[Wittrs] Wittgenstein on Machines and Thinking

  • From: Sean Wilson <whoooo26505@xxxxxxxxx>
  • To: "wittrs@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx" <wittrs@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
  • Date: Mon, 20 Jun 2011 14:36:41 -0700 (PDT)

Well Stuart, I don't know that we are able to communicate on the matter.
The empirical question is what the thing called "machine" (in the future) is 
doing when it is said to be "thinking." If everyone understands both of these 
things -- what the creature is and what it is doing -- then agreement or 
disagreement with the proposition becomes only a matter of what sense of 
"think" and "machine" one is using.  Asking whether a "machine thinks" asks 
that you FIRST have in mind a sense of "think" and a sense of "machine." In 
ordinary senses of these ideas, the answer seems to be "no" -- but ONLY BECAUSE 
OF THE GRAMMAR OF THE ORDINARY SENSE. That grammar is predicated upon what 
"machines" being things like typewriters and personal computers. 

If we say that a dog "thinks" and that a human "thinks," we don't necessarily 
have the same sense of the idea. Better to say the dog dog-thinks. Or that 
humans human-think. What you are doing with your futuristic thought experiment 
is taking a grammar that is in play at a certain time -- human over here, 
machine over there  -- and pretending that a "machine" is created that 
human-thinks. The reply here is to say that, once you do this, you've 
un-machined "machine" or, if not, have violated "human-think," because that 
idea has a species-specific grammar.  

The reason thinking can have a species-specific grammar is that brains are 
different across creatures, making their form of life different. If you create 
a hypothetical where a creature can actually share our form of life, you've 
completely changed the conditions for languaging about it. There might be a new 
sense of "think" inaugurated by this -- surely there would be a new sense of 
"machine." More likely, there would be new terms entirely. Compare these 
advancements: clone, alien, cyborg, etc.     


Now, if you deny that "thinking" has a species-specific grammar when using the 
term, all you have done is introduce a different SENSE of think. Perhaps it's a 
child's sense. Or perhaps all it means are the behaviors common to dogs, humans 
and your machine. Whatever it is, it is LOCAL TO HOW YOU ARE PACKAGING THE 
INFORMATION. If we all agree on what the information is, what package we use is 
neither here nor there. This is what causes all the confusion: not what the 
"machine" is doing. This is what makes debates go on for centuries. This is why 
they are pointless. Like a dog chasing its tail.

    

<sigh>


Let's just leave it like this. I don't think it is fruitful to continue the 
matter. The gulf between our respective frameworks is just too large. I don't 
want to go round and round in a telephone conversation in here. Let's just 
leave it be.     
 
Regards and thanks.

Dr. Sean Wilson, Esq.
Assistant Professor
Wright State University
Personal Website: http://seanwilson.org
SSRN papers: http://tinyurl.com/3eatnrx
Wittgenstein Discussion: http://seanwilson.org/wiki/doku.php?id=wittrs


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