Walter: The decision not to read X is not undertaken tabula rasa. The dismissal comes from the vantage point of having learned that certain kinds of conversations are not helpful, because of the way an orientation pre-configures them. A Wittgensteinian doesn't walk away from false problems in philosophy; he graduates from them. What you are saying is similar to this: how do you know sermon X coming from orientation Y (say, evangelical) wasn't something that would have changed your beliefs? The answer is: after having learnt of Y, and seeing enough sermons, one gains the license to skip X. (If I am wrong about X, I'd get the news anyway, because it would be novel, something that would come to redefine Y). Your persistence on this point is really problematic inasmuch as I had asked you to sit with me, in "therapy," over why the free will debate was a problem in need of a position. We can extend this: why someone being a "realist" (versus whatever) is a real problem. Or why consciousness being said to be physical is a problem for philosophy. You seem to think that this reduces to taste. That if I don't regard X as being worth my time, it would akin to thinking Soccer is less valuable than Football. I don't offer my disregard of X as a taste; I do so under warrant that: (a) there are no real philosophic stakes to the discussion; (b) I have learned this; and (c) that, very often, the problem itself is manufactured by the sins of philosophy. If I am wrong about these things, we could discuss them. But if I am right about them, my dismissal cannot be one of taste -- at least not in the sense we mean. (I might have a taste for (a) through (c) -- but that's not the issue here). Keep in mind that I pass no judgment on the value of these concerns to the disputants themselves -- they may be getting some benefit from them. My comments purport to come from a perch or loft -- one who has gone from being a disputant to having been given the inheritance of Wittgenstein. Wittgenstein, properly understood, will change a person's orientation: he'll set you free in certain ways. I can only be wrong if Wittgenstein is wrong, provided I have properly understood. So perhaps it would be better not to focus on my reading habits, but to focus upon whether the things I dismiss do, in fact, lack stakes, are false problems, etc. (and in what sense). Too much of our dispute has talked around the discussion: about me, and not the issue at hand. Regards and thanks. Dr. Sean Wilson, Esq. Assistant Professor Wright State University Personal Website: http://seanwilson.org SSRN papers: http://tinyurl.com/3eatnrx Wittgenstein Discussion: http://seanwilson.org/wiki/doku.php?id=wittrs