Justin, If you're interested in these issues, you may want to read The Periodic Table by E.R.Scerri, reviewed here http://chemistry.suite101.com/article.cfm/the_periodic_table_by_erscerri http://www.oup.com/us/catalog/general/subject/Chemistry/~~/dmlldz11c2EmY2k9OTc4MDE5NTMwNTczOQ== http://www.google.com/url?sa=t&source=web&ct=res&cd=14&ved=0CBkQFjADOAo&url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.hyle.org%2Fjournal%2Fissues%2F13-2%2Frev_kaji.pdf&ei=DVFoS5HVBsqXtgeoipzmBg&usg=AFQjCNEltijcjGir5FgXPojrYl6zoDpBaQ Much of the material can also be found here along with related topics, if you have library access (which I currently do not) http://ebooks.worldscinet.com/ISBN/9781848161382/toc.shtml Passing discussions of the ideas in the context of wider discussions can be found at http://www.google.com/url?sa=t&source=web&ct=res&cd=27&ved=0CBYQFjAGOBQ&url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.uoi.gr%2Fcerp%2F2001_May%2Fpdf%2F11Scerri.pdf&ei=rlNoS7C7HZKYtgfc87XWBg&usg=AFQjCNE58KMh0K4HvqY2fz4k1dHJXNn5FQ http://www.google.com/url?sa=t&source=web&ct=res&cd=5&ved=0CB8QFjAE&url=http%3A%2F%2Fphilsci-archive.pitt.edu%2Fdocuments%2Fdisk0%2F00%2F00%2F02%2F56%2FPITT-PHIL-SCI00000256-00%2FCase_for_poc.pdf&ei=XVRoS6vsAsWUtgfJoYTnBg&usg=AFQjCNHC6xpML0eKnVL4XqMubTvZO-NlUQ Physics also does not predict the development of organic compounds chemistry does that) or the evolution of life. But are you therefore a vitalist? There's a certain picture we may entertain, wherein we take all of the sciences and their principles and show through various complex derivations, how all of them can be translated into descriptions physicists use. But this hasn't happened, save in Carnap's wet dreams. (I'm not saying that it cannot.) And whose to say that if it did, the path from physics through biochemistry, physiology, and neurology wouldn't explain psychology? The picture is so vague that I don't think we can draw conclusions from it either way. If you take "what physics describes" in the ordinary sense, based on the activities of physicists and the content of their theories, then no, physics does not describe things that possess awareness (at least not in any ordinary sense of "awareness"). But there's an awful lot else that physics doesn't describe that we would still call parts of the physical world. But if you take "what physics describes" in the vague, promissory note sort of way suggested by reductionism, then it ceases to be at all obvious that it doesn't or cannot describe things that are aware in a perfectly familiar sense. Hence again, the equivocation. JPDeMouy ========================================= Need Something? Check here: http://ludwig.squarespace.com/wittrslinks/