[Wittrs] Re: Relationship between brain and mind as conceptual convenience
- From: "BruceD" <blroadies@xxxxxxxxx>
- To: wittrsamr@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
- Date: Mon, 04 Jan 2010 00:08:29 -0000
Consider...
If one starts with a notion of substance, an ontological distinct
something, then,
for parsimony sake, one would want to explain everything in terms of a
single
substance. The natural sciences could be conceived as studying one
substance, the
physical. Whether the various forms, particles, waves, forces, etc. are
all an
expression of one substance, I don't believe is physics's concern, nor
do I see how it
has any impact on their study. The problem begins, not for them, but for
us, when we
look at psychology, more specifically, the relationship between brain, a
material
substance, and mind.
Psychologists, like physicists, usually don't worry about whether the
object of
their study, mind, is the same or a different substance then the object
of physical
study. But neurologists working on the brain/mind border have reason to
worry.
Just what is the relationship.
Now, if the researchers hold to a substance doctrine, they have to
decide whether
the mind is a different substance. If it is, then how can the two
substances
interact? If brain and mind are not, given the fact that there were
non-mental entities before
physical ones, matter must somehow generate mind. But there are problem.
The mental isn't tangible. Perhaps it's sub-atomic particles, a wave, a
ray,
something we can't sense. All of these possibilities are based on the
assumption that mental states are
some sort of thing that exists on some plane; and the material brain
produces these
things. Where? This proposal makes the person a container. Do mental
states exist
in the mind the way stars exist in space? Don't think so. Mental states
exist only in so far as
some one thinks them. Space doesn't think stars. There is something
terrible wrong about thinking of the
brain as producing mind, the way physical things produce other physical
things.
Still, no one can deny that the brain is the basis for mind. What
alternative way of
seeing this is possible?
For starters, we ought to abandon the concept of substance, the notion
of an
ontological simple. How about: There is nothing out there that is
basically of one kind or
another. We can conceive of the brain as physical thing operating
mechanically or as
a purposive being operating rationally. By the same token, we can
conceive of mind
along mechanical lines (Tourette's syndrome, dreaming, etc.) or
purposive ones.
The alternative, I'm proposing, is to view the relationship between
brain and mind
as a conceptual convenience that under certain circumstances can be
expressed "causally",
i.e., the alarm caused me to awake, and, at other times, deliberately,
"I've trained my brain not
to hear the alarm when I want to sleep in."
Wittgenstein puts it this way: (PI, page 180)
"It's like the relation: physical object -- sense impressions. Here we
have two different language games
and a complicated relationship between them. -- If you try to reduce
their relations to a simple formula
you go wrong."
That is to say, the material brain and our conscious life can't be
reduced to the simple formula, causality.
bruce
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