[Wittrs] Re: SWM on multiple causation and tangible effects.
- From: "gabuddabout" <gabuddabout@xxxxxxxxx>
- To: wittrsamr@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
- Date: Sat, 02 Jan 2010 22:11:09 -0000
Hi Bruce,
You may have slipped below. You wrote:
"A brain -- in a certain state -- is a necessary but not sufficient
condition for a person to be conscious."
Or maybe you didn't slip at all. Maybe you would allow a particular
(artificial or biological) brain working (and not in one abstract, timeless
state, which may be the upshot you meant to deny?) to be both necessary and
sufficient for a person to be conscious.
I would. I assume you too.
Cheers,
budd
--- In WittrsAMR@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx, "BruceD" <wittrsamr@...> wrote:
>
>
>
> --- In Wittrs@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx, "SWM" <SWMirsky@> wrote:
>
> > A process of causal signaling gets transformed
> > This becomes the sensations that you have awareness of
>
> The "You" which makes sense is where in the causal chain? I can't find it.
> But the everyday "You" does work. Vut the everyday"You" isn't causally
> connected.
>
> > The point I have been making is that one CAN account
> > for all the features of consciousness,
>
> You can account for the biological basis, but none of the "features" because
> none of the features are physical. I see you as attributing psychological
> features to brain parts that are vital for psychology.
>
> For something (Y) to be a necessary condition for X, doesn't make Y
> equivalent to X -- in a nutshell.
>
> > To give it up you have to shake the dualist picture
>
> Do you?
>
> > What does it mean to be aware of anything?
> > Well look at awareness in ourselves.
>
> and so on. If I didn't know you were the author, I'd assume it was a
> hard-core dualist.
>
> > then you need the "higher" level that deals with the first level
>
> The "higher-level" is just another expression for the self. By calling it
> "higher", you are suggesting a continuity with the lower, biology. But the
> "higher", the person, operates by reason, not by causes.
>
> > You have to see how physical systems could do this sort of thing
>
> Right! I can't see it. What I mean by "physical" doesn't allow for any of the
> attributes attributed to a person.
>
> I prepared these notes: What is consciousness?
>
> I go with dictionary definition: the state of being aware of one's own
> existence,sensations, thoughts, surroundings, etc.
>
> Note: This definition makes no reference to any substance, physical or
> mental. C is can understood apart from the ontological question of "what
> exists?", or "how many basic subtances are.
>
> To continue, consciousness is consciousness of something BY SOME ONE. It is
> descriptive of a person. Similar to "happiness". What could be said of a
> person. For all descriptive terms we have criteria. But the criteria may or
> may not designate the cause of the state under question. Specifically, we are
> not clear exactly what
> brain state is necessary for C. In any event...
>
> While many conditions must hold for a person to be conscious, it is the
> person that is conscious, not the conditions, the brain for example. One in a
> vat, with the same electrical state as the person who is conscious, would not
> be conscious. A brain -- in a certain state -- is a necessary but not
> sufficient condition for a
> person to be conscious. Endorphins may be a necessary condition for a person
> to be happy, but endorphins alone happiness does not make.
>
> Basically, you are wanting a continuity where discontinuity prevails.
>
> bruce
>
>
>
> and computers are the best model for that, even if it turns out that they
> can't fully mimic everything brains do or can't do it in the right way (as
> suggested by Hawkins).
> >
>
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