[Wittrs] Re: The Tactical Paraphrase: From Fallacy to Factuality
- From: "SWM" <SWMirsky@xxxxxxx>
- To: wittrsamr@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
- Date: Sun, 02 May 2010 20:10:27 -0000
Okay, Joe, I can see discussion with you us pointless. You either don't grasp
or choosed not to grasp what's said and you have no qualms about imposing
absurd interpretations on what actually IS said.
--- In Wittrs@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx, Joseph Polanik <jPolanik@...> wrote:
>
> SWM wrote:
>
> >Joseph Polanik wrote:
>
> 1. Stuart's Strategic Defensive Claim
>
> >>your claim that Searle is a Cartesian dualist rests on the claim that
> >>Dennett agrees with you that Searle is a Cartesian dualist.
>
> >I never said I came to my views via Dennett or that my views depended
> >on what anyone but Searle, himself, said since they were based on
> >reading and thinking about Searle's CRA. I have said, however, that
> >later, on reading Dennett, I found that he was on record as having said
> >many of the things I've come to think about consciousness and deserved
> >credit since he preceded me on this and said it better.
>
> I never said that you got your views from reading Dennett.
>
You said, and I quote: "your claim that Searle is a Cartesian dualist rests on
the claim that Dennett agrees with you that Searle is a Cartesian dualist."
That's simply false. My claim does not "rest on" a claim that Dennett holds the
same position I do.
> I said that, in defending your views, you've offered nothing more than
> the claim that Dennett agrees with you.
>
No, you said my claim "rests on the claim that Dennett agrees with (me) that
Searle is a Cartesian dualist." It does not, I told you it does not. You simply
refuse to accept that. I have actually offered an extensive argument for my
position, none of it invoking Dennett as a basis.
> * * *
>
> 2. Misrepresentation of Thread History
>
> it seems that you are misrepresenting the history of this dispute in
> order to resume whining about the evolution of this thread.
>
What seems to you is wrong then. But the history is here for anyone who cares
to check. No one needs to rely on my report of it. (And they sure can't rely on
yours since you are in denial.)
> >Most recently you have argued that to be a "Cartesian dualist" one
> >needs to be a full blown subscriber to Descartes' historical philosophy
> >and now you're actually claiming that I make my case on the grounds
> >that Dennett called Searle a "Cartesian dualist".
>
> Stuart, what have you been smoking?
>
> I claim that Dennett does *not* accuse Searle of being a 'Cartesian
> dualist'; and, therefore, your case is completely bogus.
>
You always bloviate about others' being "bogus" and so forth! While some on
this list tend to argue their case by insistence, you prefer the smoke and
mirrors of faux logic, false trails (that sidetrack us onto other issues) and
citations of authority, most of which prove to be irrelevant and many of which
turn out to actually support a view that is contrary to your own (see your
citations about the fallacy of equivocation). But despite your smoke-blowing
preferences you have also shown that you are not above argument by accusation
which the above once again demonstrates.
As to what Dennett wrote and the purpose of my putting it up on this list,
here, again, is the history which you can deny in the hopes no one here will
care enough to go back and look for themselves:
In arguing my case for Searle's implicit dualism, I noted, in passing, that
Dennett noticed the same implicit dualism.
You claimed that, having read Dennett's Consciousness Explained, you could find
nowhere that he wrote anything like that.
I took the time to go back and find actual text and then to transcribe it onto
this list. In it we saw that Dennett challenged Searle's CRA and concluded that
the reason it seemed compelling to some was a matter of a presumption of
dualism, i.e., he asked rehtorically, who would believe the CRA's conclusion
that "more of the same" constituent elements in the CR could not do what the
more limited quantity of said elements in the CR could not do and he answered
his own question by saying "a Cartesian dualist would."
The text does not state "Searle is a Cartesian dualist" but it clearly states
that the CRA is convincing if one holds a Cartesian dualist's position with
regard to minds. It implies that that's the way you need to think about mind to
be convinced by the CRA. And THAT was my original point, that Dennett noticed
the same thing in Searle's argument that I had, i.e., a reliance on a dualistic
picture of mind.
From that, after a relatively long hiatus (for you, anyway -- I guess you were
hoping the issue would be forgotten since you didn't comment on it until I
called it to your attention in a subsequent exchange!), you returned to the
fray to argue a series of things in hopes of brushing off the evidence I had
presented.
You argued that there was no justification for calling Searle a dualist
(irrelevant to the point I was making!), that Dennett didn't really say it in
so many words (the context of the transcribed text was perfectly clear and so,
therefore, was its meaning), that Dennett, by citing Cartesian dualism, wasn't
necessarily invoking a claim of substance dualism against Searle which, it was
understood from our prior exchanges, I had in mind, and, moreover, that to be a
Cartesian dualist, Searle would have had to an explicit disciple of all of
Descartes' main philosophical tenets which he clearly wasn't.
All these arguments, Joe, were a transparent effort to blow sufficient smoke to
obscure the fact that you had tried to show that Dennett hadn't written
anything like I had said he had written after I had shown that he had.
> > I never claimed that a 'Cartesian dualist' has to adopt every belief
> Descartes ever held;
Then your argument that Searle can't be shown to subscribe to a belief in an
eternal soul and for that reason can't be called a Cartesian dualist is
pointless, isn't it?
> but, I do claim that Dennett understands that
> 'Cartesian dualism' is interactive substance dualism; and, consequently,
> you contradict yourself by claiming that Dennett agrees with you
What kind of smoke are you blowing now? My claim is that Dennett noted the same
implicit dualism in the CRA as I did and when he says it takes a "Cartesian
dualist" to accept the CRA's conclusion, we have the evidence for that!
Good lord man, where did you take up philosophy? You seem to have a beginner's
belief in the efficacy of sophism.
I see that I can waste untold hours here responding to you and it will never
make a particle of difference. Nothing penetrates as your idea of philosophy
consists of converting four step proofs based on truth claims to 28 step proof
immune to truth claims; invoking arcane mathematical issues; making up new
readings of others' claims (such as von Neumann's categories); arguing about
the meanings of words without regard to real usage (the "is of isness"); and
denying the obvious (such as Dennett's own words in the context in which
Dennett made them). You just waste my time here.
>while
> also admitting that you classify Searle as a Cartesian dualist even
> though his views neither presuppose nor entail a second kind of stuff.
>
The issue is not about whether we call it "stuff" or "substance" or anything
else. It's about assuming that, to explain the occurence of mind in the
universem there must be one more ontological basic beyond whatever it takes to
produce the physical universe. It's about how we think of mind. Is it reducible
to an otherwise physical reality or is it irreducible?
> * * *
>
> 3. Revising Dennett's Text
>
> it also appears that you've taken to revising Dennett's views so that
> they appear consistent with your own.
>
I invite anyone on this list to read the actual text and then make the case
that, when Dennett answers his own rhetorical question re: who would believe
the CRA's conclusion (which Dennett tells us is mistaken) with the statement
that "a Cartesian dualist would", he means something other than what he
actually says in that passage!
> for those who came in late, in Dennett's critique of the CRA, he says
> that Cartesian dualists believe that 'more of the same' would not
> produce understanding because an immortal soul is required to produce
> understanding. Stuart wants to argue
>
I suggest those "who came in late" read the actual original exchange you and I
had and then read Dennett's text which is transcribed onto this list. (He does
go on to mention the implication of that as being a believe in an "immortal
soul" but that is to show why one needs to be careful in embracing such a
Searlean view, to wit, one finds oneself on the same wavelength as believers in
souls and immortality, etc.)
> C -> X [Cartesianism entails believing X (in this case that more of the
> same will not produce understanding)]
>
> X [Searle believes the same thing (in this case that more of the
> same will not produce understanding)]
>
> (therefore) C [Searle is a Cartesian dualist]
>
> this is the fallacy of affirming the consequent.
>
My point was, first of all, was to point out what Dennett had actually said. I
did not propose that he said anything more than that text, while noting that
the text demonstrates that he saw the same dualist problem in the CRA that I
have been (and had been) arguing was there.
> instead of revising his own opinions, Stuart decided to revise Dennett's
> text.
>
I transcribed Dennett's text here precisely as it appears in the book. It
speaks for itself.
> Stuart started to claim that Dennett had said that "only Cartesian
> dualists believe that 'more of the same' would not produce
> understanding".
I said I believe that Dennett would agree with that claim but not that he made
that claim in the text in question. Note, as well, that the claim hinges on a
certain conception of mind, i.e., that it is irreducible. If, of course, it is
irreducible, then that is a dualist claim.
>the strategic purpose of this claim is that it turns
> fallacy into factuality, thus:
>
> X -> C [if only a Cartesian dualist believes X, then believing X is an
> infallable
You men "infallible".
> indicator of C; so, logically, it means the reverse of what
> Dennett's actual statement claims]
>
> X [Searle believes the same thing (in this case that more of the
> same will not produce understanding)]
>
> (therefore) C [Searle is a Cartesian dualist]
>
> now, with the revised first premise, the syllogism is a valid modus
> ponens.
>
> when challenged to point out precisely where Dennett has said "only a
> Cartesian dualist ...", Stuart admitted that there was no such place.
>
> >>>While I expect he would agree with the "only" characterization, he
> >>>doesn't explicitly say that in that text and I don't put words in his
> >>>mouth.
>
You mean I stated my position clearly enough for even you to finally get it?
> >>then we agree that Dennett does not actually say 'only a Cartesian
> >>dualist believes X' (where, as before, X is something relevant such as
> >>the belief that more of the same wouldn't produce understanding).
>
> >Where have you been in these discussions. I've never said he says
> >"only" but only that he likely would, i.e., I believe he implies it.
>
> Stuart then started claiming that Dennett had said "it takes a Cartesian
> dualist to believe X"; but, of course, when challenged ...
>
That was a paraphrase, not intended as a direct quote of Dennett and I said as
much previously.
> >>does he actually write 'it takes a Cartesian dualist to believe X'?
>
> >Go back and read the text. I didn't aim for a direct quote but only a
> >rough paraphrase.
>
As noted!
> Stuart, only a very poor paraphrase would assert that the logical
> relation between two terms is the exact reverse of the relation asserted
> by the unmodified text.
>
> Joe
Joe, you are absurd to the point of having become tedious. My posts on this
list speak for themselves. I don't think I need to waste any more of my time
defending them against your conflations, misrepresentations and faux logic. If
you have something useful or fresh to say, I'll still respond to you, but not
if it's just going to be about forever recycling the same old junk. Sophism is
not philosophy, even if you have a hard time telling the two approaches apart.
SWM
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