[Wittrs] Re: Wittgensteinian Therapy and Pluralistic Methods

  • From: Sean Wilson <whoooo26505@xxxxxxxxx>
  • To: "wittrsamr@xxxxxxxxxxxxx" <wittrsamr@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
  • Date: Fri, 6 May 2011 00:09:45 -0700 (PDT)

... let's pretend there was no thesis here. (Which, quite clearly, there is). 
Let's assume that one never adopted the three-voice stance. Let's assume, 
instead, one just marched nakedly in the room and asked:  

"... how one goes about getting someone to recognize problems with their 
thinking, how one goes about getting them to be receptive, without having a 
variety of methods at one's disposal?"

1. It seems to me that the unit of analysis for this question is explicitly 
CLINICAL. A decision has been made that the PERSON is the project. And the goal 
is to re-orient thought for his or her betterment, using whatever means that 
ultimately achieve those ends (putting aside ethics). 

This idea extends well past methods in philosophy. It could extend to all sorts 
of things. Because of this, I'm unclear that Wittgenstein has anything to do, 
explicitly, with affirming or denying this PROJECT. (I could see a post-modern 
therapist signing on to it and using Wittgenstein as an influence, though. 
That, of course, is fine, but it hardly makes Wittgenstein's ideas require it). 
[not accusing you of being POMO].

2. One could argue that, for Wittgenstein, the key unit of analysis has always 
been the PROPOSITION, not the person. And that proposition-therapy is different 
from people-therapy. Moreover, one could argue that Wittgenstein's methods were 
really only about clearing HIS mind, and that, once cleared, the matter gets 
presented for US as a kind of revelation -- i.e. what a cleared mind then looks 
like. ("The new thinking"). What this means is that he's only telling you what 
he's discovered: namely, that philosophers require therapy. He's not telling 
you that they'll accept it or even that it will be effective. 

3. Wittgenstein's life would seem to confirm # 2. Although yours is not a 
biographical assertion, we can ask whether Wittgenstein's philosophy and life 
were consistent, at least in his mind, to learn what he means. If we did this, 
we might find that his project is not clinical-therapeutic; its proposition- 
therapeutic. Take a look at his teaching. Tell me: what was the difference 
between Wittgenstein in the classroom, Wittgenstein at the Moral Sciences Club, 
and Wittgenstein in On Certainty (re: Moore)?  Or when talking politics? In 
each case the health is about the proposition, not whether the person had come 
to confession or had failed to absorb the master's medicine. If you didn't or 
couldn't "get it," Wittgenstein could be quite abrupt with you. 

Now, he also had exceptionally kind and warm moments. But here, his decision 
was simply not to doctor the proposition. Here, the matter was to let beliefs 
be, as they should.  So he would be silly with certain friends, be kind to 
people's wives, fail to engage or disrupt other's sentiments. My point is that 
Wittgenstein, like anyone, held scruples about who needed propositions 
doctored. This isn't part of the project; it's simply etiquette more than 
anything.

Finally, I can't find convincing the wall you erect for pedagogy as opposed to 
therapy. It works fine for a clinical universe, but not for one that has the 
proposition as the key unit of analysis.
 
3. Let's assume, though, that you have hit on one thing. I don't know that I 
would deny that playing the language games of ordinary philosophy would be bad 
therapy for the proposition, in some cases. The idea might be as you say: use a 
hammer to pound the jar lid before you can screw it off. 

In fact, one could find historical evidence for this. This was the way 
Wittgenstein found the exit to the bottle. If you subscribe to the view that 
Wittgenstein's second coming was a transcendence of sorts, you would find some 
benefit in Old Testament righteousness, though you would rightly believe a 
person confined there to be confused.    

But note that even this view has consequences. First, it says that analytic 
philosophy is only good if it is INSTRUMENTAL -- if it is used as a kind of 
play toy or widget. I don't know how far off that is from my account of the 
Karate school. Perhaps it's just a remedial program for the flunkey's (I don't 
know). My sense is that if Wittgenstein watched a therapy session that was 
waged this way, he would have had little patience for it -- though this might 
not at all impact what your thesis is.   

Relatedly, I don't see the instrumental use of analyticity as being a dilemma 
for Wittgenstein; I see it as a dilemma for analyticity. But I will say this: I 
DO see a dilemma for what WE are to do if Wittgenstein is correct about 
philosophy. Because it seems that there are only two paths: teach the kids that 
it was all just for fun. Or, try to see if you can replicate them growing the 
right flowers in their own gardens (on their own) -- something the soil simply 
may not permit in some of them. Or, if it does permit it, it may take bloody 
YEARS of missionary work where one insincerely toys with another's framework 
(ethics aside) until the pluralistic good works and deeds result in an epiphany.


Besides, once you open the bottle to pluralism, you better not discriminate 
against haughty arrogance. You may find that direct approaches yield short-term 
conflict but cause long term self reflection (perhaps in some). 

4. Quickies. I can't get much out of this: "it is not a theory but an 
interpretative schema."  (kinetic military operation). On Gettier: I say he 
perpetuated a false problem, not disrupted it.  

 

Regards and thanks.

Dr. Sean Wilson, Esq.
Assistant Professor
Wright State University
Personal Website: http://seanwilson.org
SSRN papers: http://tinyurl.com/3eatnrx
Wittgenstein Discussion: http://seanwilson.org/wiki/doku.php?id=wittrs ;


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