[Wittrs] TS 229: On Mind
- From: Sean Wilson <whoooo26505@xxxxxxxxx>
- To: wittrsamr@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
- Date: Tue, 3 May 2011 19:53:52 -0700 (PDT)
... forwarding this. Interesting stuff:
=========================================
From _Remarks on the Philosophy of Psychology_ vol. 1, aka TS 229, composed in
late autumn 1947, which typescript had later been cut into strips for later
rearrangement, said strips (along with others) having been published as _Zettel_
TS 229 has two versions, one presumably copied from the other, both suffering
from spelling mistakes and such. They derive from MS volume 137 composed from
May 10, 1946 to October 11, 1947. MS 130 through 138 were preparatory sketches
for the planned (not what was actually published) part two of _Philosophical
Investigations_.
_Zettel_ was slips culled from those typescripts for later rearrangement (much
of TS 229 was not in _Zettel_) and can therefore can be assumed to have passed
a
still further stage of his editorial process.
Page 159
903. No supposition seems to me more natural than that there is no process in
the brain correlated with associating or with thinking; so that it would be
impossible to read off thought-processes from
Page Break 160
brain-processes. I mean this: if I talk or write there is, I assume, a system
of
impulses going out from my brain and correlated with my spoken or written
thoughts. But why should the system continue further in the direction of the
centre? Why should this order not proceed, so to speak, out of chaos? The case
would be like the following—certain kinds of plants multiply by seed, so that a
seed always produces a plant of the same kind as that from which it was
produced--but nothing in the seed corresponds to the plant which comes from it;
so that it is impossible to infer the properties or structure of the plant from
those of the seed that it comes out of--this can only be done from the history
of the seed. So an organism might come into being even out of something quite
amorphous, as it were causelessly; and there is no reason why this should not
really hold for our thoughts, and hence for our talking and writing. [Cf. Z
608.]
Page 160
904. It is thus perfectly possible that certain psychological phenomena cannot
be investigated physiologically, because physiologically nothing corresponds to
them. [Cf. Z 609.]
Page 160
905. I saw this man years ago: now I have seen him again, I recognize him, I
remember his name. And why does there have to be a cause of this remembering in
my nervous system? Why must something or other, whatever it may be, be
stored-up
there in any form? Why must a trace have been left behind? Why should there not
be a psychological regularity to which no physiological regularity corresponds?
If this upsets our concepts of causality then it is high time they were upset.
[Cf. Z 610.]
Page 160
906. The prejudice in favour of psycho-physical parallelism is also a fruit of
the primitive conception of grammar. For when one admits a causality between
psychological phenomena, which is not mediated physiologically, one fancies
that in doing so one is making an admission of the existence of a soul
alongside
the body, a ghostly mental nature. [Cf. Z 611.]
Page 160
907. Must the verb "I believe" have a past tense form? Well, if instead of "I
believe he's coming" we always said "He could be coming" (or the like), but
nevertheless said "I believed..."--in this way the verb "I believe" would have
no present. It is characteristic of the kind of way in which we are apt to
regard language, that we believe that there must after all in the last instance
be uniformity,
Page Break 161
symmetry: instead of holding on the contrary that it doesn't have to exist.
Page 161
908. Imagine the following phenomenon. If I want someone to take note of a text
that I recite to him, so that he can repeat it to me later, I have to give him
paper and pencil, while I am speaking he makes lines, marks, on the paper; if
he
has to reproduce the text later he follows those marks with his eyes and
recites
the text. But I assume that what he has jotted down is not writing, it is not
connected by rules with the words of the text; yet without these jottings he is
unable to reproduce the text; and if anything in it is altered, if part of it
is
destroyed, he gets stuck in his 'reading' or recites the text uncertainly or
carelessly, or cannot find the words at all.--This can be imagined!--What I
called jottings would not be a rendering of the text, not a translation, so to
speak, in another symbolism. The text would not be stored up in the jottings.
And why should it be stored up in our nervous system? [Cf. Z 612.]
Page 161
909. Why should not the initial and terminal states of a system be connected by
a natural law, which does not cover the intermediary state? (Only don't think
of
agency). [Cf. Z 613.] From _Zettel_Page 105608. No supposition seems to me more
natural than that there is no process in the brain correlated with associating
or with thinking; so that it would be impossible to read off thought-processes
from brain-processes. I mean this: if I talk or write there is, I assume, a
system of impulses going out from my brain and correlated with my spoken or
written thoughts. But why should the system continue further in the direction
of
the centre? Why should this order not proceed, so to speak, out of chaos? The
case would be like the following--certain kinds of plants multiply by seed, so
that a seed always produces a plant of the same kind as that from which it was
produced--but nothing in the seed corresponds to the plant which comes from it;
so that it is impossible to infer the properties or structure of the plant from
those of the seed that it comes out of--this can only be done from the history
of the seed. So an organism might come into being even out of something quite
amorphous, as it were causelessly; and there is no reason why this should not
really hold for our thoughts, and hence for our talking and writing.
Page 105
609. It is thus perfectly possible that certain psychological phenomena cannot
be investigated physiologically, because physiologically nothing corresponds to
them.
Page 105
610. I saw this man years ago: now I have seen him again, I recognize him, I
remember his name. And why does there have to be a cause of this remembering in
my nervous system? Why must something or other, whatever it maybe, be stored up
there in any form? Why must a trace have been left behind? Why should there not
be a psychological regularity to which no physiological regularity corresponds?
If this upsets our concepts of causality then it is high time they were upset.
Page 105
611. The prejudice in favour of psychophysical parallelism is a fruit of
primitive interpretations of our concepts. For if one allows a causality
between
psychological phenomena which is not mediated physiologically, one thinks one
is
making profession that there exists a soul side by side with the body, a
ghostly
soul-nature.
Page Break 106
612. Imagine the following phenomenon. If I want someone to take note of a text
that I recite to him, so that he can repeat it to me later, I have to give him
paper and pencil; while I am speaking he makes lines, marks, on the paper; if
he
has to reproduce the text later he follows those marks with his eyes and
recites
the text. But I assume that what he has jotted down is not writing, it is not
connected by rules with the words of the text; yet without these jottings he is
unable to reproduce the text; and if anything in it is altered, if part of it
is
destroyed, he sticks in his 'reading' or recites the text uncertainly or
carelessly, or cannot find the words at all.--This can be imagined!--What I
called jottings would not be a rendering of the text, not so to speak a
translation with another symbolism. The text would not be stored up in the
jottings. And why should it be stored up in our nervous system?
Page 106
613. Why should there not be a natural law connecting a starting and a
finishing
state of a system, but not covering the intermediary state? (Only one must not
think of causal efficacy.)
Note intervening passages from RPP that did not make it into Z.
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