... yes: "knowledge is true, justified belief. It has these three properties. If, therefore, one element is missing, you don't have knowledge."

(Notice that this is exactly what lawyers do).

And when a conundrum can be invented, you search for a better law to account for the matter and defend it with the ritual of proof. In a Wittgensteinian universe, this is not only a language fallacy, but it's not philosophy properly conceived. It's premised upon a confusion.

Wittgenstein, therefore, would not offer a theory of knowledge as such, he would offer what I had called an end-theory, or what might be called "an account," because the behavior involved in doing the latter is not the same as the behavior involved in doing the former.

The key is not the word that you use. You may call either a "theory." The key is that you understand that in one method there is behavior-ritual X and in another there is behavioral-intervention Y. The things that are king in Y have family resemblance to X, because the grammar of "theory" is about kingship. (Or perhaps we should say "answership"). But that doesn't make X's candidates for Kingship (answers) the same as Y's. It only makes them cousins.

I like the new language game I invented: the "end-theory." That's really what it is.

--- In WittrsAMR@yahoogroups.com, "BruceD" <wittrsamr@...> wrote:
>
>
> Could you offer an example of a "law" in philosophy which W would find
> inappropriate and why he would?
>

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Sean,

I really wonder about this example of a theory.

> ... yes: "knowledge is true,
> justified belief. It has these three properties. If,
> therefore, one element is missing, you don't have
> knowledge."

That's not a theory. It's a definition. Definitions are a formal way of presenting certain kinds of grammatical remarks, albeit not the only way and often not the most helpful way. They can be misleading and they can obscure the variety of ways in which a word may be used.

The way the definition is phrased may suggest reification - that we are, in presenting the definition, discovering "properties" of this "thing" called knowledge. But that misleading way of speaking is fine so long as we recognize it as such and it doesn't lead us into muddles.

> (Notice that this is exactly what lawyers do).
>

...and do you suppose that Wittgenstein would have thought that legal practice needed to be corrected by philosophy?

> And when a conundrum can be invented, you search for a
> better law to account for the matter and defend it with the
> ritual of proof.

If a definition can be shown not to account for existing usage, you revise the definition. That's a perfectly reasonable procedure and it is only philosophically problematic if one supposes one is "discovering" some "deep" fact about the term under discussion. (Or if one supposes that a certain kind of definition must be available, if only we're clever enough. Or that such a definition is the only way to understand the use of a word.)

In a Wittgensteinian universe, this is not
> only a language fallacy,

A fallacy? What fallacy is that?

but it's not philosophy properly
> conceived. It's premised upon a confusion.

What confusion?

Note also: Wittgenstein clearly accepts something like "justified true belief" when he contrasts "knowledge" with "certainty".
JPDeMouy

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--- In Wittrs@yahoogroups.com, Sean Wilson <whoooo26505@...> wrote:
>
> (josh)
>
> ... read the subsequent mails (messages). The last two or three by me and J's response. Really, the matter is not committed to orthodoxy -- as virtually nothing ever is -- it belongs to understanding what he means.  

I see you doing and recommending therapy as a cure for theory, dissolving the word and the question.

You gave some quotes and comments about theory. Wittgenstein also talked about rules, laws, proofs, surveyability, and normativity. In some of these areas, dissolving the question was not an appropriate answer, and yet, perhaps there is a common approach, a Wittgensteinian grammar, to be seen. When the subject is science or mathematics, I know that you allow for different answers - but as I've said, for myself, I cannot see where you divide out questions of science from other questions.

The question at the top of this thread was yours
http://groups.yahoo.com/group/Wittrs/message/3483
and I thought it coming close to the real issues, but it was phrased almost entirely in negative terms:
"So Wittgenstein is against these rituals."

I still invite people to find the positive terms, rather than simply practicing the ritual of therapy. That's because I find much that is positive in Wittgenstein, and a steady practice of therapy merely numbing.

Josh

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JRS,

This wasn't addressed to me, though I was mentioned. I thought I'd chime in to respond, though I am increasingly thinking my answer might be quite different from Sean's on certain points.

> I see you doing and recommending therapy as a cure for
> theory, dissolving the word and the question.

You may have noticed that my take on the rejection of "theory" and "theses" is somewhat different. In many cases, our respective takes on how to avoid reading Wittgenstein as self-refuting would not make a difference in practice, but in one respect there is a big difference: telling someone who is not a Wittgensteinian (and doesn't want to be) that theorizing or theses have no place in philosophy is not a legitimate move by my lights. Particular theses and theories must be confronted and the impulse to theorize perhaps eventually dissipated.

Rules against theorizing are relevant only to those committed to doing Wittgensteinian philosophy (according to a particular account of what that means).

> You gave some quotes and comments about theory.
> Wittgenstein also talked about rules, laws, proofs,
> surveyability, and normativity. In some of these
> areas, dissolving the question was not an appropriate
> answer, and yet, perhaps there is a common approach, a
> Wittgensteinian grammar, to be seen.

The idea of "assembling reminders" and of a "perspicuous presentation" might suggest something like a "theory", though the reminders assembled may be nothing more than truisms which individually would certainly not deserve to be called "theses" or "theories". The important thing is not something that can be summarized in a theory but consists in "seeing connections" so we no longer feel that "(we) do not not (our) way about".

How far can we go in this? Does Hacker's approach, with the idea of "logical geography" go too far toward "theory" to still be Wittgensteinian? Reasonable interpreters could disagree, though I think it should be clear that a Kripke or Dummett could only be called "Wittgenstein-influenced" and certainly do engage in objectionable (by Wittgensteinian lights) theorizing.

> I still invite people to find the positive terms, rather
> than simply practicing the ritual of therapy. That's
> because I find much that is positive in Wittgenstein, and a
> steady practice of therapy merely numbing.

"Therapy" is one simile. "Surveyability" and its connections with finding our way about is another. Any simile can create only a partial picture and we have to be guided by Wittgenstein's practice if we are to understand him. And, dare I say it, by the "spirit" of his approach. To the extent that we may suppose that we have grasped such a thing.

JPDeMouy

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--- In Wittrs@yahoogroups.com, "J" <wittrsamr@...> wrote:
>
> You may have noticed that my take on the rejection of "theory" and "theses" is somewhat different. In many cases, our respective takes on how to avoid reading Wittgenstein as self-refuting would not make a difference in practice, but in one respect there is a big difference: telling someone who is not a Wittgensteinian (and doesn't want to be) that theorizing or theses have no place in philosophy is not a legitimate move by my lights. Particular theses and theories must be confronted and the impulse to theorize perhaps eventually dissipated.

Agree entirely.

And I now realize that my previous comments can be made more concise, by asking what is it that makes therapy non-theoretical?

> Rules against theorizing are relevant only to those committed to doing Wittgensteinian philosophy (according to a particular account of what that means).

Agreed.

> How far can we go in this? Does Hacker's approach, with the idea of "logical geography" go too far toward "theory" to still be Wittgensteinian?

Hacker does a marvelous job of presenting Wittgenstein, but when Hacker tries to "do" Wittgenstein - I find it much less marvelous.

> > I still invite people to find the positive terms, rather
> > than simply practicing the ritual of therapy. That's
> > because I find much that is positive in Wittgenstein, and a
> > steady practice of therapy merely numbing.
>
> "Therapy" is one simile. "Surveyability" and its connections with finding our way about is another. Any simile can create only a partial picture and we have to be guided by Wittgenstein's practice if we are to understand him. And, dare I say it, by the "spirit" of his approach. To the extent that we may suppose that we have grasped such a thing.

And, if one can find in Wittgenstein (only) a single spirit!

I see you joined as a member only recently, if you didn't read a lot of the earlier posts you may not know of my own hobbyhorse, my own concerns with Wittgenstein focusing on that matters in which he, historically and conceptually, intersects the work of Turing in particular and computation in general - the issues of computation having continued well after both W & T had passed on.

I find several spirits in Wittgenstein, multiple themes in the TLP period, and a different multiple in the PI period (which actually begins circa 1929). Many themes I see continued and developed by Turing, until they certainly chose different paths by the time of LFM in 1939. The "therapeutic" spirit probably became stronger over time, but I find it of little use to the topics of computation. Turing's 1950 CMAI paper and "the Turing Test" are actually an application of this therapeutic spirit, I believe, Turing states in that paper NOT that the test "shows the computer is intelligent" but that the observation dissolves the question of intelligence. That is well and good - as far as it goes. That aspect of the Turing Test, that it does NOT produce a constructive answer to what comprises intelligence, has proved very frustrating over the subsequent years! Dissolving the question did not make it go away.

Josh

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can we understand something which is meaningless, is meaningless "meaningless?

"a theory has no value" is a theory"

interesting "against laws?" it seems in the poker that Wittgenstein was trying to prove laws.

is the "end theory" a theory? it is only a theory which W disapproves of. Consider "the absoulute theory" no example can be given so no theory given but we have an "absolute theory" that impiles the property of an "end theory". isnt this more faithful to Wittgenstein and his thought
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--- In WittrsAMR@yahoogroups.com, "seanwilsonorg" <whoooo26505@...> wrote:
>
> ... yes: "knowledge is true, justified belief. It has these three properties. If, therefore, one element is missing, you don't have knowledge."nk you
>
> (Notice that this is exactly what lawyers do).
>

This is what SANKARA says.World created by knowledge is a myth.Truth is neither factual nor real.

thank you
sekhar

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Here's another diagram I've been sharing with the math teachers, looks
like something from LW's RFM in some ways:

This is from my debate with the aforementioned midwesterner.

http://www.flickr.com/photos/17157315@N00/4199404344/

What it aims to show is you might use a triangle to visualize A x B.
How is the meaning of "multiplication" affected?  The answers are the
same, i.e. 3 x 10 = 30.  But instead of a grid of 3 x 10 squares,
we're working against a grid of triangles and using those as our
units.

Likewise with tetrahedra.  A x B x C has a tetrahedral interpretation.

I think these are the kinds of grammatical shifts Wittgenstein would
have us investigate.  It's not like we offer any proofs that right
angles are the only way to go.  We do, however, use right angles to
peg our "dimension talk" of one, two, three dimensions (then more,
confusing people with talk of a "fourth orthogonal" etc., when doing
multi-dimensional polytopes).

What I endeavor to get across is that "4D" (as in four dimensional)
does *not* have one fixed meaning (note "meaning" -- why this is in a
Wittgenstein thread).

We have at least two different "namespaces" or "language games" in our
culture in which 4D has an established meaning:

3D + Time = 4D = world lines, Einstein's namespace (relativity etc.).

3D + 1D = 4D = tesseract, Coxeter's namespace (polytopes etc.)

Coxeter himself is clear these are two completely different lineages
(contexts) for 4D.  See pg. 119 of Regular Polytopes (I might quote it
later).

Then late in the 20th century came this additional namespace which I'd
call a philosophical namespace, which no one studies except for me and
a few people, despite all the honors and awards, applications,
international reputation of its principal author etc:

4D = tetrahedron, Fuller's namespace.

The latter is not starting with the premise that ordinary space is 3D,
as represented by three mutual perpendiculars identified as height,
width and depth respectively.  Fuller writes:

527.702 Geometers and "schooled" people speak of length, breadth,and
height as constituting a hierarchy of three independent dimensional
states -- "one-dimensional,""two-dimensional," and "three-dimensional"
-- which can be conjoined like building blocks. But length, breadth,
and height simply do not exist independently of one another nor
independently of all the inherent characteristics of all systems and
of all systems' inherent complex of interrelationships with Scenario
Universe.

Fuller is more like Wittgenstein in saying something like "imagine a
tribe that considered the tetrahedron to be its chief measure of
volume, as well as the signature shape of volume in general, the
minimum tent or representation of enclosure. When they say their
space is 4D, not 3D, they're putting distance between their culture
and our cube."

Implied in the above description is that our tribe is different (why
we have to "imagine" that other one): we worship the cube ("our
cube"), almost forget what a tetrahedron is half the time (a "three
sided pyramid" right?).

Tracing the meaning of "4D" is, I think, a fascinating exercise and
needs a lot more commentators as we seek to move forward, pass the
torch in a coherent way.

The art historian who has done some of the most research on this is
Linda Dalrymple Henderson, in this award-winning title:

The Fourth Dimension and Non-Euclidean Geometry in Modern Art
(Princeton University Press, 1983; new ed., MIT Press, 2009), by Dr.
Linda Dalrymple Henderson.

It's an area ripe for Wittgensteinian philosophy though, not just art history.

You have real world applications on the ground, i.e. people like me,
trying to introduce the elements of a new digital math curriculum.

You also have reason to bring up Remarks on the Foundations of
Mathematics and to go, from there, to the rest of the corpus (it all
hangs together pretty well, Tractatus included, for message if not
approach).

Say, I'm wondering to what extent Rich Text Formatting will come
through on Wittrsamr and echoing lists. I should probably stick with
plaintext, right?

Kirby
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Kirby,

> What it aims to show is you might use a triangle to
> visualize A x B.
> How is the meaning of "multiplication" affected? The
> answers are the
> same, i.e. 3 x 10 = 30. But instead of a grid of 3 x 10
> squares,
> we're working against a grid of triangles and using those
> as our
> units.

One contrast: with squares, we have recognizable groupings ("columns" and "rows") whose numbers correspond to the operations.

In a 13 x 17 rectangle, we can count 13 rows each having the same number of members - which we can see by correlating their members (seeing them aligned or drawing lines connecting them) or by counting. Or we can count 17 columns each having 13 members.

With triangles, the groupings are not of the same arrangement, so they are not obvious groupings at all nor are they obviously correlated.

The rectangular image does connect with more of how we count and calculate. Just getting the same answer may not be sufficient to our need.

JPDeMouy

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Kirby,

My last post was badly expressed.

Let's try this.

I see 81 pebbles arranged in a 9 x 9 array. (9 or some other number large enough that I cannot know their number by sight alone, as I obviously can with groups of around 5 or less)

It is obvious to me that each row forms a group of the same arrangement (pebbles in a line) and obvious because of this arrangement that the members of each row can be correlated with the members of every other row, because the rows line up with one another. Likewise, with columns.

I could also arrange the pebbles into a triangular "array". And having 9 pebbles along one edge and 9 along the other would demonstrate that there are 81 pebbles. I do not dispute this.

(But note the temptation to make a 4 x 4 triangular "array" having only 10 members rather than 16! Think of bowling pins, a tetractys. This obviously does not correspond to what we're meant to be doing here.)

But what is "grouping" here? And what is "correlation" here? It is not at all obvious to me how this should be done.

What we do with these pictures, not just counting and calculating and measuring but also grouping and correlating, are all tied up with our concept of multiplication.

I am not saying that one picture is "correct". Only making a contrast in the different ways the pictures can be used.

JPDeMouy

JPDeMouy

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... I'm not aware that it matters. Html may take out the footer.

SW

----- Original Message ----
From: kirby urner <kirby.urner@gmail.com>
To: wittrsamr@freelists.org
Sent: Sun, December 20, 2009 12:02:54 PM
Subject: [Wittrs] Re: [C] Re: help the math teachers?

Say, I'm wondering to what extent Rich Text Formatting will come
through on Wittrsamr and echoing lists. I should probably stick with
plaintext, right?

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--- In Wittrs@yahoogroups.com, J DeMouy <wittrsamr@...>

suggested some websites that look interesting. But at the risk of
appearing ungrateful, I've found that if two readers are in conflict
they will just move the conflict to the other text, that is to say
philosophical texts are anything but transparent. Notice how SWM and I
read Dehaene so differently

I know you are reluctant to enter our debate, I probably would be too,
if I wasn't already in it.

But I really need you to direct my reading of these sites.

thanks,

bruce

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--- In Wittrs@yahoogroups.com, "SWM" <SWMirsky@...> wrote:

> What can possibly make a difference? I have been wondering for a long
time what it takes to convince anyone of anything.

As I've suggested earlier, though I would love for you to change your
mind and credit me for getting you to see the light (The Henry Fonda
character in 12 Angry men), changing your mind is not on my agenda.
Changing my mind is. That is to say, I've found that you have forced me
to be clearer and clear, at least by my lights, and for that I'm
gratefu;.

> Sean has often suggested that debates like this are more about
allegiances

Yes. And we need to sharpen "allegiance to what?" Oversimplification:
You start with the physical and try so say how it yields mind, etc.,
while I start with the person making sense out of his world. I can't
wrap my mind around the proposition that the world I make sense of, in
part, that is, the physical, caused me to make sense. No way can I cause
you to change your mind.

> My debate with Bruce on the subject of consciousness comes down to
arguing about the best way
> to understand the referent of the term "consciousness", i.e., how we
use it to apply to what.

Agreed.
>
> I have made the point that there are a number of ways we can conceive
of consciousness, a number of things
> we can have in mind when we use the term. There is the idealist way,
the dualist way, the physicalist way.

And you know that I reject all of the them, including the mysterian. But
you are not clear about my arguments. Also, my view, Emergence, somehow
can't get a footing in your thought. You think that it is version of
mysterian. But it ain't. Because I'm not saying that there is something
we cannot know. I'm saying that the relationship between mind and brain
is not to be grasped in any sense of causal.

> it is merely to say that consciousness is explainable in physical
terms

Which you know I can't accept because every explanation of C is in
non-physical terms. But you hold to physical causation. Giving up the
rest. But I think. If my experience of the day was caused by my brain,
where am I in the process.

bruce

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9.4 Neural theories
Neural theories of consciousness come in many forms, though most in some
way concern the so called "neural correlates of consciousness"
or NCCs. Unless one is a dualist or other non-physicalist, more than
mere correlation is required;

(Yes, one must show causation. And how to do that?)

> An explanatory neural theory needs to explain why or how the relevant
correlations exist,

(Yes, how does one map the correlation. A C-fiber fires and some people
say "ouch", others nothing, and yet others start talking about a past
foot surgery.)

Such theories are diverse not only in the neural processes or properties
to which they appeal but also in the aspects of consciousness they take
as their respective explananda. Some are based on high-level systemic
features of the brain, but others focus on more specific physiological
or structural properties, with corresponding differences in their
intended explanatory targets.

(That seems to evade the issue of causation)

A sampling of recent neural theories might include models that appeal to
global integrated fields (Kinsbourne), binding through synchronous
oscillation (Singer 1999, Crick and Koch 1990), NMDA-mediated transient
neural assemblies...

(Wonderful neurological account, but does have to with mind. Do the
global-integrated fields "cause" consciousness (which sounds Dualistic)
are the GIF identical with. If identical, in what sense. The evening
star morning star are identical because they refer to the same object.)

Global fields or transient synchronous assemblies could underlie the
intentional unity of phenomenal consciousness.

("Underlie" means what? Do my hands underlie my piano playing? Wouldn't
it maker more sense to say that I use the GF when I'm in a intentional
frame of mind?)

Thus it is possible for multiple distinct neural theories to all be
true, with each contributing some partial understanding of the links
between conscious mentality in its diverse forms and the active brain at
its many levels of complex organization and structure.

(The "link" between brain and mind. That's the question.

bruce

>
> (The "link" between brain and mind. That's the question.
>
>
>
>
> bruce
>
Dear sir


Link between symbols is sound so also between brain and mind.With no air there is no sound.No sound there is no knowledge.Mind made of sound.

thank you
sekhar

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