[C] [Wittrs] "transitions" and the "cash value" of periodization
- From: J DeMouy <jpdemouy@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- To: wittrsamr@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
- Date: Tue, 8 Dec 2009 12:11:26 -0800 (PST)
Sean and Stuart,
There was only one Wittgenstein.
No, that's not to speak of his singular contribution to philosophical thought.
Nor yet is it to indicate a commitment to readings which downplay the
differences between the _Tractatus_ and later works.
It's a reminder that we are dealing with a single human being, his life, and
the development of his thought..
When we discuss and debate "transitional periods" perhaps we should pause to
ask "from what?" and "to what?"
And we should consider that we are always, all of us, changing in this way and
that, going through transitions of various sorts.
But surely there is a definitely sense to the idea that Wittgenstein's thought
can be divided into various periods and that we can identify certain periods of
his life as transitional between those periods?
Certainly.
But I want to ask, "What purpose does such a periodization serve?"
There is the potential pedagogical value of simply giving a bit of organization
to the story of his life and work. If that were the only thing at issue, what
would be the point of debating one classificatory scheme or another?
Another way of asking my question: what are we to do with a system that divides
Wittgenstein's work into periods? What use is it? What follows from a
particular work being placed in one period or another?
Considering such questions isn't merely about assessing the importance of a
controversy and putting disagreements into perspective (something I am all too
aware can easily be lost), but perhaps a clue to how we should go about
answering more specific questions about various schemes and the place of
various works within those schemes, possibly even a clue to the role and weight
appropriate to various testimony.
For me, the main value in grouping Wittgenstein's work into periods is
interpretive. I'll specify what I mean by that shortly but first I want to say
that a biographer or historian may have other purposes, equally legitimate for
their work, and that with different purposes they may also arrive at somewhat
different schema. This may have some relevance to disputes in these matters,
though I haven't thought through or researched what specific differences might
arise.
As for the value of grouping Wittgenstein's works into periods for purposes of
interpretation, I would elaborate by saying that such periodization provides a
"rule of thumb" (or several such rules) for assessing how far we should go,
when comparing remarks from different works, in trying to reconcile seeming
contradictions or resolve apparent tensions. And when we should be more or
less inclined to stop and say, "No, he clearly changed his mind between these
two works."
Or, applying such a rule of thumb to a closely related problem, we could ask,
"To what extent are remarks in this work a useful guide to understanding
remarks made in another?" Here, periodization suggests that some groupings of
works (works from the same period) are more likely than other goupings (works
from distinct periods) to represent a cohesive set of views.
Works from one period are then presumably less reliable as tools to help us
understand works from a different period than works from the same period would
be. That is basically what such a "rule of thumb" would tell us.
But note: such a rule of thumb tells us only where our presumption should be.
It is not conclusive. Note as well that "less reliable" does not mean
"useless". First of all, even works which seem to clearly disagree may still
assist us in understanding why Wittgenstein changed his mind. Second, there's
no reason to suppose that, even between TLP and OC, there are not some points
of agreement.
In considering a scheme that groups Wittgenstein's thought and works into
periods, we should consider several questions:
Is it a matter of positions being discarded or of positions being added? Or
both? And how central are the positions in question to the overall way of
thinking?
And we may try to draw a distinction between a new position and a position
undergoing some refinement.
We may also attempt to draw a distinction between a change of position and a
change in how that position is presented.
Some caveats to consider here. First, referring to "positions" ought to give
us pause in considering Wittgenstein's works. This requires some elaboration
and careful reflection. Second, we shouldn't be to rigid in distinguishing
between positions and their presentation (between content and form) in
Wittgenstein's works because the presentation itself is relevant to the wider
conception of philosophy, to understanding the purpose that elucidations are
meant to serve.
But an example:
I would be inclined to call the differences between PI 1-188 and later work
(the remainder of the PI and final works on philosophy of psychology, color,
and epistemology) "additions". I don't see the insights of the beginning of
the PI being rejected but rather new insights, consonant with those, being
incorporated.
And within those later works, I see more refinements of position and changes in
presentation than anything else. Still, these last works are clearly "work in
progress" and Wittgenstein, had he lived, would undoubtedly have continued
working over them.
I've deliberately chosen an illustration that sidesteps the current controversy
and that is, I would hope, not contentious to either side. But now, I'll
venture to indicate how my own rules of thumb would compare and contrast with
both of your positions.
The period of 1929/1930 was a period of casting off key theses of the
_Tractatus_. If any period is rightly called "transitional" it is this one.
Core ideas in the early work were being reconsidered and rejected. It wasn't
enough to refine positions in light of the color exclusion problem.. It was as
if Wittgenstein were on a ship that kept springing leaks faster than he could
repair them. He had to abandon ship. (Another metaphor is falling dominoes.)
A case could readily be made that by the end of this period, Wittgenstein had
at least a general of where he needed to go by the end of this brief period.
But there is still a vast difference between someone saying, "Eureka!" (or,
“The nimbus of philosophy has been lost.") and Athena springing forth, fully
armed and armored, from the head of Zeus!
There are refinements and additions (as noted in, e.g. G.E.Moore's lecture
notes) throughout 1930-1933, culminating in the work we now know through
_Philosophical_Grammar_ and the section "Philosophy" included in
_Philosophical_Occasions_ and finally published together in
_The_Big_Typescript_. And even in that 1933 work, there are also approaches to
problems (especially in mathematics and formal logic) that show vestiges of the
old way of thinking.
Moreover, even in the 1933 work, we see various experiments and we do not see
all of the later themes - certainly not in their mature form.
But there's a vast difference between saying that he was still developing his
new approach and saying that he was still breaking free of the Tractatus.
It seems to me that Sean is using "transitional" to mean "still breaking free
of the _Tractatus_" and Stuart is using "transitional" to mean "still
developing his new approach."
Sean says that Wittgenstein had broken free in 1930. I am inclined to describe
this as a longer process, but a process that we could say was well completed in
1933, with the works mentioned.
(But consider, OC 321. The temptations of TLP are perhaps never fully
exorcised, only more quickly recognized for what they are. Still, if we take
that line, then it's all "transitional". We could say that, but it would be
quite misleading.)
The period between 1933 and the completion of PI 1-188, the period in which
_Blue_and_Brown_Books_ were composed, is another matter. Stuart is right that
there are refinements, e.g. of the role and purpose of discussing "language
games", some of which could be called refinements of presentation and some
refinements of position. But these are additions to the new method, not
rejections of ideas from the _Tractatus_! We could say he was "in transition"
(aren't we all?) but transitioning from what? To what?
If we call this "transitional", having already used that word to describe the
transition away from the ideas of the _Tractatus_, that can only mislead! The
idea that he was still, in the latter half of the 1930s, "transitioning" away
from that early work is very misleading.
Now, I've put forth what I see as the value in arranging Wittgenstein's works
into periods. The "rule of thumb" I've proposed would suggest that we should
not expect consistency between the later works and works such as
_Remarks_on_Logical_Form, the _Lecture_on_Ethics_, _Philosophical_Remarks_ and
the various lectures recorded between 1930 and 1933 (though of course lecture
notes raise other questions of reliability as well). When we encounter an
apparent contradiction, it is well warranted to say, "He changed his mind".
And these works are not a good guide to interpreting later remarks.
Remarks we know from _Philosophical_Grammar_ and _Big_Typescript_ and moreso,
_Blue_and_Brown_Books_ should show much more consistency with still later work,
but where there is a clear inconsistency with _Philosophical_Investigations_,
we should still say, "He changed his mind."
That doesn't mean we should say, "He still hadn't rejected _Tractarian_ ideas,"
or, "He hadn't yet started doing philosophy in the new way," but simply that he
was constantly developing and refining both his ideas and his way of presenting
them.
More importantly, it is perfectly legitimate, in the absence of
inconsistencies, to cite remarks from 1933 onward as evidence of Wittgenstein's
later views. Part of this "rule of thumb" is that the burden shifts from a
presumption of unreliability or possible inconsistency to a presumption of
consistency. The burden is on the person challenging the reliability of a
remark to show that it is contradicted by remarks in the canonical PI 1-188 or
should be rejected on the basis of methodological remarks from PI 89-133 in
that same canonical collection.
Now, calling something a "rule of thumb" suggests that there is a more refined
and reliable (but presumably less convenient) method available that this rule.
But it may also be that there are merely several complementary rules and that
any refinement comes from weighing the results of each. In any case, the
guidance a rule of thumb offers is defeasible.
I've indicated how a remark from BTS, PG, or BB might be rejected. But there
are also narrower cases where the rule itself would be rejected or refined..
For instance, I would not take a remark from 1933 about impossibility proofs in
mathematics as presumptively consistent with and accurately reflecting all of
his later views on mathematics. As we go deeper, the rule of thumb becomes
less valuable than the careful, painstaking process of close reading and
comparative study.
JPDeMouy
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