[Wittrs] Re: Wittgenstein and Theories
- From: "J" <ubersicht@xxxxxxxxx>
- To: wittrsamr@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
- Date: Mon, 04 Jan 2010 03:32:04 -0000
SW,
No rush!
Enjoy your holidays and time with your daughter.
I share your reservations about the value of "justified true belief" as a
definition and about the value of such definitions generally.
My only concern was to question the idea that it should necessarily be
stigmatized as a theory. That it can be faulted on other grounds when used in
other contexts is another matter.
What is true in such a definition might better be captured by pointing out the
queerness of saying, e.g. "I know it, though I have no grounds," "I know it but
I don't believe it," or "I know it, even though it isn't true."
One might be able to imagine (very unusual) circumstances in which such
statements might make sense. Certainly, we could agree that "know" would be
being used in an odd way in these cases.
"I don't believe it: I know it!" This makes perfect sense, though another
might say, "I don't just believe it..." Or is it more accurate to indicate
inverted commas with the first, i.e. "I don't 'believe' it...", which then
amounts to, "'Believe' is not the right right way to characterize matters."
Wittgenstein acknowledges that someone might use "know" to characterize a
certainty but objects to philosophers doing this, so "I know it, though I have
no grounds," may make sense in certain cases.
(This relates to a recent interest of mine: to what extent is Wittgenstein
interested in reforming ordinary language, not as some general program, but
only for purposes of philosophers wishing to avoid particular muddles? The use
of "proposition" and the principle of bipolarity is arguably a case of this.)
> Definitions are only for people who have a "foreign language
> problem." Once you are plugged into the grammar, they are of
> no further use.
Oh, I certainly wouldn't go that far! But I would say that often debating
definitions is quite pointless and "formalistic" (or "legalistic") in a
decidedly bad way.
As Wittgenstein
> noted, one could make a philosophy (by playing games with
> sense) out of anything
Do you have a specific quotation in mind? Or do you mean that he demonstrated
such?
-- what is wishing, intention, law,
> winning, fatherhood, courtesy, etc. etc. Knowledge is not
> special here (at least not to asking what it is).
I would note that discussions of "knowledge", "wishing", "intending", and
"law", but not "winning", "fatherhood", or "courtesy", have relevance to
examinations of logical questions in Frege and especially Russell, as well as
in the Austrian tradition I had previously been emphasizing. While these
topics may seem like tangents or like simple examples of how to apply his
methods, they are actually quite central. And "winning" becomes central in
light of his own leitmotif of games. So they are "special" in a certain sense.
They relate to particular puzzles that vexed those concerned with logical
problems similar to those with which he struggled.
(Many Wittgenstein students don't read Russell or Frege nearly enough.)
I'm glad you appreciated the information on Gettier. When I was younger,
noticing how this man who seemed to be known for nothing else had inspired such
a vast literature on the basis of a single short paper had really piqued my
curiosity.
> 3. On the value of partial definitions, I'm not sure I
> completely agree. ... The
> key is to avoid traffic accidents in the language game. Not
> to give accounts of words outside of this end.
The idea that a grammatical investigation solely exists to avert a particular
misunderstanding is a familiar one and not without merit. Certainly, there are
reasons to read Wittgenstein that way. (It is one of the disagreements between
Hacker/Baker and later Baker.) But there are also reasons not to. This would
make a good subject for a separate thread.
Later in the week, I'll do a
> "Wittgenstein and definitions" mail, and maybe we can talk
> more about it.
I shall look forward to that. If the remarks are from
_Lectures_on_the_Foundations_of_Mathematics_, you could point me to the page
numbers and I could then post them, as I have the ebook.
>
> 4. I don't think we are seeing eye to eye on
> anthropology and "logic." I think the best way to get
> through that is to get to the level of example. Because
> saying philosophy is or is not logic, or is more cousin to
> anthropology than science, is not going to help until we
> actually see "philosophy" in action.
Again, is anthropology not a science?
>
> 5. You mentioned the Bouwsma book. Just got it and about 7
> other books for Christmas! Great stuff in there
> about seeing Wittgenstein as a prophet-like figure. (I'm
> going to write about that soon, too).
I'll look forward to that as well!
Bouwsma seems like
> a really great person.
He seems to have quite impressed Wittgenstein, a man not easily impressed.
More for his honesty and character than logical acumen, I suspect, though at a
certain point, getting what Wittgenstein has to say might be more a matter of
character. (That's not quite right.)
Take care,
JPDeMouy
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