[Wittrs] Where's the Dualism?
- From: Joseph Polanik <jpolanik@xxxxxxxxx>
- To: wittrsamr@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
- Date: Fri, 21 May 2010 05:50:30 -0400
gabuddabout wrote:
>If you have a philosophy of mind that is inherently not interested in
>beliefs, semantic content of beliefs, and intrinsic intentionality,
>then it amounts to a reductio of the program. Fodor largely believes
>that such approaches are variously incoherent and also a
>prioristic--perhaps resting on some outmoded (eventually!)
>criteriological view inspired by Witters.
having a mindless philosophy of mind is very popular.
>Also, Searle is not arguing that the intentional notions are found at
>the bottom level where consciousness etc. is causally reduced. The
>point is to have a story that doesn't eliminate what we want to
>explain, i.e., things like ontological subjectivity which, as a matter
>of fact, must be assumed if traffic signals, say, are to be meaningful
>for conscious drivers.
>For Fodor, it is mostly taken for granted that intentionality doesn't
>go as deep as fundamental physics. In this respect he shares Searle's
>point that one can have causal reducibility without ontological
>reducibility. Some special sciences are at levels above the fundamental
>physics without being inherently dualist. Take discovering DNA for
>example.
if intentionality doesn't go 'all the way down' to physics; then, it
must emerge somewhere 'on the way up' --- or so it seems to me.
intentionality may have its precursors, the instincts of animals and the
phototropism of plants; but, we need to overcome the linguistic habit of
saying 'X is nothing more than what X emerges from'.
Joe
--
Nothing Unreal is Self-Aware
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http://what-am-i.net
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