[Wittrs] On Skepticism for Analytic Methods
- From: Sean Wilson <whoooo26505@xxxxxxxxx>
- To: wittrsamr@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
- Date: Sun, 24 Apr 2011 00:45:51 -0700 (PDT)
J:
Closing this out now with a few loose ends. You write,
"My central point is that the plurality of methods in philosophy ought to
be respected and that, if a particular method is judged to be unsound,
this claim ought to be supported by means other than the presumption that those
who use them simply lack the ability to use better methods or relying on
lumping
other methods together under some broad rubric that fails to even make
distinctions among them which would permit reasoned critique."
This isn't really accurate. I haven't used a "presumption" to dismiss certain
methods. Any skepticism I have for analytic methods comes from using them in my
life, relying upon what I have seen of them, and knowing the nature of the
methods themselves -- they way they define problems, they way they proceed,
etc.
It would be no different than having skepticism about what formalism does as a
method in jurisprudence. In fact, there are many jurisprudes who rightly have
skepticism for certain methods: originalism, formalism, etc. They don't do this
as a "presumption," they do it out of a sense of perspective. I think you've
confused being perspectival with being closed minded.
I would think it more accurate to say you have offered something worse than a
presumption here: an ethic. If a person were preceding in the blind, it would
indeed be good to have the ethic you espouse. But a person would never deny his
or her experience (or knowledge) on account of an ethic. And wouldn't be
receptive to being told to. And the best way, it seems, to change the person's
view would not be to moralize about it or object to a system of belief, it
would
be to produce something "on the ground" that showed otherwise. You know, I'm
reading CHORA right now, and I honestly wouldn't recommend the free will debate
raging over there to any Wittgensteinian whatsoever. And in fact, for anyone
who
knew Wittgenstein's historical life, it could be very easy to imagine him not
being interested in that conversation. (Wittgenstein pretty much shunned the
reading of philosophy. He wouldn't waste time reading much of it).
And as to attributing to analytic philosophers the idea that the means they
choose to think about things is a function of the traits to which they are most
comfortable, I once again say that this is hardly something that one is morally
obliged to refrain from. Really, seeing these tendencies is something that a
watchful person can notice. Nothing wrong with it at all.
Relatedly, as to mathematicians: while they are certainly suited for the task
of
math, whether they are suited for anything more would be a function of how they
are seen to perform in those domains. If we have reason to suspect them poor,
on
average, for, say, social intelligence, then nothing is wrong with being
cognizant of this -- so long, of course, as we don't pre-judge any particular
case that attempts "social knowing." (The difference here is that the person is
attempting social-knowing methods. That's the difference: you aren't getting
that being "Wittgensteinian" involves the recognition that analytic methods
create the false problems that those philosophers work on. A Wittgensteinian
would have no choice but to recognize this).
Some loose ends:
1. I agree dull pictures can have utility or unforeseen applications. I also
agree that, just because someone has a dull picture, isn't grounds to mess with
it. (See grandmother). I have never advocated a monolithic approach or said
there is one way to do therapy.
I would also agree that two people doing analytic methods together might some
day make some headway with each other.It would be the same as if a person used
a
typewriter instead of a computer to compose a letter. We wouldn't say of the
letter or the typewriter, "one could never do that." But I wonder, empirically,
how much this happens? My sense is that analytic philosophy actually
facilitates
disagreement rather than resolves it. That is, it perpetuates (creates) things
to argue about.
2. I like this quote very much:
"Incidentally, I have found that assembling reminders, comparing language
games, and constructing imaginary and intermediate cases (all unquestionably
Wittgensteinian modalities) have been more effective than talking about
pictures
- not that I discount the latter. But this may reflect the range of issues
that
interest me, may reflect my skill with various techniques, or something else.
I
wouldn't presume to say."
(P.S. this is the kind of stuff that made me think you were a professor or a
therapist of some sort).
3. On formal methods
My position on mathematics or logic is that, as tools, they surely have their
place. The problem happens when their grammar is borrowed into foreign places:
e.g., whether you exist is a problem for logic. Regarding Wittgenstein' s use
of
formalism from 1930-1932, it was an attempt to use formality to show that
formality was flawed. (If we listen to Conant et al, even the Tractatus is
about
that). In fact, this is this reason that Wittgenstein breaks into a new format
of philosophizing around 33 or 34,
4. I never had any issue with Culture and Value. I think you are referring to
Stuart on that one.
5. You aren't being entirely fair on remembering the discussion about
transitional Wittgenstein. The position I presented was not "mine," it was Ray
Monk's. (I'm still good with it).
6. On this issue of yours about three voicings, I told you before I found it
very creative. But I'm not convinced that it limits who Wittgensteinians can be
haughty toward or who they think requires "therapy." (I do recognize it as a
very interesting theory, however).
7. I'm sure what to make of this Gettier thing. It reminds me of HLA Hart, who
was also influenced by Wittgenstein, but who wasn't, in truth,
"Wittgensteinian"
at all. Many scholars around 1960s or 1970s had been influenced by certain
ideas of Wittgenstein that would not be the same sort of ideas in the 80s, 90s
and today. It's like those who wrongly called Wittgenstein a behaviorist. It
took a while for the Nachlass to help complete the understanding. I don't
regard Gettier as doing anything but creating a false problem.
Mind you, it's not "false" in the sense that the karate school gets to practice
chopping.
It's false in that the application of a formalized attack that creates games
with a formal definition of knowledge is, in the end, a pointless conversation.
It can't be applied to anything "real." It ignores sense and grammar. It
divorces the ideas from ordinary communication. And once Wittgensteinians know
how these games work, they really don't look for their continued perpetuation
as
anything that should interest them.
Regards and thanks.
Dr. Sean Wilson, Esq.
Assistant Professor
Wright State University
Personal Website: http://seanwilson.org
SSRN papers: http://ssrn.com/author=596860
Wittgenstein Discussion: http://seanwilson.org/wiki/doku.php?id=wittrs
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