Nope. SWM --- In Wittrs@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx, "gabuddabout" <wittrsamr@...> wrote: > > I read your responses to the summary eight points and found them a disaster. > > Stuart writes: > > "His assertion that the biological nature > of the brain is paramount is being assumed here, not demonstrated, as is his > assumption as to what "intentionality" is. > This again points up his inherently mysterian concept of mind, a concept that > while explicitly denying dualism finally hinges on it because of a commitment > to a fundamental irreducibility of > mind to its constituents, even while he persists in agreeing that brains do > what he wants to say computers can never do." > > > How would a demonstration of the biological nature of the brain go for you? > > How does your notion of intentionality, perhaps, differ from Searle's? > > Your assertion that Searle is a mysterian is unsupported. Just because there > is an explanatory gap, and NCCs will be found inductively, with eventually > greater inductive strength as we get clearer as to the mechanisms of the > brain which cause consciousness, doesn't by itself amount to mysterianism. > If it does, then everyone has to be a mysterian except eliminativists, who > are incoherent or so pragmatic they don't mind waffling in the way Searle > found them to. The system repliers either mean what Searle does by nonS/H > system properties or they don't. And if not, then their strong AI is subject > to the CRA because no amount of formal programming adds brute causality QUA > program. > > That his conception hinges on dualism is mere assertion, on one hand, and > when you attempted to argue for it, you had to mischaracterize Searle in > order to do so. > > Remember that Searle's position is consistent with causal reduction. > Remember the piston/butter story. I'll never forget how hastily you once > said I got the story backward. But you've been quite the Sid Caesar over the > years. > > Also remember that you always waffle between describing the action of > potentially complex, layered computer programs as if they are brute physical > properties of the machine which are not defined in terms of the formal > properties of actual programs, on one hand, while wanting to call such > potentially complex devices computers. > > In the sense in which you mean things, your position is not inconsistent with > Searle's. > > You will deny it. But you strain credibility. > > > Cheers, > Budd > ========================================= Need Something? Check here: http://ludwig.squarespace.com/wittrslinks/