[Wittrs] Re: The True Identity
- From: "SWM" <SWMirsky@xxxxxxx>
- To: wittrsamr@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
- Date: Tue, 01 Dec 2009 03:11:11 -0000
--- In Wittrs@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx, Joseph Polanik <jPolanik@...> wrote:
<snip>
>
> I define the identity relation as the relation that satisfies Leibniz's
> Law of the Indiscernibility of Identicals, (L. Ind. Id.).
> [http://academic.reed.edu/philosophy/courses/phil200/handouts/hd-fall05-mind-1.html]
>
> this is probably what you call 'logical identity'; and, that term is
> okay with me. however, if you want to call a relation that does not
> satisfy L. Ind. Id. an 'identity' relation; then, I suggest you use a
> qualifier (other than 'logical' or 'strict') with 'identity'.
>
Note that I don't call it "identity". You and Bruce sometimes seem to want to
impute that terminology to my explanations. That's okay with me as long as you
don't mean by this what I have called "logical identity" and which you
correctly connect to the definition you have offered. But then it isn't for me
to further qualify because I have already done so when I say you can call my
proposal one of identity, as long as you do not think I mean by this the
logical variety.
I have already noted that, as with most words we play the language game with,
there are many different kinds of identity, from the logical to the identity of
twins to that of like-specked artifacts to that of different aspects of the
same thing. I am on record as saying my notion of brains causing consciousness
comes down saying this is about different aspects of the same thing (as in two
sides of the same coin or water molecules, which operate in a certain way, will
manifest on one level of observation as wetness).
Note that my point is that it is the performance of certain functions by
physical processes that are the coin on this analogy. The two sides of the coin
are the observable evidences of the processes in operation and the occurrence
of subjectiveness. On this view the brain is the platform on which the
processes are run. But neither the brain nor the processes themselves are the
consciousness (the subjectness). THAT is an aspect, on a certain level of
observation, of the functions being performed. On such a view, any processes on
any platform that can do the same things (perform the same functions) could
generate subjectness. But it doesn't follow that any two instances of
subjectness (of consciousness) would be interchangeable except insofar as they
are capable of the same functionalities (of accomplishing the same tasks).
I have said all this many times and with many different examples. I don't have
to offer a specialized name for it because I did not choose the name "identity"
for what I have in mind, you and/or Bruce did. But I acknowledge one could do
THAT and that I would be okay with it as long as we are clear on the meaning I
have in mind. You can call it "Frank" for all I care. I will still describe it
in the same way.
> this should help avoid at least one quagmire of ambiguity because L.
> Ind. Id. makes it impossible for the brain to be logically identical to
> the mind if the brain is also considered the cause of the mind.
>
The quagmire happens when people don't read or pay attention to what is being
said! I have said what I mean countless times now, on this and prior lists. I
deliberately avoid the term "identity" precisely because of this risk of
ambiguity. That's why I prefer "cause" which can, as we have seen, also be
problematic but which seems more intuitive to me, based on the simple fact
that, when asked why water is wet we can say with reasonable clarity and
limited ambiguity that it's because _______ (describing the atomic behavior
that lies at the bottom of that particular physical feature).
> to put this point in terms of the duality of measurable and
> experiencable phenomena: a measurable phenomenon can not be identical to
> an experiencable phenomenon that it causes.
>
Here we have ambiguities with regard to "measurable". We certainly can measure
responses in conscious organisms and, if Dehaene is right, we will even be able
to measure the occurrence of mental images in brains -- even without the
reporting of the organism that has the brain.
It seems to me you are collapsing "measureable" into observable but even on
that basis what I have described is, indeed, observable. What is missing though
is, of course, shared direct access to the subjective experience. Dehaene's
observations and thesis suggest that even this may be achievable but assuming
it never is, I still see no special problem here. That we have a subjective
field that is forever inaccessible to an observer other than one that already
is at one with that field doesn't strike me as especially problematic for the
study of consciounsess and its physical causes.
> getting clear on this point would likely resolve at least some
> linguistic muddles, as you call them.
>
> Joe
>
> --
>
Well it's not been for want of trying on my part. I have said for a long time
that 1) I am not hung up on any particular term and that it is the description
that interests me and that 2) I find both "causal" and "identity" appropriate
terms, with the caveats I have long provided for each. Is it my fault that some
in reading my statements to this effect simply don't or won't process what I
have said? Would coming up with an amended nomenclature make any real
difference if people aren't paying attention to the descriptive content of the
words I'm using?
The point of philosophy of the Wittgensteinian sort is precisely this, to
explore our word usages and to use the information uncovered about the variant
uses to get clear on various conceptual questions that seem to stymie
communication on a philosophical level. Renaming relations, or other things,
via stipulated terms is only an outcome of the linguistic discovery process.
It's the process that counts, not the naming.
But if you want to call the idea I have been talking about "Identity sub 2" or
"underlying identity" or "non law of indiscernibility identity" or some other
invented term, that's fine. As long as you are naming what I am actually saying
and there is no better terminology already available to us to designate this in
a distinct way, I'm fine with that. I just don't think it does much for us
philosophically. What is interesting from the perspective of philosophy is the
analysis that gets us to the relevant insights, not what we call the things we
have our insights about.
SWM
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