[Wittrs] Re: Consciousness without regard to Quantum Mechanics
- From: "J" <jpdemouy@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- To: wittrsamr@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
- Date: Fri, 01 Jan 2010 07:41:31 -0000
JRS,
I wrote:
...as it stands, various
> > interpretations of quantum mechanics are
> underdetermined...If one favors an Instrumentalist view
...then this is all...
..about our temptation to go
> beyond the maths
> > and the observations in what we say.
JRS remarked
> I just want to again endorse your post.
>
> To clarify here, when you mention an instrumentalist view
> here,
> you mean an instrumentalist (or operationalis) view of
> QM.
Yes, instrumentalism as it applies specifically to quantum mechanics. However,
I would not use "instrumentalism" and "operationalism" interchangeably.
Operationalism broadly construed has come to describe a methodological
recommendation followed by many practicing scientists in much scientific work.
It concerns the precisification of various concepts in terms of various methods
of measurement. Compared with Instrumentalism, there is nothing controversial
in operationalism in this broad sense. (Although in a philosophical context,
it would be better to refer to this as "using operational definitions" rather
than a operationalism, per se.)
But operationalism more narrowly construed involves methodological and semantic
assumptions that are problematic. Consider (originator of the doctrine)
Bridgman's criticisms of Einstein's rejection of the principle in General
Relativity (specifically the Principle of Equivalence) when Einstein's Special
Relativity had been a principle inspiration for the doctrine. That is only the
most dramatic example of how operationalism as doctrine falls short.
Note that the Principle of Equivalence is much more readily assimilated into an
instrumentalist account (at least I am aware of no arguments against
instrumentalism on that basis) which is not at all to say that instrumentalism
is without its problems.
We could easily get sidetracked here but suffice it to say that there are good
reasons to be cautious about using "operationalism" and "instrumentalism"
interchangeably.
Incidentally, I am not a proponent of either position, though I believe that
both approaches can shed light on conceptual questions in science.
That
> is certainly the way I believe QM must be viewed.
What sort of "must" is this?
And
> I would add
> that it is also the way a computational theory of mind
> would be
> viewed, in fact, the way computation itself must be viewed,
> and
> that even this does follow from the Wittgenstein maxim
> that
> meaning is use.
ummmm...
>
> (rereading that, no, I am not saying that holding to
> "meaning is
> use" necessarily implies an instrumentalist view,
Good!
but I
> would suggest
> it allows a compatible instrumentalist view ... which I
> happen to
> hold)
>
I'm not sure what Wittgenstein's observations regarding meaning and use do not
"allow". As I've indicated elsewhere, this is not a thesis. It is simply a
truism that for a large class of cases one can offer the way that a word is
used as an explanation of its meaning. Recognizing that and attending to how
words are used is a helpful way of thinking about meaning and of avoiding
certain misunderstandings and confusions, but it's not a thesis that can allow
or disallow anything.
> > I wouldn't advocate that we never attempt to do that,
> but until
> > such activities lead to new observations or new
> mathematics, the
> > dispute is merely competing ways of speaking.
>
> OTOH, I might quibble with this. Certainly JP is
> making an
> ontological claim,
It has the form of a claim, but what does this claim amount to? The person who
speaks of "unconscious toothaches" may appear to be making an "ontological
claim". But is she?
and asserting that he thinks von Neumann
> did,
> though you and I disagree with that last. And I am
> happy to make
> substantial claims about what scientific and
> methodological
> commitments a computational theory needs, implies,
> assumes. I
> see Turing as having done so, although I see Wittgenstein
> attempted
> to avoid doing so. And in that, I go with Turing.
Fair enough.
I would just note that Wittgenstein didn't claim to be developing a theory.
Quite the contrary. This is not to say that he was opposed to theorizing, per
se, only that he didn't think it consistent with his view of philosophy's role.
But note well: one is perfectly free to reject such a view and regard
philosophy's role is different from that.
JPDeMouy
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