[amc] Fascinating discussion: Nevitt & J. Denny Weaver
- From: "Ray Gingerich" <RGingerich@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- To: "Austin Mennonite Church" <amc@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Date: Sun, 13 Nov 2005 14:37:55 -0600
Hi all,
I was privileged to read some questions that Nevitt had of Weaver in his first
lecture on Anabaptist/Mennonite Perspectives on Theology.
I twisted Nevitt's arm (non-violently, of course) and I think he sort of agreed
that I could send out his questions, reflections, and Weaver's response,
although, I didn't seem to convince him that y'all would be interested in
reading it.
Here it is:
***********************
Dr. Weaver,
I am a member of Austin Mennonite Church, Austin, Texas. Ray Gingerich, another
member of our church, attended a conference at which you spoke. He brought back
materials from the conference and has made them available to the congregation.
Today for Sunday School (a perhaps dated term) we discussed your paper
"Anabaptist/Mennonite Perspectives on Theology." I have a few comments and
questions. I of course realize you may be too busy to respond, but the exercise
of writing you is valuable in itself, since it gives me the opportunity to
organize my thoughts. (We are going to discuss the other two papers on the next
two Sundays.)
I should say, perhaps by way of warning, that I am a (very old) graduate
student in philosophy at the University of Texas. I am trying to complete a
dissertation on the will to power and Nietzsche's On the Genealogy of Morals. I
tell you this in the spirit of full disclosure and so that you will be able to
locate my comments in the philosophical universe. My religious background might
also help make sense of what follows. I was raised Southern Baptist, I attended
a Plymouth Brethren church for a number of years, I was a kinship leader in a
Vineyard Christian Fellowship for quite a while, and eventually my family and I
joined the Mennonite church, first in Fort Collins, CO, then in San Antonio and
finally in Austin. We joined the Mennonite Church for two reasons (I think): my
wife, Darlene, was raised Mennonite, and we are both pacifists (or in my own
case, a wanna-be pacifist). Again, I present this life trajectory so that you
have a more organic sense of the ground from which my thoughts grow (or
moulder).
First let me say that I enjoyed reading your paper a great deal. Your work is a
pleasure to read. You are articulate and thorough without being overly
academic. Your thoughts are easy to follow and very engaging. I suspect you are
an excellent instructor.
Your preliminary discussion of postmodernism and the difficulty it poses for
Christian theology was extremely interesting and helpful. I don't read much
theology for reasons too many to consider here. Thus there is a disconnect in
my mind between philosophical notions such as postmodernism and my religious
life (such as it is). Yet reading your discussion I came to realize how my
deepest, most important, and most painful "religious" issues center exactly
around the problems you highlight. My religious training taught me to believe
in absolute foundations. When these foundations were shaken (yes, I read
Tillich, though quite a long time ago) I began to move into the postmodern
world without ever realizing this was what was happening. This is perhaps the
reason why I now find myself writing on Nietzsche. I want to find a way out of
the postmodern crisis, and apparently I thought at some level that learning the
territory thoroughly would somehow show me the way out. Well, as I'm sure you
would have been able to warn me, I'm still as lost as ever.
This too-long biography is preliminary to understanding the following response
which I initially had to your article: thank God someone has found a way to
create a sensible theology in the postmodern world! I found your analysis of
the current situation very enlightening and your initial proposal of a solution
promising and exciting. As I worked through the paper, however, certain
objections took form in my mind, and iI would like to share them you.
First, let me reflect back to you what I take to be your explanation of the
postmodern crisis, with some additional gloss of my own. Today we have lost
confidence in the Modern and the Enlightenment projects. We no longer believe
we have infallible access to some transcendent reference for Truth and the
Good, nor do we any longer believe (pure) reason is capable of fulfilling this
function. In Nietzsche's terms (according to my view), reason is always
motivated by some affect or some subconscious prejudice. Reason is an
instrument that can be used to develop coherent ideas, but the premises from
which reason operates are always prior to rational analysis, and it is these
unjustified and unjustifiable premises that ultimately determine the
conclusions our rational thought will reach.
This would seem to lead to inescapable skepticism or even nihilism. (I think
this fear is actually what motivates Nietzsche.) On the contrary, you say, this
opens a whole world of possible theologies because it ends the hegemony of
traditional theology. No one can claim to have the Truth, and so everyone's
perspective should be taken seriously (assuming, I'm sure you mean, it makes
sense and conforms to certain standards of biblical scholarship, etc.). You
say, "Postmodernity is the recognition that there is no universally accessible
and universally agreed upon beginning point or foundation that can validate
ultimate truth claims." Thus, we should not hesitate to assert that a coherent
peace theology has as much right to consideration as any other.
So far, so good. However, it seems to me that you then begin a process of
justifying a peace theology according to the traditional principles used by
Modern or Enlightenment thinkers. I haven't traced your methodology well enough
to substantiate this criticism adequately, even though it's the essence of my
complaint. So, my criticism may ultimately be impotent.
You ground a peace theology in the example of Jesus' life: "The will of God is
revealed in the particular humanity of Jesus, which forms the base line against
which Christians evaluate their own activity." This, I think, is your
fundamental principle for generating a Mennonite theology. Yet already I want
to ask: why should the life of Jesus be what defines Christian theology? What
about the rest of the New Testament? Why shouldn't we take Paul's
interpretation of the life of Jesus, for example, as the basis for our
theology? Or why shouldn't we say that our theology must take as its
fundamental basis a synthetic and careful reading of the entire Bible?
Even if we were to take the life of Jesus as the basic "premise" for our
theology, is it really indisputable that this would produce a pacifist theology
rather than some theology with a more moderate stand on peace? I'm not a
biblical scholar, but I get the impression there is enough ambiguity in the
Gospels to support some fairly wide interpretations on this issue. Is it not
possible that Mennonites find Jesus to be a pacifist is because they bring
pacifist predispositions to the text? We assemble and interpret the fragmented
stories in the Gospels so that they create the image we want to see.
My point is that your choice of the Jesus narrative as what define Christian
theology and the interpretation of this narrative as presenting a pacifist
Jesus are not unarguable. "Well," you might say, "this is indeed the postmodern
condition. We cannot justify this choice and interpretation against the choices
that other theologians have made through the centuries. We can only say this is
our choice and our interpretation."
This might be a good postmodern response, but you seem to want to make a
stronger claim than, "This is just our choice and interpretation, and you can
make your own." You are seem to want to bring your new Mennonite peace theology
into dialog with other Christian theologies. Wanting this theology to be taken
seriously seems to imply, does it not, that you want others to realize it is
"valid"? What can "valid" mean outside the Modern and Enlightenment models of
truth-seeking? Do you really mean nothing more than, "It works for us, and so
maybe it will work for you too?" If so, can this sort of theology function as a
prophetic call to Christendom, as you would like it to? You say, "Posing a
nonviolence-shaped alternative overagainst Christendom's theology is actually
an act of engagement with all of Christendom."
There are other indications in the paper that you indeed want to justify a
pacifist theology according to what seems to this theologically untrained
reader to be pretty traditional, non-postmodern exegetical principles. You say,
"Jesus' rejection of violence is certainly not the possession of Anabaptists
alone, and posing a nonviolence-shaped alternative is what demonstrates that an
Anabaptist theology does address every person who claims the name of Jesus
Christ." Does this not imply that a Mennonite exegesis of the Gospels is
superior to an exegesis by those who reach different conclusions? Furthermore,
doesn't it claim the sort of universality that you specifically rejected as
part of the postmodern condition? Again, what does "superior" mean if not "more
justified by a careful, rational analysis of the text"? But can a postmodernist
make this sort of claim? You also say, "[The Anabaptist approach to the Bible]
must take history very seriously in order to discover and correct deviation
from the gospel that begins with the story of Jesus." Doesn't the possibility
of correction imply rather clearly that there is a correct interpretation? What
(postmodern?) grounds do you find for asserting such universality and
correctness?
One more quote: "And further, that which provoked the additions and adaptations
is actually functioning as a higher authority than the supposed authoritative
foundation that is being added to. When historic Anabaptists and Mennonites
felt compelled to make changes and adaptations in the inherited theology of
Christendom, they were implicitly acknowledging a higher theological authority
than Christendom's standard."
. hmmmm . foundations and authority . in a postmodern theology? A postmodernist
would probably ask annoying questions like: why is your foundation better than
mine? Where did you find your foundation, and why didn't I find the same one?
What makes your authority more authoritative than mine?
Here's what seems to be happening in your paper. Postmodernism opens the way
for a new Mennonite pacifist theology because postmodernism rips the
foundations out from under any claim to universality or absolute authority.
Traditionalists can thus no longer marginalize alternative theologies because
the Modern and Enlightenment bases for the unique justification of their own
views has been removed. So, you outline a new theology which is in line with
Anabaptist tradition which should now be treated as a real player in the
theological marketplace. But, being unhappy with the postmodern tendency to
say, "this works for me, and maybe it will work for you," you proceed to
justify a Mennonite pacifist theology over against traditional theologies. You
don't want to say (I think), "Here's another possibility just as coherent as
yours, why don't you try it on for size." Rather, you want to say (I think),
"Postmodernism means you should listen to us. And now that your listening to
us, can't you see that we have a better interpretation of Christianity than you
do, where 'better' means 'based on biblical exegesis that is more rationally
sound." So, it seems to me that in the first part of the paper you use
postmodernism to gain a hearing for a new theology, but later in the paper you
revert to non-postmodern principles to justify this new theology. This strikes
me as fatally inconsistent. (Of course, a postmodernist might argue that my
attachment to consistency is a shadow of the Enlightenment and that I should
give it up. But this eventually tends to degenerate into nonsense: my gripe
with postmodernism.)
If I am wrong, and you really are presenting a Mennonite pacifist theology as
just another player with no more justification than any other, then I must ask:
why should I adopt yours instead of one of these others? Because of historical
accident, because I happen to be associated with a group that traditionally has
stood for pacifism? Or because I just personally happen to feel like a
pacifist, as an accident of genetics and cultural programming? These are hardly
compelling reasons to adopt a position that is supposed to induce such passion
that its adherents are willing to sacrifice their very lives for its sake.
My own suspicion is that postmodernism reduces every claim of "validity" to a
claim of power. Postmodern "validity" is power. (Nietzsche's influence is
rather obvious here.) So, even if we try to be non-coercive, we still must play
the power game because that's the only game there is. In a "free" society which
shies away from physical force we must use more subtle mechanisms. We must
appeal to people's passions, prejudices, need for acceptance, etc. We can argue
that our view makes more sense, but if reason is instrumental then we
ultimately must appeal to the non-rational commitments that underlie supposed
rational choices. In other words, the power game in a "free" society shifts
from coercion to manipulation. This is a conclusion I dislike very much, but I
don't know how to escape it.
Anyway, please understand that "I want to believe, help me in my unbelief!" My
criticism probably sounds antagonistic, but as you know, this is part of
academic training. Also, I have a fair amount of emotional energy behind these
issues, and sometime it spurts out rather forcefully. I really do admire your
effort to address these terribly difficult issues with honesty and intellectual
integrity. Too many Christians stop up their ears and hope the unpleasant
noises will go away. This can't be the way to take Christianity into the 21st
century. We need courageous and thoughtful intellectual leaders. I suspect this
is part of your "call."
Sincerely,
Nevitt Reesor
************************
Mr. Reesor,
Thanks for your interest and your comments.
Here is a brief answer. I would divide your question into two parts. One part
concerns the implications of postmodernity for discussions of Anabaptist
theology with people/religions who are not Christians. The second part concerns
the conversation with people who do claim to be Chrsitians. These are two quite
different issues.
For the dialogue with non-Christians, you are quite right. There is no
universally accessible and universally agreed upon starting point by which one
can resolve the competing, ultimate claims between or among religions. That
does not mean, however, that we just throw up our hands and say that we can't
know anything or that it is impossible to testify to truth. What it does is
change the way that we [Christians] testify to the truth. We testify to belief
that the claims about Jesus are ultimately true by being willing to live by
those claims when they are not required and even when they are costly. This is
ultimately the truth claim that martyrdom is about--one is willing to live by
the truth of ones claim, even if it means dying for that truth. Of course,
people who are not Christians can and do give the same testimony. But we can
see, at least, that postmodernity has not left us with no means to testify to
truth (or ultimate truth claims).
The conversation with those who claim to be Christian is a quite different
conversation. The conversation between Christians [such as an Anabaptist
interpretation of the Bible versus a Christendom interpretation of the Bible]
is different. Both sides of this dialogue have supposedly already answered the
question of where ultimate truth lies. Both sides have supposedly said that
ultimate truth lies with Jesus. Thus this conversation does have real criteria
(at least one criterion) by which to test truth claims. That criterion is the
narrative of Jesus. And the discussion then becomes, which reading of Jesus--my
Anabaptist reading--or a reading of Christendom--is most true to the biblical
story of Jesus. And here, I am quite willing to suggest that an Anabaptist
reading is better with reference to the story of Jesus. That is what John
Howard Yoder's Politics of Jesus is about. He showed how almost all readings of
Jesus have discounted Jesus as a source of ethics, and suggested that if we are
really Christian, then Jesus should be a source of ethics. My reconstruction of
atonement--which you will see in the third lecture that Ray Gingerich brought
from Oregon--makes the same kind of argument in theology. The second lecture
from Oregon shows how, inspite of Jesus' rejection of the sword/violence, the
standard atonement theologies all enshire or model violence at some level. The
third lecture then suggests a reconstruction of atonement theology that is
truer to the story of Jesus than are the violence-modeling models that come out
of Christendom.
I recognize that this answer also has its ambiguous dimensions--what is a true
reading of Jesus? Is it the Bible or the narrative of Jesus that is
authoritative, etc? But for the question between Christians, the dialogue has
been brought down into the realm where there are recognizable criteria with
which to evaluate a view.
Thanks again for your interest.
J. Denny Weaver
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