[Wittrs] Re: On Discussions about Free WIll (reply to SWM)
- From: "SWM" <swmirsky@xxxxxxxxx>
- To: wittrsamr@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
- Date: Tue, 12 Apr 2011 01:11:26 -0000
--- In Wittrs@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx, kirby urner <wittrsamr@...> wrote:
>
<snip>
>
> The way conversations about "free will" typically play out, in such a vacuum,
> with no discussion of imprisonment or conscription, chains of command,
> is a case in point.
>
Isn't "free will" a different concept (which thus poses a different question)
than "freedom"? Both have the word "free" at their core, true enough, but the
latter seems to refer to questions of political and civil liberty whereas the
former to questions of our ability to decide and act in a way that is
independent of exhaustive causal constraint. I would guess that it's important
to keep these concepts distinct in attacking the problems which either kick up.
> Wittgensteinians such as Sean typically make this point by "chiding" i.e.
> *so what* if we prove Free Will and / or God "exist" in some erudite "heads
> on a pin" language game of concern only in stale scholastic environments?
>
Yes and a quite useful point, too, I think, when the issue begins to stray into
the metaphysical zone of distinguishing (or trying to distinguish) between what
is freely undertaken and what only feels as if it is freely undertaken. Insofar
as we feel free in doing what we do, in what sense are we thus unfree?
I agree, however, that there are some fairly shady areas here but that's just
how life is, isn't it?
> >
> > Questions of Constitutional jurisprudence hinge on what THAT document
> > actually
> > says, on how it is to be read and on the context in which the Constitutional
> > text was written (and so historically understood). Relevant to this last, of
> > course, is the chain of interpretation that has come down to us by those who
> > have used and interpreted the Constitution over time (e.g., from the get-go
> > the
> > users of the Constitution, and accompanying jurisprudence, have accepted
> > that
> > the Constitutional provision that gives Congress the power to declare war is
> > less about formal declarations than about Congress having the power to
> > prevent
> > presidents from going to war, or of lining up with presidents in support of
> > wars
> > via legislative votes that are not explicit declarations of war per se).
> >
> > You cannot resolve such questions by importing Wittgensteinian linguistic
> > analysis into the discourse.
> >
> > SWM
>
> The argument we were presented with at the conference at Reed College
> was in offered in the spirit of a real Constitutional debate.
>
> http://controlroom.blogspot.com/2011/04/roller-coaster-at-reed.html
>
> The analysis was that the USA has never figured out how to eliminate
> slavery, with post Civil War "separate but equal" clauses setting up an
> apartheid chapter, followed by where we are today: mass incarceration
> and forced labor.
>
My point was that the Constitution addresses questions of freedom qua liberty
in both its text and context and that prisons and imprisonment were always part
of the practices engaged in by the state (and the states) from the start,
coincident with implementation of the Constitution. I suppose forced labor in
that context could be argued as being extra constitutional (not authorized by
existing text or justified contemporary practices). But the case would have to
be made that such labor is clearly separate from any concept of punishment by
incarceration as envisioned by the Constitution. I don't think it would be
enough just to point out its affinities with classical slavery.
Certainly you don't resolve the question by mixing up notions of what we mean
by "free" (freedom vs. free will), I should think.
> The speaker was saying she'd had this debate with lots of bright legal
> scholars and they hadn't really shot down her interpretation of the 13th
> Amendment.
>
I'd be interested to see the specifics of her argument. Maybe I'll take some
time tomorrow to take a look at the link you left us. Perhaps it's there?
> If you're paying your debt to society by voluntarily choosing community
> service over incarcertation and/or fines, that's one thing, but if you're
> locked up *and* made to work against your will for no compensation,
> that's actually just an opportunistic meme virus
Yes, I see that. It certainly zeroes in on a potentially serious problem with
the prison system. But does imprisonment then boil down to keeping someone
rotting in a jail cell with nothing to do -- or are we to provide them free
time to do what they like (physical fitness routines, personal research,
recreational reading, etc., all on the state tab)? Wouldn't that be a kind of
enforced vacation at worst? That would seem to work against the very idea of
prison as a deterrent to crime. On the other hand, I would tend to think of
chain gangs (such as Cool Hand Luke's experience or any number of similar
portrayals) as going too far.
Is there some middle ground or does the person you quote simply maintain that
enforced idleness in a cell is the only sort of punishment we can legitimately
(constitutionally) provide?
> taking advantage of the
> fact that the USA Constitution has not been effectively or adequately
> defended by those who consider themselves loyal to its core values.
>
I'm not sure what you mean by that. Certainly there are many conflicting views
as to what values and strictures the Constitution actually enshrines. That's
what makes constitutional jurisprudence after all.
> Perhaps the national guard should be nationalizing prison systems
> that are out of compliance with the anti-slavery laws of this land, and
> reorganizing them. USAers have been left defenseless, against many
> forms of ruthless predator.
>
I don't know what you mean to refer to by "USAers"? Do you mean citizens of the
United States (who generally call themselves, and are called by others,
"Americans")?
> I think a Wittgensteinian approach to such debates could be productive.
> He took a strong interest in issues of social justice and proper treatment
> of prisoners of war.
Having been one himself, of course!
Being a prisoner of war, however, is not the same as being imprisoned for a
crime. Soldiers in war do not commit crimes merely by being soldiers in war
according to standard modern convention. So it follows that prisoners of war
would be expected to be handled differently than prisoners held for having been
convicted of crimes.
> I can't imagine him being alive today and remaining
> silent about Gitmo for example,
I can. Not to head too deeply into the debate about Guantanamo (for which a
case can be made on either side it seems to me), I would just note that there
is a basis and reasons for keeping captured terrorists, apprehended in the
course of a war, in such a facility. And for trying them via military
tribunals. I don't think the world is as simple as some would like it to be.
And I think Wittgenstein would have recognized that. But of course he isn't
around so we can't ask him.
> whereas many an academic philosopher
> has branded him or herself a coward by remaining silent whereof much
> could be said.
>
And sometimes there are no perfectly clear or perfectly good choices. In a
situation where there is a group or groups of individuals which seek to wreak
real and substantial harm on others, treating them in a way that fails to
secure needed intelligence from them or that risks exposure of necessary
counter-intelligence about them or which prevents us from keeping them from
returning to a condition where they can do more harm requires adapting our
institutional capabilities to the circumstances. But there is always a tension
between our moral and constitutional instinct to restrain the state from
overreaching and ensuring that the state and its people can be secure from dire
threats.
What occurred on September 11th, 2001 was both dire and evidence of even more
dire threats to come. Hence the need to adapt our civil traditions to new
circumstances.
For a Wittgensteinian, aren't you being rather black and white about this?
> When it comes to word games, I agree with Werner Erhard who said
> "there is semantics, and there is nothing." In other words, for one
> side in a debate to say the other side is playing "word games" is the
> ultimate in the pot calling the kettle black.
>
> Kirby
>
Mixing up concepts like "freedom" and "free will", just because both contain
the word "free" and denote concepts that have a strong relation, one to the
other, is an example of falling back on a word game, I think. And that isn't
just pots and kettles, I submit.
SWM
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