[Wittrs] Meaning, Nonsense and Verifiability (for Kirby)
- From: kirby urner <kirby.urner@xxxxxxxxx>
- To: wittrsamr@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
- Date: Mon, 18 Apr 2011 22:44:00 -0700
---------- Forwarded message ----------
From: Kirby Urner <kurner@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Date: Mon, Apr 18, 2011 at 10:35 PM
Subject: Fwd: Meaning, Nonsense and Verifiability (for Kirby)
To: kirby urner <kirby.urner@xxxxxxxxx>
<< snip >>
>
> What was missing was insight, getting it. He had no room in his model for
> that because he thought it was only about argument. (He hated Wittgenstein,
> claiming he was a charlatan by the way, because Wittgenstein eschewed the
> game of arguing.) But one thing McD taught me was that argument doesn't get
> us anywhere, at least not during the period of the actual argument anyway.
> Even McD admitted, of course, that over time, in the course of many
> arguments, we might gradually revise our views. But that seems to be because
> we gradually take in positions pressed on us by others which seem to become
> ours. Once they seem like our own, there's no longer the seem resistance to
> changing one's view, I guess.
>
> SWM
Interesting account of McD, very colorful.
I'm glad you play up what's to be gained in these arguments or
debates short of agreement, which may not even be a realistic goal.
If "agreement" is something like compatibility, then I think of
two random computers and how likely it might be that I could plug
one into the other and get a coherent result. Hardly likely.
But then much hinges on the meaning of "compatible". Maybe the plugs
fit, even if there's nothing like real data between them.
Perhaps even more believably (a better analogy) -- since computers
have come a long way and might just start talking together -- we
could imagine some "gear & lever" machinery, spinning wheels. How
likely is it that two random machines might "gear in" with one
another and make mutual sense. About nil, right? A bleak picture.
Sheesh, I've been reading Duncan Richter on Gordon Baker on Carnap on
Heidegger, versus Wittgenstein on Heidegger as Duncan sees it, and
as he thinks Baker sees it. All was going well when the interface
blew up (I was reading on-line), and I just had to laugh at all the
new phenomenology associated with reading. You would never be
sitting in some musty library with a book in your hands and have it
all split up and slide out of its rectangles or whatever we call it,
most the text no longer in scope -- maybe a JavaScript glitch, who
knows.
Back to an image of older personnel hobnobbing around the water
cooler: these are characters, not here for agreement necessarily,
but for shooting the breeze, and maybe philosophy is especially good
at keeping the air breezy (channels open). You mention the Supreme
Court and the paralysis that sometimes sets in, which might just be
an extreme case of slowness. When will we have a Free State? (some
flash to some "I have a dream" speech). That sounds like a merely
political question, but then what good is a free will to a slave or
a prisoner? Why would you need one?
But then they say "he's a slave to his money" (are they jealous?).
What is "willful"? Is a "willful" child a "defiant" child? Aren't
some children groomed to be headstrong and stubborn (positively
reinforced), whereas others are discouraged in that regard? These
are anthropological questions. Power relationships come through
with or without agreement happening. And power relationships might
not be all about subordination and kowtowing. Sometimes what's
most powerful is equitably shared power. Many a team building
exercise is aimed at developing such esprit de corps.
Recall my thesis that Frege et al were inadvertently hammering on
precursors to computer languages, which it turns out we'd need for
all the recordkeeping we'd be needing to do (medical records,
FaceBook etc.). Philosophers of that day had no clear picture of
"computer languages" such as we know them today, what with LISP,
C++ and all those. Yet this passionate dedication to a new kind of
calculus (propositional calculus some called it), this logic (nothing
quite like it in ancient Greece, but precursors, certainly) was
going to shuffle in with boolean algebra, circuit design, chip
making... keyboards / typing, in ways that no one was anticipating
or in charge of making happen (not in detail -- one had one's
visionaries). Yet here we are today, yakking about Wittgenstein in
some ethereal medium made of spinning disks, so much like prayer
wheels (even more than *like* -- another dovetailing practice).
So what is philosophy today really up to? Rather than rush in to fill
the void that question opens, best to just pause to imagine a blind
spot, a dimension we haven't imagined. I'm not trying to get mystical
on ya, just saying the future tends to contain this element of
surprise that just doesn't go away. In philosophy, we allow ourselves
to express feeling dumbfounded, at a loss. That's a legitimate
sense to express, even amongst all the rest of it, the arguments,
the nailing of points, the construction of new theories.
Kirby
PS: I've got the Duncan Richter piece open in Word now, locally,
so there's a good chance I'll be able to resume.
>
> --- In Wittrs@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx, kirby urner <wittrsamr@> wrote:
> >
> <snip>
>
> >
> > In my telling of the story, gestalt psychology (the duckrabbit one of
> > its icons) was just getting going around then as well, in conjunction
> > with anthropology. The need to "see in new ways" was simply the
> > practical need of the field worker, trying to get into the head of
> > some tribe in the Amazon jungle or whatever.
> >
> > <snip>
>
> > It's an unending process.
Other related posts:
