "new Berlin". This came just days after four
separate racist attacks
<https://news.vice.com/article/retaliation-attacks-in-cologne-as-hooligan-gangs-launch-foreigner-manhunt>
hit Cologne, injuring two Pakistanis, two Syrians and a group of Africans.
The violence in Germany followed the sexual attacks in Cologne and Hamburg
on New Years Eve (NYE). In Cologne, it is estimated
<http://www.nytimes.com/2016/01/15/world/europe/as-germany-welcomes-migrantssexual-attacks-in-cologne-point-to-a-new-reality.html>
that over 350 sexual offences took place in a few hours. The perpetrators
were gangs of men, many reportedly of North African or Arab descent, who
coordinated their efforts to kettle and pen-in women who were then
molested. German police, slow to act and underprepared for the eventuality,
have identified around 32 people thus far. Twenty-two are reported
<http://www.nytimes.com/2016/01/15/world/europe/as-germany-welcomes-migrantssexual-attacks-in-cologne-point-to-a-new-reality.html>
to be asylum seekers, while two are German and one is an American citizen.
Authorities within Germany are attempting to separate the country’s
assistance for refugees from the crimes of New Year's Eve, to very little
effect. The global media now has its eyes on the country, scoping how the
EU’s most open state to migrants and refugees will respond.
Legislative changes
Two immediate legislative changes are set to follow in the wake of the
Cologne attacks; one to be applauded, the other resisted. German Justice
Minister Heiko Maas has finally agreed
<http://www.dw.com/en/germany-set-to-finally-update-rape-law/a-18967875>
to reformulate Sections 177-179 of the German criminal code that requires a
victim to prove their resistance to sexual advances in order to prosecute
the attacker as an abuser. Previously, if you didn’t scratch, bite, push,
scream at, punch, kick, stab or shoot your attacker, you tacitly consented
to their advances. Many feminist organisations and women’s shelters in
Germany have pushed
<https://www.frauen-gegen-gewalt.de/vergewaltigung-verurteilen.html> for
such legislative change for years. It is a shame that sexual abuse had to
be racialised for action to be undertaken.
The second change to come about is for German law to become far less
restrictive when it comes to deportations, so those criminalised in German
courts face being sent to the country they fled from, akin in many cases to
a death sentence, and in contravention of the Geneva Convention.
Despite some appeals
<http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/3fb8df10-b7ab-11e5-b151-8e15c9a029fb.html#axzz3xKek1ZLg>
from
certain German lawmakers and analysts for asylum laws to be maintained to
provide sanctuary, such ideals have been lost in the hysteria of early
2016, which points the finger of blame at the cultures of Germany’s new
arrivals, which they claim, should not be tolerated. Over 400 attacks
against asylum seekers have taken place in the last two years, many of
which were arson <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-35174668>, and
for which there have been precisely zero convictions. In the wake of
Cologne, a huge spike in gun and weapon sales has been noted
<http://www.nbcnews.com/storyline/europes-border-crisis/cologne-sex-attack-sprees-sparks-huge-spike-weapons-sales-n497201>.
The
limits of toleration are plain to see.
Germany’s model of multiculturalism, due to its lack of an empire, was
based on the guest worker (gastarbeiter) policy, which denied citizenship
and the right to remain in the country without work. This policy was passed
down through generations until the formation of the EU. The policy created
ghettoes in the country’s cities and led to social and political
segregation and detachment.
Germany’s political classes are aware of their previous mistakes. They
have vowed to rectify past wrongs by integrating their new arrivals into
the country in a way they didn’t before. Due to the widely held belief that
“multiculturalism has failed,” a policy of naturalisation and forced
assimilation is now common practice, with Belgium trailblazing by teaching
<http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/belgium-refugees-will-be-taught-to-respect-women-a6802221.html>
how to “respect women".
Europe's rape culture
The "other" is always useful to deflect attention, instead of addressing
the fundamental issues in play. Take, for example, Munich’s Oktoberfest,
where an estimated
<http://www.vice.com/en_uk/read/rape-culture-germany-cologne-new-years-2016-876>
200
sexual assaults take place each year, with foreigners particularly
vulnerable. On average, four to six rapes have been reported per year.
However, due to German law requiring proved resistance, which intimidates
the victim and allows attackers to walk away to attack again, prosecutions
are rare.
Sexual violence is not specific to any particular ethnicity and other than
legislative progress and open debate, there is not much more one can do to
address this problem than to shine a light on the cultures that create the
conditions for rape to be normalised and accepted, what we now call rape
culture.
Coming from the UK, childhood heroes have become sexual villains on a near
monthly basis, as the high beams of justice have shone (selectively) upon
them. Judges, MPs, media stars, pop stars, lords and even some royals are
implicated. But do we question the perversions of elite sexuality? Does the
systematic abuse of children in London’s Elm House and Dolphin Square stir
such global attention in the same way? Of course it doesn’t. There is no
political capital to be gained. However, by finding Muslims to be sexually
predatorial, a positive image of one’s self can be conjured, as Kundnani puts
it:
<http://www.kundnani.org/wp-content/uploads/Kundnani-Islamophobia-as-lay-ideology-of-US-empire.pdf>“Islam
is merely the absolute 'Other' that enables the construction of a positive
image of oneself.”
Singling out Muslims
Islamophobia and anti-Muslim racism serve a function. Despite Islam being
a rich and diverse belief system of many different manifestations, Muslims
in the West are homogenised and ascribed a particular nature that allows
for the disavowal and rejection of cultural traits and issues we cannot
face to see in ourselves.
The internet is awash with claims that the effects of migration and
multiculturalism, especially in relation to people from Islamic
backgrounds, leads to an increase in crime and a reduction in wages. It is
plain nonsense. In regards to the migrant contributions to the economy
<http://www.cream-migration.org/publ_uploads/CDP_03_08.pdf>, “immigrants
are paid less than the value of what they contribute to production,
generating therefore a surplus".
As for crime, despite the claims of the sexually repressed and dangerous
Muslim male stalking fearful white women, empirical research
<http://cep.lse.ac.uk/pubs/download/dp0984.pdf> once again illustrates
that increased rates of migration, particularly related to asylum, does not
lead to an increase in violent crime, but can lead to a slight increase in
property crime if access to work and the right to earn is denied to recent
arrivals.
Europe is not being invaded, nor is it taking refugees because all of a
sudden it has developed a conscience. The continent is in the midst of a
population crisis that simply cannot be solved by domestic measures alone.
A declining birth rate matched with a greater length of life has led to
ballooning pension liabilities that threaten the very stability of the
state as it is conceived. Germany, for example, faces such a population
decline that by 2050, it is estimated the nation will drop
<http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/aug/23/baby-crisis-europe-brink-depopulation-disaster>
from 81 million inhabitants to 67 million. To reverse this trend, it is
estimated that Germany needs to take in 2 million migrants and refugees per
year.
Europe needs migrants and refugees as much as migrants and refugees need
Europe, there’s no running away from that fact.
*- Daniel Renwick* *is a journalist and youth worker. He was based in
Germany for three years before returning to London.*
*The views expressed in this article belong to the author and do not
necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Middle East Eye.*
*Photo: Refugees from Syria present flowers to passers-by as they
demonstrate against sexual violence near the Cologne main train station in
Cologne, western Germany on 16 January, 2016 (AFP). *
http://internacional.elpais.com/internacional/2015/12/11/actualidad/1449832662_879236.html
Bruselas pide una policía europea de fronteras desplegable en tres días
La Comisión lanza un proyecto para desplegar guardas de fronteras durante
las crisis
Lucía Abellán <http://internacional.elpais.com/autor/lucia_abellan/a/> /
Claudi
Pérez <http://internacional.elpais.com/autor/claudi_perez/a/> Bruselas 11
DIC 2015 - 17:29 BRST <http://elpais.com/tag/fecha/20151211>
[image: alt]
Varios migrantes hacen cola ante la Oficina Estatal de Sanidad y Asuntos
Sociales en Berlín. / CLEMENS BILAN (EFE)
La Comisión Europea se escuda en la enorme presión que sufren las
fronteras comunitarias
<http://internacional.elpais.com/internacional/2015/11/01/actualidad/1446393806_254215.html>
para lanzar todo un desafío a los Estados. Bruselas propone configurar un
cuerpo europeo de guardias fronterizos que pueda desplegarse en dos o tres
días en cualquier frontera exterior de la UE que lo requiera. El elemento
más controvertido radica en que la Comisión podrá adoptar la decisión aun
sin el consentimiento del Estado al que se envíen los refuerzos, según un
documento oficial al que ha tenido acceso EL PAÍS. La mayoría de los
Estados rechazan esa fórmula.
El Ejecutivo de Jean-Claude Juncker quiere evitar que las fronteras bajo
presión
<http://economia.elpais.com/economia/2015/11/05/actualidad/1446716890_630021.html>
—como las griegas, italianas o húngaras durante la crisis de refugiados—
tarden meses en reforzarse. Por eso cree que, “en situaciones de urgencia”,
un organismo europeo debe tomar el control “incluso si no lo ha pedido el
Estado concernido o si considera que no existe necesidad para una
intervención adicional”, reza la comunicación de 10 páginas que presentará
la Comisión Europea el próximo martes.
Con la entrada irregular de casi 1,5 millones de personas en la UE hasta
noviembre, la mayoría por Grecia, cada país ha adoptado medidas
deslavazadas. Atenas solo ha aceptado ayuda de sus socios en las últimas
semanas. Y los llamamientos para apoyar con policías europeos a los países
más afectados han encontrado escasa receptividad en el resto de socios.
Bruselas cree que la única manera de actuar con agilidad es contar con un
núcleo duro de agentes que, aunque dependan de las fuerzas de seguridad
nacionales, puedan ser movilizados por la UE para aliviar una crisis
fronteriza. El texto comunitario habla de “al menos 1.500 policías”, que
serían complementados por el personal de Frontex, la agencia europea de
fronteras. La Comisión quiere duplicar la dotación de este órgano, hasta
casi 800 empleados.
Para que cumpla estos nuevos cometidos, Bruselas quiere transformar
Frontex, ahora con meros poderes de coordinación, en la Agencia Europea de
Guardias de Frontera. Este nuevo organismo contará con un centro de
análisis de riesgos que evaluará cuándo una frontera requiere intervención.
Sus expertos viajarán a la zona y trasladarán sus conclusiones a la
Comisión, que podrá decidir el despliegue de ese cuerpo europeo creado con
policías nacionales. También tendrá nuevos poderes para expulsar a los
extranjeros sin derecho a asilo.
Aunque en los planes de Juncker no sea necesario el aval del Estado
afectado, el conjunto de los países miembros sí deberán aprobar esa medida
por mayoría cualificada. “La decisión de la agencia será obligatoria para
el Estado miembro”, aclara el texto.
Caos en Grecia
La iniciativa está pensada para que ese colectivo de 2.000 personas
<http://economia.elpais.com/economia/2015/11/05/actualidad/1446716890_630021.html>
—junto con barcos, vehículos y equipamiento— actúe en cualquier frontera
exterior de la UE (hasta 15 países europeos limitan por tierra o mar con un
país ajeno al bloque). No obstante, el caos generado en la frontera griega
(y en menor medida en la italiana) con la entrada de extranjeros en el
último año ha acelerado este proyecto comunitario. “Grecia ha mostrado sus
limitaciones en este terreno”, aseguran las fuentes comunitarias
consultadas.
Apoyo de Tsipras al nuevo cuerpo
El primer ministro griego, Alexis Tsipras, dio ayer la bienvenida a las
propuestas comunitarias para crear una Agencia de la Guardia Costera de la
Unión Europea que controle las fronteras marítimas. “Damos la bienvenida a
una Guardia Costera Europea”, ha afirmado Tsipras durante su intervención
en el Parlamento. El primer ministro ha recalcado, sin embargo, que Grecia
debe mantener siempre la última decisión sobre el control de sus fronteras,
reiterando su oposición a una acción conjunta con Turquía. / REUTERS
No obstante, el hecho de que buena parte de los migrantes que acceden a
Europa sean refugiados cuestiona la efectividad de cualquier medida de
control de fronteras. Un demandante de asilo tiene derecho a ser acogido al
menos mientras se decide sobre su estatus, por lo que resulta difícil
reducir el tránsito hacia la UE.
Con esta propuesta, Bruselas recoge una demanda francoalemana para evitar
que el descontrol en una frontera exterior de la UE acabe afectando a otros
miembros por la libre circulación de la zona Schengen. De momento, ningún
país más apoya explícitamente la idea, en particular el despliegue
obligatorio de policías ante una situación de crisis. España no rechaza el
plan, pero recela de su carácter vinculante. Para entrar en vigor, esta
novedad deberá ser aprobada por los Estados.
La idea del cuerpo europeo de fronteras se incluirá en un paquete más
amplio sobre la dimensión exterior de la UE. Entre las medidas propuestas
figura una revisión del código de Schengen para poder aplicar a todos los
europeos controles sistemáticos en la frontera exterior, como
comprometieron hace unos días los ministros del Interior.
También se presentará un mecanismo para acoger directamente desde Turquía
a refugiados sirios a los que la ONU ya otorgue esa condición y viajen a
Europa con garantías.
[mensagem organizada por Helion Póvoa Neto]
__._,_.___
------------------------------
Enviado por: "niem.migr" <NIEM.migr@xxxxxxxxx>
------------------------------
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