(J) WITTGENSTEIN'S LANGUAGE 1. The language from W that led me to the distinction is here: "44. We said that the sentence 'Excalibur has a sharp blade' made sense even when Excalibur was broken in pieces. Now this is so because in this language-game a name is also used in the absence of a its beater. But we can imagine a language game with names ... in which they are used only in the presence of the beater; and so could always be replaced by a demonstrative pronoun and the gesture of pointing." BEARER-CALL AND ASSIGNMENT You seem to have gotten the bearer-call, bearer-assignment distinction. There are just some lingering questions: 1. What description satisfies a bearer-call is whatever makes the bearer-call successful. That's the only point of this language game. Whatever establishes the correct X of N. Note this works perfectly for "N is dead" in Wittgenstein's 79. However you tag the body is however you do it. If, "that guy from block 12" will do it between any two people, that is as good as "DNA such and such" as between another two. Now, for historical figures like Moses, you are right to note the problem with trying to "tag the body," so to speak. But the hypotheticals we have been exchanging regarding remains and parents were supposed to assume a scenario where a bearer-call could be hypothetically created, while a bearer-assignment could too. I think what you are asking is when does "Moses" in a conversation actually become a bearer-assignment? The answer is NEVER UNTIL TWO APPEAR. Or rather, never until you can separate it from the bearer. This is because in the language game of bearer assignment, the name and the bearer need to have become separated. When they become separated, the name functions like a title. It is bestowed upon whoever earns its criteria. This is why we have been inventing all these name games. (e.g., batcave) 2. Your "Bacon is Shakespeare" stuff seems spot on. (You use "rule of grammar" which I do not oppose. I prefer simply "name as a rule or title." [I've dropped predicate-calculator or "like a predicate-calculator."]) 3. Regarding whether to use the expression bearer-calls or assignments for statements or props, etc., I don't see the point. These things are FUNCTIONS that names fulfill when used in language. 4. On planets. The Vulcan that is "the planet that occupied such a position as to explain Mercury's perihelion precession within Newtonian mechanics" is ALWAYS a bearer-call UNTIL THE NAME CAN SEPARATE FROM ITS BEARER. Maybe it would be good to say putative or ostensive bearer. You cannot play bearer-assignment unless: (a) you can separate the name from its bearer; and (b) the name functions as a rule or title. So, "Sally isn't Sally anymore" (even though she is). [Note how this plugs into our discussion of "bachelor." You might say this is a non-literal sense of Sally. It may be, but that doesn't matter. It is nonetheless a SENSE of Sally. One that strips the name from the bearer because the latter hasn't earned it anymore]. And so, for Vulcan, all we have is an X of N until we can find conditions that can separate them. When we say "Vulcan" doesn't exist, it is the same as saying in Witt's 79, "N is dead." Here we are saying the X of N doesn't exist. These are bearer-calls. (Neptune as "whatever planet satisfied what was required to explain the motion of Uranus" is a bearer-call until we can separate it from its bearer.) AIR FORCE ONE Air Force One (AF1) is a tough one!!! Do you see the problem here!!?? On one hand, it seems like perfect bearer-assignment. Wherever the president is, is the thing. However, we can't separate the bearer from the name here can we? This is a NEW LANGUAGE GAME. In this one, we have invented a proper name for a VARIABLE. Very f-ing interesting. Imagine the President is on plane X. Imagine that midflight, he switches to Y by using new technology where the planes can latch midair (like in refueling). He crawls into plane Y. Which plane was AF1? Answer: X during its part of the president's voyage and Y during its. You cannot separate the name from the bearer here. NAME TAGS I can't agree that the name tag example was stupid. It illustrated the points just fine. SLOGANIZED WITTGENSTEIN Yes, we both agree that a sloganized Wittgenstein is to be avoided. But I think we might disagree on who has one. Glen's ideas, for example, were clearly only partial. He just stuffed what he understood and liked about Wittgenstein into other packages he liked more (e.g., Skinner and Behaviorism). One wants to say: he bent Wittgenstein. Were he able to actually discuss the matter, we would gladly have him here to exchange it with us. Tell me, do you want to discuss it? Because, right now, it isn't doing any good in its present form (a telephone dropping). If you actually want to devote some intellectual time to this, maybe open it up as a separate thread and indicate what you think are the common pitfalls in understanding meaning as use. We would need substance here, not the a.m. radio version. We need people who can actually take the other person's idea and come to understand it. My sense is that what might come out is something half-blooded or directed toward some other idea. E.g., The "meaning-is-the-standard-use" Wittgenstein. Or, "no-counter-examples-allowed-if-you-take-common-fences down" Wittgenstein. Or, in Glen's case, the reification-branch Wittgenstein who was a doctrinal behaviorist who would never allow anyone to to talk about brains or minds, and who thought that if you were not using ordinary sense, you had an "anything goes" approach that was supportive of nonsense or chaos. My sense is that many of these ideas have Russell and abandoned-verificationist ideas hiding in the closet, and are a little too friendly to methods of logic and science when applied to statements. You know, I posted all sorts of Wittgenstein quotes the other day in support of my position, and this is what I get in return? I know this: I am no longer discussing in here with people who can't do it (usually for failings of character). You and I have yet to reach that point. Tell you what: why not open a thread about Wittgenstein and behaviorism between you and I? I bet we could have a civil discussion that advanced the ball. You do agree that the point is to advance the ball, right? You know I usually like talking with you because there is substance in the offering. You can catch an idea and throw it back. Virtually no one else can really do that. Why not open up some genuine threads in the future that get into meaning as use or behaviorism? (I'd like to have good stuff going to and from on that). Regards and thanks Dr. Sean Wilson, Esq. Assistant Professor Wright State University Personal Website: http://seanwilson.org SSRN papers: http://ssrn.com/author=596860 Discussion Group: http://seanwilson.org/wittgenstein.discussion.html ========================================= Need Something? Check here: http://ludwig.squarespace.com/wittrslinks/